Countries: Israel, Lebanon, occupied Palestinian territory Source: International Crisis Group Please refer to the attached file. I.OverviewIn November 2024, a ceasefire ended fourteen months of hostilities between Hizbollah and Israel that the Shiite party-cum-militia had launched the preceding 8 October – one day after Hamas’s fateful attacks on Israel from Gaza. Yet the tensions sparked by the conflict in Lebanon remain. Israel dealt Hizbollah withering blows, emboldening the group’s adversaries in the Lebanese political system. Some are now bringing the long-running, contentious debate over disarming Hizbollah – a requirement of the ceasefire – back to the forefront. Meanwhile, most of the approximately one million Lebanese uprooted by the war have returned to their home districts, but tensions generated by the displacement could flare up again if the ceasefire collapses. Given Hizbollah’s residual strengths, Lebanon’s political leaders should work toward its disarmament through negotiation rather than confrontation. Outside actors should support ceasefire implementation, help bolster the Lebanese armed forces and steer clear of Lebanon’s domestic politics.In Lebanon, war-related frictions linger, despite the truce that ended fighting between Israel and Hizbollah. The ceasefire provided that, with the end of hostilities, the Lebanese army would work to ensure that Hizbollah no longer had military facilities and men under arms. Israel undertook to withdraw its remaining troops from southern Lebanon by late January. The deal created conditions that allowed many but not all of the people displaced from southern Lebanon to go home. Although the truce has held, it is fragile. Hizbollah and Israel have accused each other of violations throughout the last three months. In late January, Israel delayed its withdrawal past the deadline specified in the agreement. Its soldiers then fired upon Lebanese trying to re-enter areas still under occupation, killing dozens and wounding well over 100.But while the world’s attention focuses on whether the ceasefire will hold, the war has created several other consequential challenges for Lebanon. One set of issues concerns the tensions uncorked by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of mostly Shiite residents during the war. The truce alleviated, but did not eliminate, simmering hostility to these people among some non-Shiites – which will likely resurface should the truce collapse.Separately, the war has kicked off domestic debates over what role Hizbollah’s military wing will play in post-war Lebanon. At the war’s end, two opposing narratives have taken hold that prefigure protracted division among Lebanese politicians. On one side, Hizbollah has declared itself victorious, claiming that Israel accepted the ceasefire agreement because it had failed to destroy the movement, despite its huge technological advantages. On the other, Hizbollah’s opponents say the party-cum-militia recklessly cast Lebanon into a ruinous conflict before accepting onerous ceasefire terms when its military campaign became untenable. Calling themselves “sovereignists” – because they seek to reallocate power from Hizbollah to the state – they demand that the group honour the truce accord and surrender its weapons.Lebanon’s newly appointed executive must find a way to contain these tensions while carrying out the ceasefire agreement’s terms and much-needed reforms. In early 2025, Lebanese politicians elected a president, the army commander Joseph Aoun, and endorsed a new cabinet under Nawaf Salam, who was serving as president of the International Court of Justice. The appointments ended a double executive vacuum, stretching back to November 2022, during which the country had no president and only a caretaker government. Aoun pledged in his inauguration speech on 9 January that he will assert the state’s monopoly on bearing arms. Hizbollah grudgingly supported him after years of stonewalling, with Lebanese leaders facing intense international pressure to choose a president. Aoun also promised to make headway on tackling Lebanon’s crippling economic crisis, which has wracked public finances since October 2019.While many Lebanese greeted Aoun’s reform agenda enthusiastically, Hizbollah and its allies may not play along.While many Lebanese greeted Aoun’s reform agenda enthusiastically, Hizbollah and its allies may not play along. Hizbollah has occupied a unique space in Lebanon’s political and security landscape since the civil war (1975-1990), during which it emerged as a major part of armed resistance to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Since then, with Iran’s patronage, it has built up both military and political muscle inside Lebanon. After the drubbing the group took from Israel, its military strength is diminished, but many Lebanese still consider it a formidable fighting force, at least vis-à-vis its domestic rivals. Before the war, Hizbollah likely had up to 50,000 fighters (half of them reservists) and tens of thousands of short-range rockets. Plenty of both remain, even if Israel’s claims that it killed over 3,000 fighters and eliminated 80 per cent of the rocket stockpile are correct.On the political side, Hizbollah and its key ally, the Amal Movement, retain firm footholds in parliament and Salam’s new cabinet, despite having made striking concessions. Combined with Hizbollah’s residual military strength, the two parties thus have an array of tools for obstructing the political process, or even wielding veto power, under the country’s sectarian power-sharing system.For the most part, sovereignists acknowledge that, if push comes to shove, Hizbollah remains powerful enough to overmatch any coalition of domestic adversaries militarily. Nevertheless, they think the odds of armed confrontation are low. They see the party-cum-militia as hemmed in by its disastrous (if unacknowledged) loss to Israel and thus unlikely to resort to violence – lest it trigger a resumed war with Israel or jeopardise inflows of post-war reconstruction aid. With the group on the back foot, they view the current moment as an opportunity they might not have again to deny Hizbollah its privileged access to arms.But Hizbollah is unlikely to acquiesce to aggressive attempts aimed at forcing its disarmament. Even short of violence, Hizbollah could react in destabilising ways. When previously faced with perceived political strong-arming, Hizbollah has staged street protests – some of which turned ugly – and according to its opponents also resorted to assassinations. Right now, the group may not be at its most popular, given the war’s brutal toll on Lebanese Shiites in particular. But if it looks like other sectarian parties are pulling the rug out from under Hizbollah, Shiites may rally to the group’s side, increasing the risk of intercommunal violence. A major fight over Hizbollah’s future could also spark conflict among Shiites.As Lebanon’s new political leadership, Hizbollah and outside actors decide how to play their hands, the key will be to consolidate the truce, while moving cautiously with respect to those elements that relate to disarmament. While the ceasefire has largely held, both belligerents have allegedly violated its terms. It is not yet clear how the Trump administration, which has upended longstanding U.S. policy in other areas, will approach Lebanon. For the sake of all those with interests in regional security (including Israel and itself), the U.S. should continue supporting the army, notwithstanding slashes to foreign aid, and use its position as chair of a committee created to monitor the ceasefire to press both sides to fulfil their obligations. The mid-February news that Israel will retain strategic positions in southern Lebanon indefinitely will make that challenge all the greater.Lebanon’s political leaders should capitalise on the war’s end by probing to see if the war’s upheaval has created a margin for negotiation between the country’s political camps. A central objective will be convincing Hizbollah that disarmament need not amount to the party’s complete demise. That could be a long, slow path, but it has better odds of success than the alternatives. Finally, outside actors should bear in mind that if they join in efforts to box out Hizbollah, they risk shoring up its domestic support. The better way to build respect for the state and its institutions is to invest in the Lebanese army, which has suffered years of severe budget cuts amid the country’s financial collapse. In tandem, external partners can work with the new government to provide humanitarian relief and support reconstruction.