My grandfather was a farmer near Lake Urmia in northwestern Iran. Once the largest in Iran, it is now a salt-ridden desert. When the water vanished, his fields dried up. Salt crept over his wheat farms, swallowing everything. He migrated to the city of Hamadan, hoping to find water, but instead, he lost it all—his land, his life, and the water he chased. He died—not right away, but slowly. We saw a man who fathered us get buried under the salt.While the world focuses on Iran’s nuclear program and political tensions, a quieter, deadlier crisis is unfolding: water scarcity. It is not simply caused by drought—but the result of decades of mismanagement, resource plundering, and neglect that have now brought Iran to the brink of a social and environmental catastrophe. From dried-up wetlands in Gavkhouni to the migration of millions to the north, water is not only an environmental issue but has become a fault line of ethnic and political division in the country and beyond. Mohammad Bazargan, Secretary of the Water and Environment Task Force in Iran’s Expediency Council, recently warned that the country is dangerously close to a full-blown water and soil crisis. His statement marks one of the strongest public acknowledgments by an official.If trends continue, by 2050, a large portion of Iran’s southern population may be forced to migrate northward in search of livable conditions—adding enormous pressure to already overstretched regions. Bazargan has warned that we could soon reach a point where “there won’t be enough room for people to sleep, let alone enough food to eat.”The shrinking of lake Urmia from 1984 to 2014. Wikimedia. Public DomainA looming catastropheIran’s water crisis is one of the most urgent yet least seriously addressed national issues. Despite mounting warnings and visible environmental consequences, attention to this looming catastrophe remains largely superficial—if not entirely absent. More dangerously, the worsening water situation carries the potential to inflame ethnic tensions and deepen existing social divides.The crisis stretches far beyond simple drought. From drying lakes and polluted rivers to environmental degradation, land subsidence, mass unemployment, and large-scale migration to northern regions, water mismanagement is silently reshaping Iran’s demographic and political landscape.What was once a sociological concern is now rapidly transforming into a socio-hydropolitical crisis — a term increasingly used to describe conflicts that stem from water scarcity.People migrating to northern provinces, abandoning their homes due to drought and water shortages, are becoming what experts call climate refugees. Some villages have experienced complete abandonment. This slow, creeping process of climate-induced migration has been unfolding for years—quietly, steadily—until it reached today’s critical threshold. Decision-makers have long neglected this form of migration, which, unlike sudden disasters, leaves deeper social and political impacts.More than a droughtAt the core of the problem is not just mismanagement, but a misguided philosophy of control. Although Iran has several laws on water management, such as the Law of Equitable Water Distribution and the Comprehensive Water Law, successive administrations have approached water not as a public resource, but as something to be dominated and owned. This top-down view has severely weakened Iran’s institutional capacity to implement sustainable solutions.According to Abbas Keshavarz, Iran has overdrawn its groundwater reserves by an estimated 150 to 350 billion cubic meters—a staggering depletion that places aquifers on the verge of collapse. This figure reflects the total amount of groundwater overuse in recent decades due to unsustainable extraction practices.People visit lake Urmia in 2016. Picture by Solmaz Daryani, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0In contrast, Mohammad Hossein Bazargan, Secretary of the Water and Environment Task Force of the Expediency Council, highlights that Iran has lost around 50 billion cubic meters of groundwater over the past 150 years—a number that refers specifically to irreversible losses, meaning water reserves that can no longer be naturally replenished.The difference in these figures stems from the type and timeframe of measurement: Keshavarz refers to the overall extraction, while Bazargan focuses on permanent depletion of non-renewable reserves. Regardless of the estimate, both warn that the situation is reaching a critical point. Water is no longer just an environmental issue—it is becoming a national fault line.While some, like Bazargan, may still refer to this crisis as a ‘drought,’ such terminology grossly oversimplifies the situation. The term evokes a temporary condition—a few dry years, less rainfall or snow, and the hope of a forthcoming ‘wet season.’ But this is no longer our reality.For earlier generations, water scarcity was local and seasonal. If a spring or river ran low, the cause was likely a lack of rainfall. But today, when major cities like Isfahan and Yazd face water shortages, the state implements inter-basin water transfer projects—redirecting water from wetter provinces like Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari to drier regions. As Issa Kalantari, former head of Iran’s Department of Environment, pointed out, the problem is not low inflow. During the Safavid era, Sheikh Baha’i calculated the flow of the Zayandeh Rud River at around 700 million cubic meters annually. Today, the same river sees a flow of 1.85 billion cubic meters—yet it is dry and excessive consumption prevents any water from reaching critical ecosystems. For instance, Gavkhouni, once a vibrant wetland, has suffered worse than even Lake Jazmourian, which still occasionally receives flood waters while Gavkhouni does not.Water wisdomKalantari warned in 2014 that Iran would only have 15 years of water left for agriculture if consumption remained unchecked. That leaves just four years from now. The core of the crisis, experts say, is clear: Iran’s rainfall has remained relatively consistent, but extraction from underground aquifers—waters that take centuries or millennia to replenish—has skyrocketed. People visit lake Urmia in 2011. Picture by Ninara, Flickr. CC BY 2.0This unchecked overuse lies at the heart of Iran’s water emergency. Keshavarz notes that oil wealth shifted Iran away from its ancient qanat systems—ingenious underground channels—toward a destructive reliance on deep wells, unraveling centuries of water wisdom.According to Iran’s former head of the Department of Environment, the country originally possessed around 500 billion cubic meters of fossil water—ancient underground reserves. However, 200 billion cubic meters of this freshwater have already been consumed, and the remaining 300 billion cubic meters are saline, rendering them unsuitable even for agriculture.While water scarcity has now reached nearly every corner of the country—including typically lush provinces like Gilan and Mazandaran—the crisis is not evenly distributed. The Iranian Central Plateau, located to the east of the Zagros Mountains and south of the Alborz range, faces the most critical conditions. Experts caution that these regions may eventually force entire populations to relocate.What’s striking, however, is the deafening silence from current environmental officials. In Iran, it is common for officials to only speak out after leaving office—whether by resignation, dismissal, or the end of their term. When in power, accountability and proactive responsibility are often absent. The water crisis deepens, but institutional responses continue to arrive too late.Mismanagement and policy failuresOne of the primary drivers of Iran’s worsening water crisis is the government’s policy of excessive groundwater extraction. According to Mostafa Fadaei-Fard, head of the Flood Evaluation Committee of Iran’s National Committee on Large Dams, over 37 million people in western and northern provinces may be forced to migrate due to the depletion of aquifers.Zayandeh River, Isfahan Province, Iran. Picture by Ninara. Flickr. CC BY 2.0Projects like the Koohrang water transfer channel have diverted massive volumes of water from river sources to the city of Isfahan, sustaining industrial and agricultural sectors in drought-stricken central Iran. However, the environmental and social costs of such policies are mounting. Keshavarz highlights how land reforms in the 1960s, combined with lax regulations, spurred a drilling frenzy. Today, Iran counts 660,000 legal wells and 360,000 illegal ones, bleeding its groundwater dry.Military-linked companies, particularly those affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have seized lands around Lake Urmia, engaging in high-water-consumption agriculture, notably watermelon farming. Producing one kilogram of watermelon consumes roughly 250 liters of water, yet the price of watermelon is relatively low at the expense of local communities facing severe water scarcity. This paradox has led many to claim that Iran now offers the cheapest water in the world.Household water consumption in Iran is estimated at 6–7 billion cubic meters annually. Of the 400 billion cubic meters of annual precipitation, 270 billion evaporates, leaving 130 billion, of which nearly 110 billion cubic meters is consumed. A staggering 70–90% of this is used in agriculture, yet Iran’s irrigation efficiency is only around 30% compared to neighbors like Turkey and Iraq, which have irrigation efficiencies above 50%, meaning up to 50 billion cubic meters of water is wasted every year. Urban water loss is also a critical concern: 25–30% of water is lost in city water networks due to leaks, outdated infrastructure, and poor management. By comparison, this figure is under 10% in the global north. In many Iranian cities, drinking water is still used to irrigate green spaces, whereas treated wastewater is commonly used for this purpose elsewhere. Meanwhile, industrial zones, including steel, petrochemical, tile, and ceramic factories in the central desert, consume massive volumes of water. For example, Mobarakeh Steel Company uses around 210 million cubic meters of water annually—nearly 40% of the total water used in the provinces of Yazd, Kerman, and Isfahan combined.The government’s dam-building spree has also exacerbated the crisis. Iran has entered the 21st century facing what experts call a “human-made drought” due to unsustainable practices. In 2012, Iran had 316 dams; by 2018, that number had surged to 647. In 2019, the government announced plans to construct 109 new dams within two years, many of them military-led or aimed at altering demographic patterns, and built without environmental assessments.This rapid dam construction has led to significant water loss. For instance, the Latyan Dam, one of Tehran’s five main drinking water sources with a capacity of 95 million cubic meters, currently holds only 9 million cubic meters. Water levels in other major dams such as those in Minab, Zayandeh-Rood, and Saveh have also dropped to critical lows.The dry Zayandeh River bed in Isfahan. Picture by Mostafameraji. Wikimedia Commons. CC0 1.0Groundwater levels in Tehran have fallen an average of 12 meters over the past two decades, causing land subsidence in urban areas. The policies pursued by both the current and previous administrations have pushed Iran toward an irreversible water disaster, one that intertwines environmental collapse with political and social instability.Migration, Somalia, and social tensionsBoth global and historical experiences show numerous examples of severe water scarcity leading to social and political crises. One of the most alarming cases is that of Somalia.Since the beginning of 2020 , approximately 1.3 million Somalis have been forced to migrate due to the water crisis. Considering Somalia’s population of 16 million, this means 8% of the entire nation has become internally displaced within a single year.Certainly, while it’s an oversimplification to attribute Somalia’s conflicts and state failure solely to water scarcity, it’s important to recognize that water-related challenges play a significant role in exacerbating existing vulnerabilities. For instance, the 2011 famine in Somalia, which led to the deaths of over 250,000 people, was primarily caused by severe drought conditions. This environmental crisis intensified existing political instability and conflict, highlighting how water scarcity can act as a catalyst in fragile contexts. Moreover, a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) emphasizes that environmental degradation, including water scarcity, contributes to conflict dynamics in Somalia by undermining livelihoods and fueling competition over scarce resources. Therefore, while water scarcity is not the root cause of Somalia’s complex challenges, it is a critical factor that, if overlooked, can hinder efforts toward peace and stabilityThe case of Somalia offers a warning. Could Iran follow the same path? A study by the Iranian Parliament’s Research Center indicates that 282 cities in Iran are currently facing high water stress. The same study reports that average rainfall has declined by 36% compared to the past 52-year average. In provinces like Hormozgan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Fars, Kerman, Razavi Khorasan, and South Khorasan, the reduction is even more dramatic—between 50% and 85%.Iran has now been confronting water scarcity for over two decades. According to the World Resources Institute, Iran ranks fourth globally among countries facing an extreme water crisis. The country is essentially on the brink of what experts call “Day Zero” — the moment when water reserves might entirely run out.Ethno-hydrological and climatic fault linesThe internal migration from arid to cooler, water-rich regions in Iran is intensifying existing social fractures. In a country characterized by diverse ethnic groups, water scarcity further inflames pre-existing tensions. Rather than uniting people in crisis, water is becoming a divisive force, fueling mistrust and resentment between regions and communities.One stark example is the Koohrang water transfer project, along with the Beheshtabad and Golab canals, which collectively transport nearly two billion cubic meters of water annually to Isfahan. For years, this transfer triggered protests from neighboring provinces inhabited largely by Lur communities, who accuse the Persian-majority Isfahan of “plundering” their water. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, in an attempt to appease protestors in Chaharmahal, Bakhtiari and Lorestan, villagers were granted unrestricted permission to drill wells. This unregulated access quickly depleted underground water reserves and worsened the crisis. Ahmadinejad famously dismissed Ministry of Energy restrictions as “bureaucratic nonsense,” encouraging anyone to dig wherever possible. Such populist policies, compounded by ill-informed parliamentary decisions, have deepened Iran’s water crisis.Ethnic fault lines are increasingly intertwined with water politics.The dry Zayandeh River bed in Isfahan. Picture by Mostafameraji. Wikimedia Commons. CC0 1.0In Khuzestan, a major Arab-populated province with rich water resources, the transfer of water from the Karun River—Iran’s largest—has sparked anger among Arab residents. They accuse the state of “Arab-cleansing” and favoring Lur populations in the region. The Koohrang-3 Tunnel project, which submerged several villages, triggered an influx of migrants into Khuzestan, exacerbating ethnic tensions. In northwest Iran, Lake Urmia—once the country’s largest lake—has nearly dried up. The region straddles East and West Azerbaijan, inhabited by Turks and Kurds. Despite numerous proposed solutions, the lake remains a source of inter-ethnic tension. The Zab River transfer project, designed to refill the lake, has sparked opposition among local Kurdish communities, who argue that their water is being diverted to Turkish-speaking regions at their expense. As demographic shifts intensify—Azerbaijanis migrating to Tehran and Kurds moving into Urmia—a new crisis of ethno-demographic imbalance looms.Other controversial megaprojects, such as transferring water from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf or from the Oman Sea to central provinces like Isfahan, have drawn harsh criticism from economists and environmentalists. Critics argue that these projects are unrealistic and ecologically destructive, benefiting only industrial interests in provinces like Isfahan, which already dominate Iran’s economic landscape. There is growing concern that these projects are driven not by necessity, but by powerful lobbying from industrial elites, at the expense of Baluchi and Arab communities in southern Iran.These ethnic, environmental, and economic pressures, coupled with poor governance, over-construction of dams, and inefficient water management, have pushed Iran toward an ecological and social catastrophe. Some experts argue that misguided self-sufficiency policies in agriculture have led to over-extraction of groundwater and irreversible land subsidence.The consequences are alarming: rapid rural-to-urban migration, population surges in northern provinces, and creeping demographic transformation. Yet, the government responds by securitizing the crisis, rather than addressing its root causes.Iran is also in water disputes with neighboring countries—such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. However, it is not just external challenges, but internal mismanagement and the weakness of the Islamic Republic’s governance model that are at the core of this crisis.Ethnic and identity-based tensions, exacerbated by crippling sanctions, state repression, and erosion of the middle class, are escalating. Water is Iran’s most urgent existential crisis. And if this reality continues to be ignored, the hydro-ethnic conflict may become the greatest threat to Iran’s territorial and social cohesion. Water is the blood of the earth, a shared vein running through us all—blue brothers and sisters, not bound by blood but by this liquid lifeline. Yet, like the parched earth, we too have cracked and splintered from its absence. Forced to romanticize our misery, we weep—for the waterless in Sudan and Somalia, for the salt-scattered people around Lake Urmia, for throats choked dry under the sun of injustice.The post The Countdown to Iran’s Day Zero: A Crisis of Water, Not War appeared first on Untold.