By Cubadebate Media Observatory – Sep 3, 2026An investigation published by the Cubadebate Media Observatory on August 24, 2026, reconstructed a web of business, communication, and political relationships that connects Argentinian businessman Fernando Cerimedo with Miami and Washington. Corporate records, lobbying files, consultants, ideologized media, and connections with figures in the US Republican ecosystem provide evidence for the identification of the infrastructure behind those connections.This second work examines the other end of the thread: what happened when the name Cerimedo emerged in the Latin American public conversation.It is worth reviewing who Fernando Cerimedo is. The Argentinian political consultant, communication entrepreneur, and digital strategist is the founder of the media outlet La Derecha Diario and an executive at the Numen consultancy. His involvement in the presidential campaigns of Javier Milei, Jair Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Paz, and Nasry Asfura, along with his connections to figures in the US MAGA ecosystem, made him one of the most visible operators of the new Latin American right.Various journalistic and judicial investigations have also found him to be associated with strategies of disinformation and manipulation of digital conversation. He is currently under preventive detention in Bolivia, charged with the attempted femicide of his ex-partner, lawyer Nadia Beller. Additionally, he is facing investigations for alleged illicit enrichment and suspected links to drug trafficking and concealment activities.The theoretical framework for analysis comes from the article by Olga Rosa González Martín and Hilda Saladrigas Medina: “The Cultural Military-Industrial Complex: Its Ramifications Between Imperialism and Cultural Absolutism,” published in 2026.The two researchers, who work at the Center for Hemispheric and United States Studies at the University of Havana, expand the classic concept of the military-industrial complex to incorporate its connections with the media, Hollywood, sports, video games, and social media. They develop the notion of cultural absolutism to describe a deeper phase than the mere export of cultural products: the homogenization of narratives and the colonization of the frameworks through which a society interprets reality.In the Cerimedo case, we apply this concept to digital political communication. The central thesis of this work is that a transnational network of consultants, technologies, media, and operators associated with the MAGA ecosystem adapts and amplifies political frameworks in Latin America that originated or were reinforced in the United States, presenting them as seemingly unique expressions of each national reality.When a discourse originating from the US culture war can appear as Argentinian in Argentina, as Brazilian in Brazil, as Honduran in Honduras, or as Bolivian in Bolivia—even though similar figures, technologies, symbols, and interpretive frameworks circulate in all these countries—we are no longer merely witnessing the export of an ideology. We are witnessing the construction of a transnational system of production of political sense that operates under the logic of cultural absolutism.The model ceases to be perceived as imported and is able to become naturalized as an autonomous expression of each national context. It is not limited to disseminating certain messages, but rather contributes to establishing the categories from which problems are identified, people are legitimized, and the alternatives considered possible are defined.Based on the Cerimedo case, the Cubadebate Media Observatory asks whether a relevant figure in this framework can be inserted into different national scenarios and be functionally reinterpreted in each political context. The data analyzed answers in the affirmative: Cerimedo appears incorporated into different narratives depending on the country.Methodology: what this database does and does not measurePosts from public Facebook pages mentioning Fernando Cerimedo or his company, Numen, were downloaded. After removing duplicates and summary rows generated by the platform, the database consisted of 5,286 unique posts, dated between January 1, 2022, and August 30, 2026. In total, they accumulated 4,716,893 actions—comments, reactions, and shares—and 38,956,924 video views up to the date of data extraction.In this universe, references to MAGA and its political and ideological repertoire associated with Cerimedo and Numen were also identified. For this purpose, reproducible groups of keywords were used, related to Donald Trump, MAGA, the confrontation between “freedom” and “communism,” allegations of electoral fraud, the rejection of the left, and other recurring themes in the US culture war.These categories may overlap and allow for the measurement of the presence of certain terms and associations, but they do not constitute an analysis of feelings, determine each publication’s political position, or prove ideological adherence. These elements are not the subject of this analysis.The country listed in the database is the one attributed by the provider to the page or property that published the content; it does not necessarily correspond to the location of its audience. In 286 publications, this field does not contain any information. Therefore, the database allows for the study of how mentions of Cerimedo and Numen relate to individuals, symbols, and interpretive frameworks of the MAGA ecosystem in different national contexts.Five years compressed into 13 daysThe first piece of evidence does not show a regular expansion, but rather an extraordinary concentration. Between 2022 and 2025, 690 publications appear; between January and June 2026, only 42; and between July and August, 4,554. Moreover, 4,545 publications—85.98% of the entire database—were posted between August 18 and August 30, 2026.Posts mentioning Cerimedo over time. Photo: Cubadebate. This behavior indicates a distinction between activity and visibility. For a good part of the period between 2022 and the first half of 2026, Cerimedo operated with relatively limited public exposure despite participating in campaigns, communication firms, and regional political networks. The scarcity of mentions does not mean he was inactive; rather, his work was primarily carried out behind candidates, digital media, consulting firms, and social media intervention devices.As shown by the Cubadebate Media Observatory’s previous research, while Cerimedo maintained such a low public profile, his business and communication infrastructure was operational. Numen, La Derecha Diario, their alliances with other consultants, and their connections with figures in the US MAGA ecosystem formed a network capable of providing political services, producing content, intervening in digital conversations, and transferring campaign methods among different countries. This was corroborated by Cerimedo’s own statements about the use of trolls and the creation of fake accounts, as well as subsequent complaints and investigations into possible bot farms. These pieces of evidence demonstrate the existence of an active machinery, although they do not automatically authorize us to attribute all its operations to a centralized direction from the United States.The spike recorded in July and, above all, in August 2026 coincides with Cerimedo’s arrest in Bolivia and the public accusations made against him. From that moment on, an operator who had worked with relative discretion became the subject of regional scrutiny. The conversation was no longer limited to the Bolivian judicial process; it began to retrospectively reconstruct his trajectory as a consultant, his relationship with Javier Milei, his actions in Brazil, and his connections with campaigns, companies, and political actors in Mexico, Chile, Honduras, and other countries.The event acted as a revealer. It did not suddenly create transnational connections, but rather made visible relationships that already existed, yet remained dispersed and were observed in a fragmented manner in each country. What might have seemed like a structure associated with Milei in Argentina, a device associated with Bolsonaro in Brazil, a consultancy integrated into national politics in Bolivia, and a specific electoral intervention in Honduras, began to be perceived as part of a broader regional framework.Therefore, it would be incorrect to present the curve as proof of a digital presence that has steadily grown since 2022. It shows something different: the distance between the quiet functioning of a political infrastructure and the moment when a critical event exposes its connections so that it is publicly recognized. The Bolivian judicial case heightened Cerimedo’s visibility, but it also allowed us to observe how the same network of consultants, media, technologies, and ideological frameworks had taken on different national expressions in Latin America.In this sense, the peak in mentions does not measure the network’s date of birth, but rather the moment of its public exposure. The machinery was operating before the regional public conversation could see it as a machinery.Transnational conversation with national accentsAccounts and pages attributed to Argentina published 2,264 pieces (42.83%); those from Bolivia, 1,480 (28.00%); Mexico, 402 (7.61%); Brazil, 243 (4.60%); Chile, 188 (3.56%); and Honduras, 128 (2.42%). The distribution does not measure the populations’ interest: it measures which pages included by the provider produced content.An important clarification: the country attributed to each publication corresponds to the page or property that produced the content, not necessarily to the location of its audience. The significant aspect is the narrative localization. Cerimedo is linked to Milei and La Derecha Diario in Argentina; to the judicial case and national politics in Bolivia; to statements about a potential electoral intervention and national political figures in Mexico; to post-2022 election fraud narratives in Brazil; to controversies over digital campaigns and “troll” accounts in Chile; and to the disputed 2025 election in Honduras.The word counts reinforce this plurality: “Bolivia” or “Rodrigo Paz” appear in 2,313 publications; “Milei,” “Argentina,” or “libertarian,” in 1,532; “Bolsonaro” or “Brazil,” in 411; fraud or election, in 327; Honduras and associated names, in 115; Trump or MAGA, in 63. A post can belong to multiple categories.Keywords used for searching texts related to Cerimedo. Photo: Cubadebate. From cultural imperialism to cultural absolutismThe decisive point is not that all publications repeat a US message. In fact, many question Cerimedo. The point is that a political repertoire born or reinforced in the US culture war—electoral fraud, anti-politics, populist leaders, activist media, polarization, trolls, “freedom” against “communism”—can be translated by local actors until it no longer seems imported. Hence, the thesis of cultural absolutism proves useful as an interpretative hypothesis.Foreign Policy called the movement of Latin American leaders seeking access and validation in the MAGA ecosystem through personal relations with Donald Trump “caudillo courtship“. The concept describes the highest center of legitimization. The Cerimedo case allows us to look at the intermediate level: consultants, digital firms, media, influencers, and operators who adapt the political frameworks of the transnational right-wing to national campaigns.Cubadebate’s previous investigation documented this infrastructure through corporate records, FARA files, and a Numen-Latin America Advisory Group memorandum. Journalistic sources have also reconstructed Cerimedo’s involvement in Milei’s digital strategy and the dissemination of unfounded claims about the Brazilian voting machines. In Brazil, authorities and observers found no evidence of fraud capable of invalidating the 2022 election. Therefore, separating that verification from political narratives is essential.The macrodata obtained from Facebook provide the missing layer: when the operator’s name becomes news, each country incorporates it into its own conflict. This localization is compatible with the thesis that cultural absolutism achieves greater effectiveness when it no longer needs to present itself as American.Comparison between cultural imperialism and cultural absolutism. Photo: Cubadebate. Here, one of the deepest traits of cultural absolutism appears: the system works better when it stops seeming imposed. As Olga Rosa González and Hilda Saladrigas point out, unlike classical cultural imperialism where the relationship between a producing center and a receiving periphery is relatively visible, here the periphery begins to reproduce, adapt, and legitimize the codes originating from the center on its own.The MAGA ecosystem offers numerous examples of this shift, as the Cerimedo case has so pedagogically shown. Latin American leaders incorporate MAGA’s symbols and categories. Some directly participate in US cultural debates, others seek recognition from figures in the MAGA political universe or turn their proximity to Donald Trump into internal political capital.A second audience also appears: certain actions carried out in Latin America are simultaneously directed at the national electorate and the political market of attention and legitimacy in Washington, Florida, and the MAGA ecosystem. Trump thus ceases to function solely as the president of the United States and, for certain sectors of the Latin American right, acquires an additional role as a transnational producer of political legitimacy.The Cerimedo case is particularly useful because it allows us to observe the infrastructure underlying this cultural circulation. Its analytical importance does not derive solely from its ideological positions, but from being at the intersection of electoral consulting, media, social media, data technologies, and transnational political relations.At Cambridge Analytica, Alexander Nix spoke about personality, behavior, and electoral persuasion. He promoted the company as an empire that used data to “change audience behavior.” Former employees called the techniques genuine “psychological warfare” operations. Cerimedo invoked narrative, data, emotional communication, algorithms, and the construction of common sense. Nix primarily formulated it from electoral behavioral engineering; Cerimedo integrated it into a long-term political strategy that he called a “permanent cultural battle.”Cerimedo’s documented relationship with Brad Parscale, his partner-in-crime and symbol of the technological dimension of the MAGA ecosystem, adds a crucial piece: it connects a Latin American operator with professional and technological capabilities directly sourced from Trump’s electoral ecosystem. In this way, a single network can transport not only narratives but also people, technologies, electoral knowledge, segmentation mechanisms, and power relations.This also introduces a significant difference compared to traditional propaganda. In the digital environment, it is not necessary for millions of people to receive exactly the same message. The process usually works in reverse: different audiences receive messages tailored to their national and local concerns, but those messages can lead them toward a common interpretive repertoire: freedom versus communism, people versus elite, patriots versus globalists, legitimate elections versus fraud, traditional values versus wokeness.Homogenization does not necessarily occur in the concrete content of the message but in the categories through which reality is interpreted.Beyond Cerimedo: The Pro-Israel Network Manipulating AI ChatbotsConclusionsThe Cerimedo case illuminates a transnational system of meaning production in which political access, electoral technology, ideologized media, and local translation coexist. The Facebook database that we have analyzed shows its public footprint: 5,286 posts, 635 pages, and circulation in at least 25 national categories with available data.The solid conclusion is twofold. First, the operator was intelligible simultaneously in various national arenas: he did not appear as an identical foreign agent everywhere, but as a piece of Argentinian, Bolivian, Mexican, Brazilian, Chilean, and Honduran narratives. Second, this narrative plasticity helps explain how a transnational repertoire can be localized.The conclusion that the data does not support would be more ambitious: that the 5,286 posts were coordinated, that the metrics equate to electoral influence, or that Facebook has a chain of command from Trump to each phone.Precisely because it avoids these assertions, the analysis reinforces González Martín’s and Saladrigas’ theoretical question: contemporary cultural power does not operate merely by telling us what to think; it also disputes the categories through which it becomes possible to think about politics.Cultural imperialism explains how ideas travel. Cultural absolutism, as shown in this work, helps explain how they cease to seem like imported ideas. (Diario Red)Translation: Orinoco TribuneOT/SC/SF