When Donald Trump called Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator” for his failure to hold elections, it was a shocking moment. Even by the topsy-turvy standards of the current US administration, this looked like deliberate ignorance of the facts. Ukrainian law and the electoral code state that elections cannot be held while martial law is in place. That leaves aside the practical impossibility of ensuring fair, free and secure elections during war on the scale Russia is inflicting on Ukraine. In making this dangerous intervention, the US president was simply repeating a well-established trope of Russian propaganda. For some time, the Kremlin has been casting aspersions on the legitimacy of Zelensky. Vladimir Putin has been using this as a pretext to allow him to sidestep any direct contact with the (legitimately elected) Ukrainian president.It is not the first time that Russia has cited a concern for constitutional propriety in its Ukraine policy. The Kremlin condemned both the orange revolution of 2004 (which forced a rerun of a rigged presidential election) and the Euromaidan protests of 2013-14 (which chased out the Russia-friendly president Viktor Yanukovych) as cases of anti-constitutional mob rule ousting a legitimately elected leader.Russia’s defence of constitutional legitimacy has been selective and self-interested. For two decades, it has energetically – and often unconstitutionally – meddled in the political processes of Ukraine and other neighbouring states. Electoral outcomes are sacrosanct only when they confirm pro-Russian candidates in power. No matter if these results were secured by massive fraud and intimidation. Meanwhile, when Putin found his own constitution an inconvenience, he had it changed in a referendum which handed him the opportunity to retain power until 2036.Making things ‘legal’But there is more than pure cynicism to the Russian government’s embrace of constitutional rhetoric. This belief in the need for power to have a legal framework has a long tradition behind it. Russia imposed rapid-fire referendums in Crimea in 2014 and then in four regions of occupied Ukraine in 2022 in an attempt to give a legal basis to its military occupation of these territories. There were echoes of the shotgun plebiscites conducted in 1939-41 in eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the Baltic states. Almost immediately after it annexed these territories, the Soviet state forced the population into participating in the Stalinist version of democracy. These were votes with only one candidate on the ballot paper. The Soviet Union was desperately poor, its state apparatus was overstretched and underresourced – but money and personnel were found for these choreographed elections.The same logic applied in the Soviet Union “proper”. In 1918, at the very start of the civil war that followed the October revolution, the Bolsheviks adopted a constitution for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. This was amplified by a Soviet constitution in 1924 that established the elected Congress of Soviets as the supreme organ of state power (even if the Communist Party really pulled the strings). Just over a decade later, Stalin found it necessary to update the constitution. He wanted it reflect what he saw as the progress made towards socialism in the first two decades after the revolution. The result, after extensive if largely orchestrated public discussion, was the 1936 constitution. This, among other things, enshrined universal suffrage elections to a national representative body: the Supreme Soviet.This was not to be the end of the Soviet constitutional road. A generation later, in the early 1960s, the post-Stalin leadership felt the need to refresh and amplify the 1936 document. It took until 1977 for a new constitution finally to be agreed and adopted, but it was clear that this authoritarian state took “socialist legality” very seriously indeed. Constitutional law might have been considered malleable by the Communist party, but it was important for it to exist and to withstand challenge, whether from internal dissidents or from cold war adversaries.Why have a constitution?To understand the significance of constitutions and political institutions in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia, it’s worth considering what function constitutions actually perform. Western nations tend to think of them as documents setting out the relationship between different branches of government: executive, legislative, judicial. They contain some limitation on the powers of the executive. Certainly, this is how the US constitution – which is often seen as the archetype of a western state constitution – is most commonly viewed. Defining a new country: the US constitution. https://pixy.org/1262083/ But there has long been another way of viewing constitutions: as a symbol of the integrity and robustness of the state. As British historian Linda Colley has shown, between the mid-18th and the early 20th centuries, constitutions became perhaps the main currency of legitimacy for a nation state. To have a constitution was, above all, a way to stake a claim to exist in a dangerous world inhabited by predatory empires. For some of those empires, constitutions served as a way of holding together their own large and disparate territories. This tended to work by, for example, conceding a degree of representation to minority groups in the hope of preempting separatist movements. On close inspection, this was also true of the US constitution. It was a document designed to bring and hold the original 13 states together and establish the US as an international power.Constitutions and elections have always been as much about power, legitimacy and state integrity as about representation – democratic or otherwise – or limitations on government. For states that are not major powers, the legitimacy needs to be projected externally as much as internally. Ukraine now finds the legitimacy of its constitution under threat from both the dominant regional power – Russia – and the world power of the US. It falls on Europe – a region almost defined by its commitment to constitutional democracy – to articulate and defend an alternative vision. European leaders – and their electorates – need to act on the belief that democracy and sovereignty are not on separate tracks but belong together. Ukraine deserves to retain its free elections, but it also deserves a state.Stephen Lovell is currently at work on a project on the history of voting in the Russian Empire and USSR funded by a Major Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.