The invasive Mediterranean fanworm. spiderment/Getty ImagesAs Cabinet considers proposals to amalgamate regional authorities as part of its overhaul of local government, much of the discussion has focused on rate increases, roads and water infrastructure.Almost no one is asking how the reconfiguration will affect New Zealand’s biosecurity system.This matters because the current system already faces mounting pressures to protect landscapes, farms and coastlines from invasive pests and weeds.The gold clam invasion is just one recent example. While it was first discovered in the Waikato River in May 2023, it is believed to have been present for at least two to three years prior. As a result, by the time it was found, eradication was considered infeasible and it has now spread to Auckland and Taranaki.I argue local government reform offers a rare opportunity to prepare New Zealand’s biosecurity system for the next wave of pest and weed invasions. Growing threat from pests and weedsUnder the Biosecurity Act, regional councils and unitary authorities are responsible for post-border pest management, with each required to develop its own regional pest management plan. These statutory documents set out which pests are controlled, how landowners must act, and how programmes are funded. Implementing these regional pest management plans costs ratepayers upwards of NZ$142 million annually but has been shown to provide a strong economic return on investment. The system is far from perfect. Regionalisation has created a patchwork of inconsistent rules and enforcement. A species tightly controlled in one region may be left entirely unmanaged in the next. Fragmented databases and isolated reporting systems mean regional bodies often fail to spot spreading threats or coordinate effective responses against pests. As a result, pests have been known to expand from regions with lower biosecurity resourcing into neighbouring regions which then bear the cost.Making a fragmented biosecurity system worseMany reform proposals currently on the table would create smaller councils with limited environmental expertise. Most district councils have never managed biosecurity programmes, yet they could inherit responsibilities currently held by regional councils. This raises fundamental questions about who would manage pests that move across landscapes, how biosecurity responses would be coordinated across boundaries and where funding would come from.The impacts of pests and weeds fall disproportionately on rural communities, yet rural rating bases are small. Urban areas may have the financial capacity, but they often experience fewer direct impacts and may not support higher rates for problems they rarely see. Local government reform risks widening this gap. If biosecurity responsibilities are devolved to smaller units, many will simply not have the resources to act, leaving rural communities exposed and national environmental outcomes compromised.A federated biosecurity systemIn the face of increased fragmentation, it is tempting to consider a centralised biosecurity system run nationally from Wellington. But effective biosecurity is intensely local. Effective pest control depends on people who know not only the landscape but also the landowners, contractors and communities involved. A highly centralised system runs the risk of becoming a bureaucracy detached from regional realities. A better model is one that combines national coordination with genuinely regional delivery, in effect a federated biosecurity system. How might this work? Central government should establish national priorities, scientific standards, surveillance systems, data infrastructure and funding arrangements. It should identify priority emerging pests and establish national codes of practice to manage pathways of national significance, such as the movement of soil, boats and farm machinery. But importantly, operational capability would remain distributed around the country. Regional biosecurity organisations could retain the pest managers, field officers and relationships with landowners, iwi, industry and communities that make surveillance and control work. They could operate across several new councils where necessary, rather than being forced to reproduce specialist capability inside every new unitary authority.Integrating national oversight with local deliveryNew Zealand already has examples of successful federated biosecurity systems that combine national strategy with regional delivery. These include programmes that manage bovine tuberculosis, kauri dieback, wilding conifers and wallaby control. They represent different models of national-regional partnerships, but share fundamental similarities, including a national strategy supported by shared data systems and standard operating procedures delivered through regional teams embedded in the communities they serve. A federated system would make much better use of the resources available if future regional pest management plans targeted pests of national significance – such as the gold clam, Chilean needle grass or the Mediterranean fanworm – and focused on emerging pests that could threaten much of the country if left unchecked.The government’s proposed amendments to the Biosecurity Act create a rare opportunity to address the structural weaknesses of the current system by implementing a federated biosecurity system that better reflects how pests actually spread. A revised Biosecurity Act provides the legislative opportunity. Local government reform provides the institutional opportunity. Together they can deliver a national biosecurity mandate and pooled, ring-fenced funding set by statute, not left to each council’s rating base. This could also deliver consistent codes of conduct and focus on species of national significance, resourced to match the potential scale of the problem. New Zealand cannot afford a future where pests spread faster than our fragmented governance system can respond. The question is simple: will local government reform strengthen New Zealand’s biosecurity, or weaken it? The answer will shape our landscapes for decades.Philip Hulme is affiliated with Environment Canterbury though membership of its Biosecurity Advisory Group. He is also Chair of the Canterbury Aoraki Conservation Board and a Director of the QEII National Trust. He was formally a member of the NZ Government Biosecurity Ministerial Advisory Committee and the Zespri Biosecurity Advisory Group. He has received funding through MBIE, TEC and the Marsden fund to support research on weed invasions.