As questions grow over Uganda’s political future, President Museveni’s younger brother is promoting a new national settlement to overcome decades of division. But opposition leaders suspect the initiative could be another attempt to manage the country’s succession from within the ruling establishment. Gen Salim Saleh has spent much of his political life helping his elder brother, President Yoweri Museveni, consolidate power. Now, as Uganda confronts the increasingly sensitive question of what happens when Museveni eventually leaves office, Saleh is emerging publicly with an ambitious proposal for the country’s political future. At the heart of his initiative is a 128-page document advocating a new national agreement to address political exclusion, regional inequality, sectarianism and the unresolved grievances that have shaped Uganda’s politics for decades. The proposal, co-authored with Prof. Ogenga Otunnu, calls for a fundamental departure from the secretive political bargains that have historically brought rival elites into government. Instead, it proposes a transparent national dialogue involving political parties, civil society, religious and cultural leaders, and ordinary citizens. But the timing has raised questions about Saleh’s intentions. Less than six months into Museveni’s ninth presidential term, four sources familiar with developments within the ruling establishment say disagreements are emerging over who should succeed him and how to manage the transition. Some of those disagreements, the sources claim, concern Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the Chief of Defence Forces and Museveni’s son, who has publicly expressed presidential ambitions for 2031. “There are some who support him and others who are scared of his presidency…” one source, granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter, said. Another source suggested that Saleh’s increasingly visible political activities should be understood against this background. These accounts, however, do not establish that Saleh is positioning himself as an alternative successor or that Museveni has endorsed a competing succession plan. SALEH ENTERS THE BESIGYE QUESTION Saleh’s growing public involvement became particularly evident when he acknowledged efforts to mediate between the government and imprisoned opposition politician Dr Kizza Besigye. Besigye has been detained since November 2024 on treason and misprision of treason charges. Speaking to NRM parliamentary committee chairpersons at his base in Kapeeka, Nakaseke district, Saleh said he had intervened to secure Besigye’s transfer from Luzira Prison Hospital to the Joint Clinical Research Centre at Lubowa for improved medical care. Besigye’s health had become a matter of public concern following his reported collapse in court on August 29 during a protest over what he considered violations of his right to a fair trial. “By the time I went to the hospital [Luzira prison], I found my friend almost dead. My first action was to take him out of prison to a proper medical centre. The bed he is now being attended to is the same bed I would be in if I were in intensive care,” Saleh told the MPs. Saleh said Muhoozi had invited him through a social media post to become involved in Besigye’s situation. His intervention is politically significant because Besigye, once Museveni’s personal physician and political ally, has become one of the president’s most prominent opponents. Whether Saleh’s involvement represents a humanitarian intervention, an attempt at political reconciliation, or part of a broader initiative remains unclear. His recent public statements make it clear that Saleh wants political leaders to begin confronting the divisions that could outlive Museveni’s presidency. A DIFFERENT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT The document, titled Consociational Democracy Agreement: Addressing the Root Causes and Consequences of Sectarianism, Exclusion, Marginalization and Conflicts in Uganda, presents a wide-ranging critique of Uganda’s political and economic system. Consociational democracy generally refers to arrangements through which competing political or social groups share power and seek consensus rather than allowing one group to dominate. Saleh and Otunnu argue that Uganda needs a political settlement that can address the grievances that continue to divide communities and influence elections. Their analysis points to regional voting patterns, economic exclusion, inequality and the failure of education to deliver equal opportunities. The document observes that Museveni won elections across most regions between 2006 and 2026, with exceptions in northern Uganda in 2006 and central Uganda in 2021 and 2026. Although it acknowledges that voting behaviour is complex, it suggests that regional and sectarian divisions remain politically important. More strikingly, the authors question whether Uganda’s education system, traditionally presented as a route out of poverty, is instead reinforcing existing inequalities. They identify household income, geographical disparities, commercialization of education, inadequate public investment, corruption and weaknesses in public schools as factors preventing education from becoming a genuine equalizer. This argument goes beyond electoral politics for ordinary Ugandans. It raises questions about why children from wealthy families often enjoy better educational opportunities, why some regions remain economically disadvantaged and why public services have failed to narrow the gap between privileged and marginalized communities. The document acknowledges Museveni’s previous reconciliation efforts but argues that they have largely concentrated on agreements between political elites. Such arrangements, it suggests, have often failed to address the grievances of the communities those leaders claim to represent. “The failure to share the details of the cooperation and the inability of the elite cooperation to bring on board the constituencies they claim to represent poses significant risks to democratic governance, public trust, transparency, accountability, scrutiny necessary for functioning political parties and democracy, and the ‘social contract’ between the political elites and members of the respective political parties and the larger body of citizenry and their representatives,” the document states. This criticism matters because elite political accommodation has been a recurring feature of Uganda’s political history. The authors argue that reconciliation cannot succeed merely by offering political positions to influential individuals while leaving underlying grievances unresolved. NO MORE SECRET POLITICAL BARGAINS Perhaps the document’s most consequential proposal is that any future political settlement must be written, publicly accessible and subject to scrutiny. “A successful Consociational Democracy Agreement must also accomplish what other previous efforts could not. First, the Agreement must be a written, public document, not a backroom arrangement,” the authors state. They argue that opaque agreements have weakened public trust, undermined political parties and damaged accountability between leaders and citizens. The proposed agreement would therefore extend beyond negotiations among prominent politicians. It would involve communities affected by land disputes, regional economic inequalities, unemployment, inadequate services and political exclusion. The authors also caution against creating permanent political divisions through rigid ethnic or regional quotas. Instead, they propose reforms intended to reduce the influence of sectarian identities in national politics. Electoral credibility, institutional independence and limits on the influence of money in elections are identified as essential foundations for rebuilding public confidence. The document also recommends integrating the proposed agreement into government policies, budgets, and institutional programmes, with participation from Parliament, political parties, religious institutions, development partners, and civil society organizations. This would require more than a political declaration. It would demand measurable changes in how government distributes resources, delivers services and responds to citizens’ grievances. Saleh urged the NRM legislators he addressed to study the proposals carefully. “We are carefully examining what needs to be done for you people of 35,45,55, so that you don’t inherit our generational quarrels; that’s what we are trying very hard, and I hope God will help us achieve that,” he said. His remarks suggest a concern that Uganda’s younger political generation could inherit unresolved conflicts from the leaders who have dominated national politics for decades. OPPOSITION QUESTIONS SALEH’S INTENTIONS Some opposition leaders, however, say the initiative raises an uncomfortable question: can a political establishment that has dominated Uganda for four decades credibly lead its own reform? A senior National Unity Platform (NUP) official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the party supports genuine national dialogue in principle but remains suspicious of Museveni’s intentions. “I have told you many times that in principle, I have no problem having national dialogue on the Uganda we want. But many times, Museveni is not interested in talks but just wants to co-opt you as he has done to Norbert Mao,” the official said. The official acknowledged another difficulty: persuading opposition supporters, many of whom feel politically marginalized, that dialogue would not amount to surrender. “Obviously we lead a group that has been emasculated; they will interpret any effort at dialogue as betrayal,” the official added. Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda, secretary general of the People’s Front for Freedom (PFF), was more skeptical. Speaking by telephone from exile, Ssemujju suggested that Saleh’s initiative could be an attempt to test alternative arrangements for managing Uganda’s political future.The post Salim Saleh’s post-Museveni game plan appeared first on The Observer Media Ltd.