5 min readOct 15, 2026 02:10 PM IST First published on: Oct 15, 2026 at 02:10 PM ISTThe imposition of emergency and governor’s rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) on October 11 is being presented by Islamabad primarily as a response to the deteriorating security situation and the provincial government’s failure to confront terrorism. However, beneath the narrative lies a much larger issue that will determine the fate of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), the province and the federal government itself. It is whether the PTI can mobilise effectively and survive without the machinery of the province versus whether the Centre can actually tame terrorism now that it has assumed control over KPK.The federal government has taken the most consequential step available to it short of direct military rule. Emergency has been imposed under Article 232 and governor’s rule under Article 234 of the Constitution. The move follows weeks of confrontation between Islamabad and the PTI government in KPK over a “Long March” to secure the release of its incarcerated leader, Imran Khan. Islamabad has justified the intervention by citing a sharp increase in terrorist attacks and what it describes as the provincial government’s “deliberate disengagement” from the fight against terrorism. The timing, however, is revealing. The gathering momentum of the PTI’s “Long March” to Islamabad provided the immediate political backdrop.AdvertisementAlso Read | View from Pakistan: Imran Khan’s ‘politically motivated’ convictions ahead of electionsKPK has been the PTI’s stronghold for 13 years. Its importance to the party has never been merely electoral. Control of the government provided the PTI with an administrative structure, political legitimacy, and, importantly, a territorial base from which to organise resistance to the federal government — and a lifeline for the imprisoned Imran Khan. The removal of that machinery, therefore, presents the party with its most serious organisational and political test.The PTI has demonstrated repeatedly that Imran Khan retains a substantial popular following. Yet, there is a distinction between possessing a large vote bank and being able to convert it into sustained street mobilisation. Thus, the PTI has had considerable difficulty in translating its support in Punjab into durable street power. Whether the KPK will prove different is now the critical question.The biggest handicap for the PTI has been that an insecure government (Read: The army) has choked off access to Imran Khan. Yet it was able to sustain itself by ruling KPK. Removing the government, therefore, removes the institutional scaffolding around which the PTI survived. The test for the PTI would, therefore, be whether it can continue to bring people onto the streets without the provincial government. If it can, it will demonstrate that its strength is genuine rather than administrative. If it cannot, the Centre will have succeeded in demonstrating that PTI’s political reach is considerably narrower once stripped of state power.AdvertisementBut this is only half the equation. The much harder test is for Islamabad.For years, Pakistan’s central problem in KPK has been the persistence and expansion of terrorism, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan. The federal government has now removed the principal political obstacle it says was preventing a more coherent counter-terrorism policy. The army has been authorised to deploy in aid of civil power, while the Centre will now exercise much greater administrative and security control, particularly in the terrorism-affected districts. This creates a simple but unforgiving yardstick for success.If terrorism declines, Islamabad will be able to argue that the resistance of the PTI government had indeed impeded the fight against militancy. If, however, terrorism continues unabated or increases, the Centre’s narrative will fall flat. The PTI would then be able to argue that the problem was never provincial governance in the first place. It will be interesting to see what kind of a muscular strategy the federal government adopts in the province.Any kinetic approach will carry risks. Terrorism in KPK is not simply a law-and-order problem. It is embedded in the geography of the border, the unresolved Durand Line issue, the situation in Afghanistan, tribal networks on both sides of the Durand Line and the continuing contest between Kabul and Islamabad. Military control of territory is one thing; eliminating the ecosystem that sustains militancy is quite another. Pakistan has tried it in the past and failed. That is why the Centre’s intervention will be judged by whether it can make the province safer.you may likeThere is also a larger federal question. KP is overwhelmingly Pashtun. Islamabad will, therefore, have to avoid allowing the political contest with the PTI to acquire an ethnic or provincial character. If Pashtun alienation deepens, it could be dangerous and invite comparisons with East Pakistan/Bangladesh.Islamabad has gambled big. In its anxiety to foil the PTI’s “Long March” that was gathering a lot of steam, it decided to use its constitutional power to get rid of the provincial government. If, however, the PTI can demonstrate that its power comes from the people and not merely from its control of provincial institutions, Islamabad would have lost the gamble. Equally, if Islamabad is not able to get a handle on the security situation, it would prove the PTI’s point, lay itself open to the charge of trampling provincial rights and also unleash the ethnic genie.The writer is an author, former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, and former Member, National Security Advisory Board. Views are personal