CHAD P. BOWN2026年8月28日 Ioulex for The New York TimesThe keenest observer of the all-out trade war between the United States and Canada is surely President Xi Jinping of China. If Washington doesn’t change course, he’s probably going to be its winner, too.最热切的美加全面贸易战观察者莫过于中国国家主席习近平。如果华盛顿不改变方向，他很可能也将成为这场冲突的赢家。Mr. Xi already has monopoly power over components that are vital to hundreds of thousands of American and Canadian jobs. His April 2025 restrictions on rare-earth magnets temporarily shut down a Ford Explorer plant in Chicago. In Ontario later that year, Honda briefly reduced and suspended production of Civics and CR-Vs after he closed off access to semiconductors, which disrupted parts supply.习近平已经对事关美加数十万就业岗位的一些关键部件拥有垄断性权力。他于2025年4月对稀土磁铁实施的限制曾一度导致芝加哥的一家福特探索者组装厂停产。同年晚些时候在安大略省，当他切断半导体供应、扰乱零部件供应后，本田一度减少和暂停了思域和CR-V的生产。These sorts of attacks and those sorts of vulnerabilities should bring allies together. In a normal world, Washington and Ottawa would be laser focused on how much and how quickly they could manufacture together to prevent that kind of Chinese economic coercion.这些攻击以及这种面对攻击的脆弱性本应让盟友团结起来。在一个正常的世界里，华盛顿和渥太华本应专注于它们能以多快的时间、多大的程度共同生产，以防范此类中国经济胁迫。Instead, President Trump has framed his tussle with Canada as a fight over how much manufacturing the country should be prepared to yield to the United States. And Mr. Trump wants almost all of it.然而，特朗普总统给这场与加拿大的争端制定的目标是，要由此明确加拿大应向美国让出多少制造业。而且特朗普想要的是几乎全部。Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada walked away from Mr. Trump’s latest offer and then escalated with fresh tariffs. Former Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland was correct to say it was even “a bad deal for the United States.”加拿大总理马克·卡尼拒绝了特朗普的最新提议，并以新的关税进行升级对抗。前副总理克里斯蒂娅·弗里兰说这甚至“是一笔对美国来说也很糟糕的交易”，她说得对。Mr. Trump cannot allow Canada to abandon the negotiations. Like it or not, Washington needs a resilient Canadian manufacturing sector working in concert with America’s companies in the much bigger and more consequential battle against Chinese market dominance.特朗普不能让加拿大放弃谈判。不管喜欢与否，华盛顿需要一个有韧性的加拿大制造业，在这场与中国争夺市场主导地位的较量中，与美国的公司协同作战。这是一场远为重大的对抗，将产生深远的影响。Ottawa rebuffed Mr. Trump’s latest offer in part because it retained too many of his import tariffs on Canadian cars, heavy trucks, steel and aluminum. With tariffs that high, Americans will eventually stop buying Canadian-assembled vehicles, and Detroit will rework its supply chains to exclude Canadian parts. Cars and parts once moved seamlessly across the U.S.-Canada border between suppliers and buyers, much as they did over the U.S.-Mexico border.渥太华拒绝了特朗普的最新提议，部分原因是该提议保留了太多他对加拿大汽车、重型卡车、钢铁和铝的进口关税。在关税如此之高的情况下，美国人最终会停止购买加拿大组装的汽车，底特律将重新调整其供应链，排除加拿大零部件。曾经，汽车和零部件在美加边境的供应商和买家之间无缝流动，就像它们穿越美墨边境一样。Being shut out of the market next door will devastate the Canadian auto industry. Canada is not close enough to Asia or Europe to survive as part of their supply chains.被邻国市场拒之门外将重创加拿大汽车业。加拿大离亚洲或欧洲不够近，无法作为其供应链的一部分而生存。We know what will probably happen next based on what took place in Australia after its automakers disappeared. By 2017, Toyota, General Motors and Ford closed their last Australian plants and caved to economic reality: The Australian market was too small and too remote to support the scale needed for globally competitive manufacturing.根据澳大利亚汽车制造商消失后发生的情况，我们大致知道接下来会发生什么。到2017年，丰田、通用汽车和福特关闭了在澳大利亚的最后一家工厂，这是屈从于经济现实：澳大利亚市场太小、太偏远，无法支撑具备全球竞争力的制造业所需的规模。Australians at first imported cars from manufacturing hubs across Japan, Korea, Thailand, Europe and the United States. Less than 10 years later, Australia looks very different. Nearly one in three new cars bought in Australia in the first half of 2026 was made in China, up from less than one in 250 back in 2017. (Only one in 50 Australian purchases in the first five months of 2026 was made in the United States.)澳大利亚人起初从日本、韩国、泰国、欧洲和美国的制造业中心进口汽车。不到10年后，澳大利亚的情况已大不相同。2026年上半年在澳大利亚购买的新车中，近三分之一是中国制造的，而2017年这一比例还不到250分之一。（2026年前五个月澳大利亚人购买的汽车中，只有50分之一是美国制造的。）Mr. Trump should expect Canadian consumers to go the same route. In January, Mr. Carney announced Canada would allow 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles to be sold in the country — less than 3 percent of new car sales — and would slowly increase that number. Any decision to further open the Canadian market would probably lead to a Chinese import surge.特朗普应该预料到加拿大消费者也会走上同样的道路。今年1月，卡尼宣布加拿大将允许销售4.9万辆中国电动汽车——占新车销量不到3%——并将逐步增加这一数字。任何进一步开放加拿大市场的决定都可能导致中国进口激增。Why is pure Econ 101. Buying higher-cost cars from the United States is easier to justify politically when there are offsetting benefits to the national economy, such as assembly jobs, profits to domestic parts suppliers and communities built around steel or aluminum plants. If local manufacturing disappears, so will the reasons for Canadians to accept paying higher prices.原因纯粹是最基础的经济学。只有在国民经济能得到补偿性收益时，从美国购买更贵的汽车在政治上才是相对能接受的——比如组装工作岗位、国内零部件供应商的利润以及围绕钢铁或铝厂建立的社区。如果本地制造业消失，加拿大人接受更高价格的理由也将消失。Losing Canadian customers to China would be terrible for America for two reasons.将加拿大客户拱手让给中国对美国来说将是可怕的，原因有二。First, the total number of buyers matters for sectors such as automobiles, which have high fixed costs and substantial barriers to new entrants. Having more consumers means companies can learn how to lower costs and offer reduced prices to get even more customers. Losing Canadian car buyers will be one more step toward ceding the global automotive industry to China.首先，对汽车这样一个固定成本高、入场门槛高的行业，买家总数是个重要指标。拥有更多的消费者意味着企业可以学习如何降低成本并提供更低的价格来获得更多客户。失去加拿大购车者将是向中国让出全球汽车工业的又一步。Today, Chinese companies sell low-priced cars. Tomorrow, the country could weaponize its newfound monopoly power. China also once offered the world great deals on rare-earth magnets and low-end semiconductors. Those prices allowed it to accumulate the market dominance that ultimately gave Mr. Xi the capacity to cut off Ford, Honda and many others last year.今天，中国企业销售低价汽车。明天，中国可能将其新获得的垄断力量武器化。中国也曾向世界提供过优惠价格的稀土磁铁和低端半导体。那些价格使其积累了市场主导地位，最终赋予了习近平去年切断福特、本田以及许多其他公司的能力。China has increasing market shares in sectors such as steel, aluminum, shipbuilding and telecommunications equipment. A recent O.E.C.D. report suggested that 60 percent of China’s global market share gains since 2005 could be attributed to its policy of supporting industries with generous subsidies.中国在钢铁、铝、造船和电信设备等领域的市场份额正在不断增加。经合组织最近的一份报告表明，自2005年以来，中国在全球市场份额增长中有60%可归因于其以慷慨补贴支持产业的政策。Second, losing the Canadian commercial base could turn away, once and for all, one of Washington’s few remaining economic security allies. Before Mr. Trump started whacking Canada with tariffs in 2025, Ottawa matched many of Washington’s duties on Chinese electric vehicles, steel and aluminum. He has forced Canadians to ponder separating from America instead of working with America to separate from China.其次，失去加拿大的商业基础可能会让华盛顿从此失去为数不多的经济安全盟友之一。在特朗普2025年开始用关税打击加拿大之前，渥太华在针对中国电动汽车、钢铁和铝的关税上与华盛顿保持了许多一致。特朗普迫使加拿大人思考与美国脱离，而不是与美国合作，与中国脱离。To fight the real trade war with China, Canadian consumers must continue to choose North American products, even though the Chinese versions are less expensive. Washington needs Canadians to accept today’s costs of a manufacturing sector integrated with the United States’.为了打赢与中国的真正贸易战，加拿大消费者必须继续选择北美产品，即便中国产品更便宜。华盛顿需要加拿大人接受眼下与美国进行制造业一体化的成本。Mr. Trump, for his part, will have to moderate his “made in America” demands. He can’t kill off Canadian manufacturing and hope to retain access to the Canadian consumer.就特朗普而言，他必须缓和其“美国制造”的要求。他不能一边扼杀加拿大制造业，一边还指望保留对加拿大消费者的准入。To tackle the China challenge, the West requires more manufacturing clout than even an integrated North American economy can offer. Washington needs to rally all potential allies in the collective fight against China’s market dominance, and they are waiting to see whether Mr. Trump finds an offramp from his wrongheaded trade war before it is too late.即便是一个一体化的北美经济体都不足以提供西方应对中国挑战所需的制造业实力。华盛顿需要团结所有潜在盟友，共同对抗中国的市场主导地位，而这些盟友正在观望特朗普是否能找到一条从这场错误贸易战中及时脱身的出路。Chad P. Bown是彼得森国际经济研究所的高级研究员，著有《如何赢得贸易战》(How to Win a Trade War)一书。翻译：纽约时报中文网点击查看本文英文版。