《纽约时报》2026年9月3日周一，特朗普在椭圆形办公室。 Doug Mills/The New York TimesIf you want to understand the moment we’re in, you have to understand Donald Trump. That’s easier said than done; Trump thrives on drama — ideally in ALL CAPS on Truth Social — and prides himself on being unpredictable (although some would argue it’s all part of a strategy).要理解当下，必须理解唐纳德·特朗普。这说起来容易做起来难。特朗普热衷于制造戏剧性事件，最好是在Truth Social上用全大写字母发文。他对自己的行事不可预测感到自豪，尽管有人认为这都是其策略的一部分。The flood of missives and missiles, of hyperbolic threats (“a whole civilization will die tonight”) and morphing deadlines coming out of the White House can seem surreal. But two of my colleagues have written a book full of riveting, granular detail that makes it feel, well, very real.白宫发出的信息与行动似乎极不真实。这其中包括如潮水般的信件与导弹指令、夸张的威胁（例如“今晚一整个文明将走向消亡”），以及不断变动的最后期限。但我的两位同事撰写的一本新书用引人入胜、事无巨细的详尽叙述让这一切感觉非常真实。In “Regime Change,” Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan take you into the room for the key moments of the president’s second term. I spoke to Jonathan about some of them.在《政权更迭》(Regime Change)一书中，玛吉·哈伯曼与乔纳森·斯旺带领读者深入现场，回顾总统第二任期内的关键时刻。我就其中部分时刻与乔纳森进行了对话。Trump’s world特朗普的世界Jonathan, let’s start with Iran. A lot of people were baffled by Trump’s decision to go to war. What swayed him? Was it Iran’s plots to kill him? His success in Venezuela? Israel’s war pitch?乔纳森，我们先谈谈伊朗。许多人对特朗普决定开战感到困惑。是什么影响了他？是伊朗刺杀他的阴谋吗？是他在委内瑞拉取得的成功？还是以色列对战争的游说？It was all those things. But also, Trump has always been hawkish about Iran.以上因素兼而有之。但同时，特朗普对伊朗一直持鹰派立场。In Term 1, he pulls out of the Iran nuclear deal. He orders the assassination of this very senior Iranian general, Qassim Suleimani. Then, when he’s out of office, he learns that the Iranian regime is trying to get hit men to kill him. Iran hacks the emails of his campaign manager. So, for Trump, this is also personal.在第一任期内，他退出了伊朗核协议。他下令暗杀了地位极高的伊朗将领卡西姆·苏莱曼尼。随后在卸任期间，他得知伊朗政权正企图雇佣杀手刺杀他。伊朗还黑入其竞选经理的电子邮箱。因此，对特朗普而言，这也是私人恩怨。How important was that meeting in February you guys describe in such incredible detail, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu persuaded Trump to actually go to war?今年2月，本雅明·内塔尼亚胡总理说服特朗普对伊发动真正意义上的战争。你们在书中极为详尽地描述了那次会议。那次会议有多重要？It was very important. I’m not aware of any historical parallel for a foreign leader going down to the White House Situation Room and pitching the American president on going to war.极其重要。据我所知，历史上还没有哪位外国领导人走进白宫战情室向美国总统推销战争的先例。去年12月，马阿拉歌的一场会面。 Tierney L. Cross/The New York TimesThat war hasn’t gone to plan. How has that affected the Trump-Netanyahu relationship?目前的战局并未按计划发展。这对特朗普与内塔尼亚胡的关系有何影响？It was always a very up-and-down, fraught relationship. Trump views Netanyahu as a strong leader but also as someone who needs to be restrained. A couple of months ago Trump started to view Netanyahu as a problem — an obstacle to getting out of this war.双方关系一直起伏不定，充满摩擦。特朗普认为内塔尼亚胡是一位强势领导人，但也是一个需要加以约束的人。几个月前，特朗普开始将内塔尼亚胡视为一个麻烦。他认为他是美国从这场战争脱身的主要阻碍。He became very agitated about what Netanyahu was doing in Lebanon. And so the U.S. cut the Israelis out of their negotiations with Iran. Right now, it’s not a good relationship at all.特朗普对内塔尼亚胡在黎巴嫩的行动感到非常不安。因此，美国将以色列排除在美伊谈判之外。目前，两人的关系非常糟糕。You write that Netanyahu, President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin were all better prepared to deal with Trump during his second term than his first. How so?你在书中写道，在应对特朗普第二任期时，内塔尼亚胡、习近平以及弗拉基米尔·普京都比他第一任期时准备得更为充分。为什么这么说？Yes, and on that list, Xi Jinping might have been the best prepared.是的，而且在这份名单中，习近平可能准备得最充分。In April last year, when Trump essentially declares a trade war with the whole world, Xi Jinping doesn’t negotiate. He just raises tariffs himself and implements a whole bunch of restrictions on rare earths and magnets and things that the Americans need. He had this all lined up — he was fully prepared to wage economic supply chain war against the United States. And he won that skirmish.去年4月，特朗普实质上向全球宣告发起贸易战。当时习近平没有选择谈判，而是直接自行提高关税。他还对美国急需的稀土和磁铁等物资实施了一系列限制。他早已将这一切部署妥当。他完全做好了对美发动经济供应链战争的准备，并在这场交锋中取得了胜利。Trump sends his Treasury secretary to Geneva to negotiate an off-ramp with China. Which he does; the tariff rates go down. And ever since then, Trump has taken a very dovish posture with Beijing.特朗普随后派遣财政部长前往日内瓦，与中方谈判寻找退让方案。他的确退让了，关税税率随之下降。自那以后，特朗普对北京一直采取非常鸽派的姿态。Are there lessons for the rest of the world in this approach to dealing with Trump?这种应对特朗普的策略对世界其他地区有借鉴意义吗？There’s this whole conversation in the international diplomatic community: How do you deal with Trump? I’ve always thought that conversation is sort of absurd. The Europeans talk about this playbook — you flatter him, bring him gifts and what have you. That might get you something, for a day or two. But what Xi Jinping showed is the way to deal with Trump is through strength.国际外交界一直有这样一个讨论：应该如何与特朗普打交道？我一直觉得这种讨论有些荒唐。欧洲人谈论的套路是奉承他、给他送礼诸如此类。这或许能让你换来一两天的甜头。但习近平展现出的应对方式是通过实力。Trump really understands leverage. He likes picking off countries one at a time so he can use the leverage of the U.S. military and economy and technology to squeeze that other party. And China — unlike some of the struggling small and middle powers — had leverage to force Trump down, in a very effective way.特朗普非常懂得筹码的作用。他喜欢逐一针对各个国家，以便利用美国在军事、经济和技术上的筹码来挤压对方。但与一些苦苦挣扎的中小强国不同，中国拥有筹码，能以极为有效的方式迫使特朗普退让。5月，特朗普访问北京。 Kenny Holston/The New York TimesWhat does that mean for Trump’s commitment, say, to defend Taiwan?这对他诸如保卫台湾等承诺意味着什么？We have a scene in our book where he’s talking about Taiwan and he holds up a little teaspoon, basically, as a means of saying, Why would we fight over this little speck of land?书中记录了这样一个场景：他在谈论台湾时举起一把小茶匙。其用意基本是说，我们为什么要为了这么一点微不足道的土地而开战？He hasn’t formally changed U.S. policy on Taiwan, but I’m not aware of anyone around him who thinks that Donald Trump would use the American military to fight for Taiwan’s independence.他还没有正式改变美国对台政策，但他身边所有我认识的人中，没有人认为唐纳德·特朗普会动用美国军事力量为台湾独立而战。Does that suggest NATO is dead, too? If the Russians march into Estonia, would the U.S. intervene?这是否意味着北约也名存实亡？如果俄罗斯人攻入爱沙尼亚，美国会干预吗？At this point, you would have to be smoking something to think that Article 5, the mutual defense clause that is the bedrock of the alliance, is ironclad when it comes to Donald Trump. I wouldn’t want to predict one way or the other, but the notion that you could rely on him to defend a small nation against Russia is obviously questionable at best.事到如今，如果还有人认为，作为北约同盟基石的第五条款——也就是共同防御条款——在唐纳德·特朗普眼里不可动摇，那肯定是脑子有问题了。我不想预测结果如何，但指望他来保卫小国抵御俄罗斯，至少是一个令人起疑的想法。All this considered, how ideological is Trump, really?综上所述，特朗普究竟有多在乎意识形态？Trump has never viewed the world the way American presidents of the last 50 years have viewed it, in terms of a post-World War II order and an alliance of liberal democracies. He basically sees the world as a bunch of countries that owe America money.过去50年来的历任美国总统都是从二战后秩序以及自由民主同盟的角度看待世界，特朗普却从未如此看待世界。他基本上将世界视为一群欠美国钱的国家。At a sort of cellular level, he’s attracted to strongmen and has contempt for Europeans and multilateral institutions defending human rights and international law. But that doesn’t come from a deeply held consistent worldview. If there’s an ideology, it’s “Might makes right.”从某种本质层面上看，他被政治强人吸引。他对欧洲人以及捍卫人权和国际法的多边机构嗤之以鼻。但这并非源于某种根深蒂固且一以贯之的世界观。如果非要说他有什么意识形态，那就是“强权即公理”。This conversation has been condensed and edited for clarity.为求表达清晰，本对话经过了删减与编辑。本文节译自《纽约时报》全球新闻通讯The World。翻译：经雷