In late May, as New Delhi was preparing to host the Foreign Ministers of the US, Japan and Australia — comprising the Quad grouping of nations — Pakistan and China released a joint statement of their own.One section stood out: “The Chinese side reiterated that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is left over from history, and should be properly and peacefully resolved in accordance with the U.N. Charter, relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.”India’s Ministry of External Affairs responded to the assertion, with spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stating that India “categorically rejects unwarranted references” to the region, calling them “integral and inalienable parts of India.” “No other country has the locus standi to comment on the same,” he added.The MEA also criticised “the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects,” stating that some of them were in India’s sovereign territory and that it opposed “moves by other countries to reinforce or legitimise Pakistan’s illegal and forcible occupation.” While the criticisms are not entirely new, they are part of the larger story of India’s response to CPEC and deepening Chinese presence in South Asia. Here is what to know.The CPEC issueThe CPEC is a $65 billion flagship project between China and Pakistan under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Focusing on infrastructure development, it launched in 2015 and connects China’s Xinjiang region with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea. Through this project, a 3,000 km-long network of highways, railroads, and pipelines has been established.The recent joint statement confirmed plans to further develop the Gwadar Port and Karakoram Highway under the CPEC to expand trade. Another potential aim for China is to bypass the Strait of Malacca, a maritime chokepoint in Southeast Asia, to receive imports from West Asia. It can provide an alternative in case of a blockade or disruption, like the one unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz today.Story continues below this adAlso Read | Expert Explains | What the China-Pakistan peace plan for West Asia says about China’s stakes and global tradeHowever, the ground reality does not match these promises, with many CPEC projects incomplete or unable to spur significant economic growth. “The CPEC, which was touted as a game changer for Pakistan, is mired in Pakistan’s phenomenal scale of inefficiency and corruption,” Col Deepak Kumar (retd), former Chair of Excellence for Defence Services at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, told The Indian Express.With Pakistan aiming to deepen its ties with the US post-Operation Sindoor, CPEC may again fall on its list of priorities, he added.Why CPEC matters to IndiaBeyond the CPEC’s internal problems, Kumar said, “The biggest concern for India is the clear violation of sovereignty due to Pakistan’s illegal occupation of Kashmir, which is rightfully ours.”From the outset, India has officially opposed it on the grounds of sovereignty. For instance, the Karakoram Highway passes through Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Akshay Ranade, Director of the Dr Shripati Shashtri Research Institute of Social Sciences, told The Indian Express that the recent diplomatic exchange was “a signal” that India is willing to push back against China and Pakistan’s assertions, in their language.Story continues below this adFor the first time, the China-Pakistan joint statement also invited third parties “to participate in the development of CPEC”, potentially bringing in international investors. Ranade said that the presence of any other international entity here would strengthen Pakistan’s control over PoK.Explained | China This Week | China reveals Op Sindoor help to Pakistan, Trump-Xi meeting, and death to ‘corruption’Additionally, Gwadar Port’s revamp strengthens the theory that China is strengthening its “String of Pearls”, a network of ports and military facilities it has invested in across the Indian Ocean.The chain stretches from Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, through Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe in Myanmar, to the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. It is meant to create a dominant Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and surrounding waters.The Gwadar port also poses a distant but real naval threat. “A port that services Chinese merchant vessels today can also be used for naval vessels tomorrow”, said Col Kumar. It also sits just about 400 km from the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of India’s energy imports passes.So, how is India responding?Story continues below this adIndia’s most direct response has been supporting the development of the Chabahar port in Iran, which is located just 72 km from Gwadar. It gives India an anchor in the Arabian Sea and also direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan completely. India’s involvement with the port began in 2002, but assumed greater significance with BRI.The project MoU was signed in 2015 to develop the Shahid Beheshti Port at Chabahar. Answering a Rajya Sabha question in 2016, then Minister of State for External Affairs, Gen (DR) VK Sing (Retd), described it “as an alternative and reliable access route into Afghanistan utilizing India’s earlier investment in Zaranj-Delaram road built in Afghanistan, and also a reliable and more direct sea-road access route into the Central Asian Region.”More than a decade later, however, development remains slow-paced due to US sanctions on Iran. While the port remains functional and has had consignments shipped to and from India and Afghanistan, the recent waiver extension period for US sanctions ended in April, leaving its future uncertain. The war in West Asia has worsened its prospects. Moreover, the latest Union Budget has not allocated any funds to the port.Further north in the Arabian Sea is the port of Duqm in Oman. India secured access to it for military use and logistical support in 2018 and then renewed it in 2021, placing Indian naval assets directly opposite Gwadar. Ranade said that “With India attempting to deepen its presence in the Indian Ocean region and to counter China implicitly,” access to the port should be seen as part of attempts to expand its presence.Story continues below this adIn Sri Lanka, China sought to maintain a presence through the port of Hambantota, which was built with Chinese loans and leased to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017. However, in 2025, India and Sri Lanka signed a five-year defence cooperation MoU, reaffirming that Sri Lanka’s territory won’t be used in ways that threaten India’s security interests. Shortly after, India also acquired 51% stake in Colombo Dockyard through the government’s Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders.The government has also pushed for the Great Nicobar Island project, even as Opposition leaders and environmental activists have claimed lapses in the environmental impact assessment process and pointed to the region’s biodiversity and tribal groups. At the recent Quad meeting in New Delhi, too, the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) was launched for the Indian Ocean region.China has criticised the Quad, and the grouping has also struggled to gain momentum over the years, in part due to the divergent aims of its members. But in the face of aggressive Chinese posturing in the region, there is little doubt that, despite hurdles, countries are seeking to counter China.