In the face of an epidemic where a population behaviour both influences disease transmission and reacts to it, social processes can generate norms to support socially beneficial behaviour. Most mathematical models of coupled behaviour disease dynamics treat norms as pre-existing rather than explaining how they are maintained. Here, we investigate whether altruistic punishment can sustain a social distancing norm when individuals may defect, cooperate without punishing, or cooperate while paying a cost to punish defectors. We couple a transmission model to an imitation model for these three strategies. Disease prevalence affects behavioural payoffs, while the behavioural composition modifies transmission. We also compare this coupled system with a control where behavioural decisions respond to a fixed prevalence. We find a wide parameter regime corresponding to the establishment of an injunctive social norm in support of social distancing, where the punisher strategy is widespread. Persistence may occur through stable states where punishers or dominant. Disease behaviour feedback can also create oscillations (where the three strategies succeed one another in response to epidemic waves) or tipping points (sharp transitions between all-defector and cooperative states). These effects do not occur in the uncoupled model, although there are still broad parameter regimes where a social norm persists. Our findings show that costly peer punishment can support persistence of social norms that mitigate disease transmission. More broadly, endogenous epidemic feedback can qualitatively change the conditions under which cooperation and punishment are sustained, producing tipping points and long-term behavioural epidemiological cycles that fixed-payoff models cannot capture.