The Maharashtra government, through its Food Safety Commissioner Tukaram Mundhe, recently approached the Bombay High Court against the Central Health Ministry and the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), alleging that the central regulator has unlawfully set up a parallel enforcement system.The commissioner claimed this “usurped” the state body’s powers and prevented it from enforcing the Food Safety and Standards (FSS) Act, 2006, by restricting state authorities from entering or sampling from food business premises operating under a ‘Central License’.1. Does the dispute reflect a tension in the division of power over matters of monitoring food safety between the centre and states?2. To what extent does the constitutional distribution of legislative and administrative powers affect the autonomy of states?3. Does Parliament’s supremacy over the matters in the Concurrent List constrain the legislative autonomy of states?4. Does the existing constitutional arrangement adequately balance national regulatory uniformity and state-level accountability?Story continues below this adWhy is the FSS Act, 2006 at the heart of the dispute? As per the state government’s plea, the dispute emanates from the FSS Act, 2006. The plea stated that when Parliament enacted the law in 2006, consolidating legacy food laws, it established a clear division of administrative responsibilities between the Centre and the State.The state government contended that subordinate regulations under the Act curtailed the powers of state authorities and undermined the intent of the parent Act. It specifically objected to provisions concerning: * The designation of central licensing authorities. * The creation of additional administrative posts for central regulator. * The introduction of an online portal for central licensing and registration Food Safety Compliance System or FoSCoS.* The expansion of the jurisdiction of central authorities. * Restrictions on powers of state authorities. * The revision of turnover thresholds for central registration.But does Parliament enjoy exclusive authority to legislate on food safety and adulteration? Although the declaration of the Act states, “it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the food industry”, the legislation on the matter is not the exclusive authority of the Union legislature. Story continues below this adWho governs concurrent matters Food safety and adulteration fall in the Concurrent List (entry 18) in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, allowing both the Centre and States to regulate in the matter. Under Article 246 of the Constitution, Parliament and state legislatures have powers to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III). Parliament enjoys exclusive powers in making laws with respect to matters in the Union List (List I), while state legislatures ordinarily have exclusive powers in matters enumerated in the State List (List II), subject to constitutional restrictions. However, the legislative competence of the state is not absolute. There are exceptional circumstances, such as the proclamation of the emergency and national interests, that authorise Parliament to make laws on any matter in the State List under the Article 249 and 250. If the laws made by Parliament under these Articles are inconsistent with the provisions of state laws, the law made by Parliament prevails. In addition, Article 248 vests residuary powers of legislation in Parliament.Although both Union and state legislatures possess complementary powers to make laws with respect to matters in the Concurrent List, they do not enjoy equal legislative authority, especially when there are inconsistencies between their respective legislations. Article 254(1) provides that if any provision of a state law is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament with respect to any matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, the Parliamentary legislation shall prevail. Again, there are exceptions. Where a state law on matters mentioned in the Concurrent List is inconsistent with provisions of an existing or an earlier law made by Parliament, the law made by a state legislature shall prevail within the state if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and receives Presidential assent. Although this qualification introduces a degree of flexibility into the concurrent legislative arrangement, Parliament has the power to subsequently enact legislation to amend, vary or repeal the state law. Therefore, K C Wheare, while observing this flexibility, argues that the Indian constitution has a “quasi-federal structure”. Story continues below this adConstitutional provisions on centre-state administrative relation In essence, the boundaries between exclusive, concurrent, and conflicting domains of legislation reflect a balance sought to be achieved by the framers of the Constitution. But the allocation of legislative powers shows a tilt towards the Union. The quasi-federal constitutional structure creates a qualified hierarchy in the distribution of legislative powers. Does this centralisation of legislative standards prevent the federal distribution of administrative powers?The balance between national unity and regional autonomy warrants an appropriate distribution of administrative powers between the Union and state governments within the federal structure of the Constitution. The administrative relations between the centre and states are primarily governed under Articles 256-263, contained in Part XI (Chapter II) of the Constitution. However, the general scope of executive authority of the Union and state governments is specified in Article 73 and Article 162, respectively. Article 73 provides that the executive power of the Union government extends to matters with respect to which Parliament has the power to make laws, as well as to the exercise of jurisdiction arising from treaties or agreements. Similarly, Article 162 provides that the state executive power is extended to matters on which the state legislature makes laws. However, the executive authority of the state is subject to limitations imposed by the Parliamentary laws and the Constitution in concurrent matters. Limitations on state executive powerStates are constitutionally obliged to exercise their executive power in a manner that ensures compliance with laws made by Parliament. And the Constitution entrusts the Union Government to give directions to states necessary for the purpose. This is to ensure that a state’s exercise of the executive power does not impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union. Additionally, Article 257 specifies matters on which state executive power is restricted by the Union. Story continues below this adThe Union government is authorised to issue directions to states in specified matters, including the construction and maintenance of means of communication for national and military purposes and measures for the protection of railways within the state. If any state fails to comply with directions issued by the Union government, the President may consider, under Article 365, that the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Such a determination of the President may provide ground for the proclamation of President’s rule. The Constitution also provides for the mutual delegation of executive functions of the Union and states. The President, with the consent of the state government, can confer certain functions to states (Article 258) in matters on which the Union has executive power. Conversely, the Governor of a state, with the consent of the Union government, can confer executive function of a state to the Government of India (Article 258A). Together, these provisions provide for administrative cooperation. The President of India can establish an inter-state council, under Article 263, for better coordination of policy and action among states and the Union. It is clear that in some circumstances, the centralisation of legislative standards may result in the Union government limiting or overriding the administrative functions of state governments. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to interpret these provisions as the complete subordination of state executive power to the Union. Instead, the framers of the Constitution sought to reconcile state autonomy with the requirements of constitutional compliance and coordination on matters of national interests. Story continues below this adThe central question, however, is whether the federal structure adequately secures an appropriate balance between the executive powers of the Union and States in practice. Key areas of administrative tensionThe major areas of administrative tension between the Union and state governments include disputes between Governors and elected state governments, the dual accountability of All India Services, the allocation of grants and conditions on centrally-sponsored schemes, and concerns over excessive administrative control and directions issued by the Union government.Other sources of friction are the operation of central investigative agencies and conflict with state jurisdiction, dispute over the centre’s assessment of constitutional failure in states, and overlapping powers of central regulatory authorities and state departments. Such frictions have been a recurring feature in the Indian federal system since the commencement of the Constitution. Judicial interventions play a critical role in ensuring the federal balance in these spheres of conflict. The recent Tukaram Mundhe vs FSSAI case also reflects a broader friction between a state’s administrative autonomy and uniform standards of national regulation. While central regulatory arrangements can be justified on grounds of uniformity, coordination and ease of doing business, the importance of local knowledge, field expertise, and institutional capacity of states underlines the need to preserve meaningful regional autonomy.Story continues below this adCooperative federalism and accountability gapThe mismatch between the administrative responsibility of states and the administrative control of the centre creates an accountability gap. The state government officials are often directly responsible for the implementation of regulatory requirements and are immediately accountable to people in the field. However, key regulatory decisions are taken by the Union government. Hence, addressing the accountability gap is essential to resolving administrative friction. A clear statutory authority, meaningful consultation and consensus on changes in the regulatory framework, and an effective intergovernmental dispute-resolution mechanism can function as the fundamental pillars of cooperative federalism. Such a federal arrangement does not require abandoning the national level regulatory framework; rather, it should accompany meaningful state participation in decision-making and a clear and appropriate distribution of powers and responsibilities.Post read questions1. India’s federal structure is characterised by centralised legislative authority and constitutionally distributed executive responsibilities. Examine the implications of this arrangement for administrative federalism.2. Examine the major sources of administrative friction between the Union and State governments in India. Suggest measures to strengthen cooperative federalism.Story continues below this ad3. Does the Tukaram Mundhe vs FSSAI case highlight the tension between national regulatory uniformity and State administrative autonomy. Comment.4. Examine the constitutional implications of overlapping regulatory and enforcement powers between central authorities and State departments.5. Does the centralisation of regulatory authority necessarily improve administrative efficiency? Critically examine with reference to food safety governance in India. Discuss the role of cooperative federalism in resolving conflicts between central regulatory institutions and State governments.(Dileep P Chandran is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science in P M Government College, Chalakudy, Kerala.) Share your thoughts and ideas on UPSC Special articles with ashiya.parveen@indianexpress.com.Click Here to read the UPSC Essentials magazine for August 2026. 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