Countries: Myanmar, Bangladesh Source: International Crisis Group Please refer to the attached files. Armed groups in the Rohingya camps of southern Bangladesh have joined forces to battle the Arakan Army, the ethnic Rakhine group that has taken over much of the refugees’ home state in Myanmar. But fighting is more likely to hurt than help the Rohingya cause.What’s new? Since the Arakan Army’s seizure of much of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, Rohingya armed groups have paused their turf war in Bangladesh’s refugee camps and ramped up recruitment, using religious language to mobilise refugees to fight the Rakhine armed group. Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government has started engaging the Arakan Army.Why does it matter? A Rohingya insurgency against the Arakan Army is unlikely to succeed, but it would do grave damage to intercommunal relations in Myanmar. Rohingya in Rakhine State are likely to be caught between the armed groups, while prospects for the return of one million refugees living in Bangladesh would fade away.What should be done? Bangladesh should step up informal cross-border aid and trade with Rakhine State while curbing the influence of Rohingya armed groups in refugee camps. The Arakan Army should strive to govern for all communities in Rakhine, while foreign donors – where possible – should limit aid cuts affecting refugees.Executive SummaryThe Arakan Army’s defeat of the Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State has shifted Rohingya armed groups onto the front foot. After years of bloody infighting in Bangladesh’s refugee camps, these groups, which claim to represent the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine, agreed in November 2024 to work together to fight the Arakan Army, which draws support mainly from the state’s Buddhist majority. Since then, violence has fallen sharply in the refugee camps, while the groups have expanded recruitment. At the same time, the Bangladeshi government has started engaging tentatively with the Arakan Army, which controls all of Myanmar’s border with the country. Mounting attacks by Rohingya armed groups in Rakhine are not only likely to undermine these talks, but could also heighten anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar, damaging prospects for the repatriation of up to one million refugees. Bangladesh should curb the influence of Rohingya armed groups in the camps and step up dialogue with the Arakan Army, which for its part should take concrete steps to show it can govern in the interests of all communities.When the Arakan Army began pushing into northern Rakhine State in early 2024, the outnumbered Myanmar military sought to mobilise the Rohingya Muslim minority in the state to fight alongside it. The military forcibly recruited Rohingya men into militia units, worked with community leaders to attract volunteers and cut deals with Rohingya armed groups – a startling turnaround, given that these outfits had previously battled Myanmar’s authorities, ostensibly in defence of Rohingya rights. This mobilisation slowed the Arakan Army advance, but the military was unable to stave it off entirely. Many Rohingya opposed the decision to align with the Myanmar military. The Arakan Army’s rhetoric and alleged abuses of Rohingya in northern Rakhine, however, spurred a good number of refugees to view the ethnic armed group as a bigger threat than the military.Even before the fall of Maungdaw township in December 2024, which marked the Arakan Army’s complete takeover of northern Rakhine, Rohingya armed groups had begun repositioning themselves. They reached a “harmony” agreement in November and held a large “unity” rally in the refugee camps the following month, urging Rohingya attendees to join the fight to take back northern Rakhine by force. They enlisted religious leaders to legitimise their campaign, which they frame as a “jihad” against “non-believers”. Until recently, most refugees resented these groups, due to the violent tactics they had used. Nonetheless, strong negative sentiment toward the Arakan Army and fears that repatriation will remain elusive have made refugee camps more fertile recruiting grounds for the armed groups.Bangladeshi security agencies, which have long maintained relations with both Rohingya armed groups and the Arakan Army, have backed the “unity” campaign. While they insist that their intention is to reduce violence in the camps, they appear to be using Rohingya armed groups as a means of compelling the Arakan Army to take back refugees. Though it remains unclear whether they are providing material support to the groups, the involvement of these security bodies threatens prospects for nascent dialogue between the Bangladeshi government and the Arakan Army, which now controls all the areas from which Rohingya refugees fled in 2017.Rohingya armed groups ... have already started carrying out attacks on the Arakan Army in Rakhine State and are training fighters in camps along the border.Rohingya armed groups, meanwhile, have already started carrying out attacks on the Arakan Army in Rakhine State and are training fighters in camps along the border. Further intensification of this insurgency would cause great harm to all concerned – Rohingya civilians, the Arakan Army and Bangladesh. It would heighten the risk of further bloodshed between the Buddhist majority and Rohingya Muslim minority within Rakhine State, as well as increase the likelihood that more Rohingya will flee conflict across the border to Bangladesh. It would also make it more difficult for the Bangladeshi government to engage the Arakan Army, since the group believes that Dhaka is offering support to Rohingya armed groups. Given that the Arakan Army is now an inescapable interlocutor for any meaningful effort to repatriate the Rohingya living in Bangladesh, a breakdown in ties between it and the Bangladeshi government would represent a major setback to planning for the refugees’ return.Rohingya armed group attacks on the Arakan Army are also likely to shape the way the Rohingya are perceived in Myanmar and undermine their campaign to gain full rights, including citizenship, in the country. The Arakan Army has emerged as one of the junta’s most formidable opponents, boosting its appeal nationwide. Opposing it would put the Rohingya on the “wrong” side of the anti-military struggle in the eyes of many across Myanmar, damaging their prospects of gaining public acceptance, increasing the threat of persecution and undermining efforts at eventual reform of the country’s discriminatory citizenship law.Building trust among the three sides – the Arakan Army, the Rohingya and Bangladesh – will be crucial to averting a drift into further conflict. Bangladesh’s interim government should step up its dialogue with the Arakan Army as well as work to increase informal trade and humanitarian assistance to Rakhine State that could stabilise the border area by improving living conditions. Dhaka and its security agencies should also strive to contain the influence of Rohingya armed groups within the camps and create opportunities for civilian leadership to emerge. For its part, the Arakan Army should seek to demonstrate both to Bangladeshi authorities and Rohingya refugees that it can govern for all communities in Rakhine State and that it is willing to sit down in talks with the Rohingya minority to smooth over differences. With the U.S. axing much of its foreign aid, other international donors should minimise the impact on Bangladesh’s refugee camps in the knowledge that severe cuts will deepen the disillusionment and frustration among refugees that is already playing into the hands of the budding Rohingya insurgency.