On June 19, China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan had their first-ever trilateral meeting at the Foreign Office level hosted in Kunming, Yunnan. What might look like a sudden development is actually a steady culmination of geopolitical alignments of the past year.AdvertisementIt is no secret that the relationship between China and Pakistan is on a firm footing. For one, the recent India-Pakistan standoff has only hardened this relationship. It is also commonplace to argue that Bangladesh has been working with China on several aspects for a long time now. What has changed, then, to bring about this realignment? There are two key shifts since Bangladesh’s dramatic regime change in August last year that explain this. First, the weak link in the triangle, Bangladesh-Pakistan ties, is notably improving. Second, with the Delhi-Dhaka rift, Bangladesh is decisively inclined towards China.Bitter history and lingering issues notwithstanding, Bangladesh and Pakistan are in a convergence of convenience and opportunism. A meeting between Muhammad Yunus and Shehbaz Sharif in December 2024 initiated military and economic engagement. A high-level military delegation from Bangladesh held talks in Pakistan with the Chief of Army Staff, Asim Munir, in January. In February, the Bangladeshi Navy participated in Aman 2025 in Karachi after a gap of 12 years. In a historic first since 1971, the two states started direct trade from March 2025.Also Read | Bangladesh is drawing closer to Pakistan and China. What should India do?Bangladesh’s new regime is in search of partners in the region as it has firmly resolved to undo Hasina’s and the Awami League’s legacy of prioritising India in foreign relations. For Pakistan, it is an opportune moment to engage with Bangladesh on several fronts. Strategically, it balances and offsets India’s asymmetry in South Asia. It is not surprising that one of the notes in the first meeting between the heads of state was about reviving the SAARC. With Pakistan’s continuing economic woes, a new trade partner in Bangladesh is welcome too. Culturally, challenging the legacy of the 1971 War of Independence and the rise of Islamism can be the preface for an interesting period of relations between Dhaka and Islamabad.AdvertisementYunus made an economic outreach when he went to China in March. A total of nine economic and technical agreements were signed on diverse issues. With US investments drying up and Bangladesh deliberately looking beyond India, China becomes its best option to resolve its economic difficulties. Interestingly, engagements are not limited to state interactions alone. China has been hosting delegations from Bangladesh’s political parties and striving to develop people-to-people ties as well.Under the Hasina regime, China-Bangladesh ties had only grown, but with some tacit acknowledgement from India (seemingly lacking now). It was primarily about giving priority to India in major economic projects and making sure that India’s security concerns were addressed. Yunus, however, has now welcomed Chinese companies to the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP), while Hasina had preferred Indian involvement. Reportedly, Bangladesh and China are in talks to develop the Lalmonirhat Airbase, which is 135 kilometres away from the Siliguri Corridor. This is concerning as China’s assistance cannot rule out its presence and surveillance near India’s strategically vulnerable location.India’s unease was further aggravated when Yunus touched a raw nerve by showcasing the Northeast as almost like a landlocked captive market sandwiched between China and the sole guardian of the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh. In a sharp response, India curbed the import of ready-made garments from Bangladesh, a move intended to financially hurt Bangladesh and force it to acknowledge India’s security sensitivities.The main concern for India in this triad is China’s entry into its strategically crucial and vulnerable zones through an eastern front in Bangladesh. What options does India have? There is little to mend with Pakistan now that the hard lines are drawn. It is also a reality that China will attempt to intrude in South Asia and widen the chasm between India and other South Asian countries.most readThere aren’t many options for India other than to diplomatically engage and have a functional relationship with its regional counterparts for a stable neighbourhood. A punishing move, like India’s restrictions on Bangladeshi imports, is only likely to harm its interests. It will provoke an even stronger anti-India narrative and create a vacuum that will be capitalised on by China. India’s diplomacy has to pursue substantive gains amidst a neighbourhood where it is entangled in the identity politics of other states and an unforgiving asymmetric structure.The triad’s cooperation also highlights that the longstanding features of South Asian politics show remarkable consistency. The Bangladesh-Pakistan bonhomie shows that small states may unite over rifts and grievances with big states in the region. Despite India’s previously good relations with Bangladesh, Delhi always aligned itself with a particular regime and political party. India, therefore, is not merely an external player but is embedded in the corrosive domestic equations of the South Asian states. The lines between domestic and foreign policy remain blurred in the region. Finally, the smaller states will always be inclined to draw in an extra-regional balancer, here in the form of China, when rifts with the regional big power widen.The writer teaches at the Department of Political Science, St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata