Amnesty International’s recent report alleging that India sent at least 2,596 shipments of military equipment and components to Israel since the outbreak of the Gaza war has generated understandable attention. Yet the revelations themselves should not come as much of a surprise. They do not mark a dramatic shift in India’s defence relationship with Israel so much as underscore the depth and maturity of a strategic partnership that has been steadily built over the past quarter century.The foundations of India’s defence relationship with Israel were laid during the 1999 Kargil War. At a time when New Delhi urgently required military supplies, notably mortar ammunition, and faced an international embargo, Israel emerged as one of the few countries willing to rapidly provide critical equipment, including ammunition, drones and precision-guided munitions. That experience established Israel as a reliable defence partner and accelerated a relationship that has expanded continuously ever since.AdvertisementFurther, unlike many Western suppliers, Israel has also demonstrated a willingness to transfer sophisticated military technologies to India. Over the past two decades, New Delhi has procured drones, missile defence systems, airborne early-warning platforms, surveillance equipment, precision-guided weapons and a wide range of ammunition from Israeli firms. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India has consistently ranked among the largest importers of Israeli defence exports and Israel is now India’s fourth-largest weapons supplier behind Russia, the US and France. The relationship has therefore been one of strategic complementarity rather than mere ideological alignment.Over the last decade, however, the partnership has evolved beyond a conventional buyer-seller arrangement. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, Israeli defence companies have increasingly established joint ventures and local manufacturing partnerships within India. The production of drones, electronics, missile systems and components has become embedded within India’s expanding defence industrial base. This localisation means that India’s role is no longer confined to importing Israeli systems but increasingly extends to manufacturing equipment and supplying components.It is precisely this evolution that gives the Amnesty report its significance. If the findings are accurate, they suggest that India has become more than just a customer; it has also emerged as a contributor to Israel’s defence supply chain during one of its most controversial military campaigns in recent history. At a time when Israel has faced mounting international criticism, legal scrutiny and growing pressure on defence exports from several traditional suppliers, India’s manufacturing capacity appears to have helped mitigate some of those supply chain constraints, particularly in such areas as drones and ammunition.AdvertisementAlso Read | Mehbooba Mufti writes: Images from across LoC underline that fear can never be the foundation of peaceThis development is fraught with important diplomatic implications. For years, India has sought to balance an increasingly close strategic partnership with Israel while maintaining its longstanding support for the Palestinian cause and its expanding economic and energy relationships with the Gulf states. That balancing act has become more difficult as the Gaza conflict intensified. While New Delhi has carefully calibrated its public diplomacy, reports of sustained military shipments inevitably invite greater scrutiny from partners across the Middle East and beyond. As India’s defence industry grows and its strategic partnerships deepen, New Delhi will increasingly find that military-industrial cooperation cannot be insulated from the geopolitical and diplomatic costs that accompany conflict.Given the complexity and depth of the Indo-Israeli relationship, which runs the gamut from agricultural technology to weapons production, it is unlikely that New Delhi will abruptly terminate its defence ties with Israel regardless of the revelations in the Amnesty International report. However, the disclosure is likely to have two important consequences: Internal and external.At a domestic level, elements within the Congress party who have been sceptical of the steady embrace of the Netanyahu government under Modi are likely to highlight these disclosures and try to embarrass the ruling party. Such an attempt, however, is unlikely to gain a great deal of traction in the current political milieu when most of India’s attentive public is focused on the student agitation in the wake of the exam paper leaks. A few groups and individuals within India’s civil society are likely to protest this burgeoning defence partnership, but it is unlikely that their remonstrations will have much impact on the current government’s choices.you may likeExternally, in the Arab world, it may draw some attention and lead to a few expressions of public displeasure. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that India’s key Arab partners were wholly unaware of India’s expanding defence and security links with Israel. More to the point, unlike decades ago during the Cold War, there is no unified Arab opinion toward Israel despite their periodic (and mostly cosmetic) denunciations of Israel’s handling of the Palestinian issue. A few Muslim nations, outside the Arab world, ranging from Turkey to Malaysia, may express diplomatic outrage but, once again, New Delhi is unlikely to change its policies because of such criticisms.These political considerations aside, the larger question of the ethics of participating in the joint production of weaponry with the current government in Israel may be deserving of debate. Its conduct of the war in Gaza has drawn widespread global disapprobation and has even attracted some criticism from within Israel. Accordingly, despite the carefully forged and multi-faceted partnership with Israel, New Delhi might want to reconsider its stance on this fraught subject.Blarel is Associate Professor of International Relations, Leiden University, and Ganguly, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution at Stanford University