I began studying West Asia in 1967, while still at school. Its wars, revolutions, and shifting alignments fascinated me long before I entered the Army. From 1992, I studied Iran more closely, particularly its missiles and rockets and the external networks which helped build that capability. Almost six decades after my first encounter with the region, I find its strategic environment more complex than ever. The current US-Israel confrontation with Iran poses a deceptively simple military question: What would victory actually look like?Nearly eight months into the war, US and Israeli strikes have damaged Iran’s military infrastructure, yet Tehran retains the ability to threaten regional security and shipping. Overwhelming American superiority has not delivered a decisive political outcome. Destroying targets is not the same as winning a war.AdvertisementThe November 3 midterms may influence Donald Trump’s choices, but cannot replenish munitions or resolve Washington’s uncertain objectives. Does America seek to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability, dismantle its missiles, secure Hormuz, or change Tehran’s behaviour? Each demands a different strategy. Regime change would require far more. Without clarity about the desired outcome, further military escalation may merely prolong the conflict.The apparent reluctance to employ America’s full military might is not necessarily evidence of weakness. It may reflect recognition that escalation without a defined end state can create more problems than it solves. A renewed air campaign could further degrade Iranian capabilities, but targets become harder to identify after months of dispersal and adaptation. A limited ground operation against an island or coastal installation might produce a dramatic tactical result without a commensurate strategic payoff. A major invasion would entail risks and commitments of an entirely different order.Iran, meanwhile, has organised much of its defence around the knowledge that it cannot win a conventional contest with the US. Missiles, drones, dispersed launchers, underground facilities and the capacity for intermittent attacks offer another method: Remaining dangerous enough to deny an adversary an easy conclusion. A country need not match US firepower to threaten ships, energy infrastructure or regional bases. Nor must it sustain the same intensity of operations indefinitely to preserve uncertainty.AdvertisementAlso Read | Six steps to strengthen the India-US relationshipMy study of Iranian missile development taught me how little outsiders know about concealed inventories. Destroyed launchers and damaged factories reveal neither serviceable weapons remaining nor Iran’s capacity to replace them. Historical links with North Korean missile technology and Chinese equipment, alongside relations with Russia, merit attention. Yet these connections do not establish that any country is presently replenishing Iran’s arsenal.Supply chains challenge assumptions about isolation. Iran’s northern land borders, Caspian access and overland commercial routes receive little attention compared with its vulnerable southern coastline. Across West Asia, ISIS and the Houthis have demonstrated how weapons and components move through indirect networks despite surveillance, hostile borders and maritime interdiction. Iran’s requirements as a state are far greater than those of insurgent organisations, making direct comparisons imperfect. Nevertheless, control of sea approaches cannot prevent military replenishment. The question is how quickly Iran can restore sufficient capability to remain dangerous, not whether every damaged facility can be rebuilt.The US faces its own industrial problem. Reports of exceptionally heavy expenditure of Patriot interceptors, alongside other precision munitions, underline the mismatch between the speed of consumption in combat and the years sometimes needed for replenishment. Defensive missiles can cost vastly more than the weapons they intercept. America must also maintain commitments to Ukraine and preserve readiness for contingencies in the Indo-Pacific. Industrial endurance, not merely technological sophistication, has become a measure of military power.Iran’s endurance has limits too. Sustaining missile production is different from sustaining an economy and feeding a population. Inflation, disrupted trade, reduced revenues, and civilian hardship can gradually erode the state’s freedom of action. Northern connectivity cannot replace every lost commercial channel. But economic distress does not automatically produce political collapse, and a country can remain militarily disruptive long after its society has suffered greatly.Israel can impose further punishment, but it cannot by itself guarantee Iranian submission. The Gulf states have little appetite for an expanding war that threatens their infrastructure and economic ambitions. A wider confrontation involving Yemen or renewed attacks on shipping could enlarge the conflict without clarifying how it ends.you may likeAfter November 3, Trump may enjoy greater political freedom or face sharper congressional scrutiny. Either result leaves the military dilemma intact. Washington can sustain pressure, launch selective strikes or pursue negotiations backed by force. What it cannot assume is that a further increment of destruction will automatically deliver a settlement. Tehran, equally, cannot assume that endurance will remain affordable indefinitely.The US can continue to inflict enormous military damage on Iran, but that alone may not bring the war to an end. Iran, despite its losses, may retain enough military capability to prolong the conflict, although its economic difficulties will increasingly constrain it. Neither side can sustain this indefinitely without paying a price. The challenge for Washington after November 3 will be to determine how much more military force can realistically achieve, and when diplomacy must take over. Ultimately, the ability to end a war on acceptable terms is a greater measure of military success than the ability to prolong it.The writer is a former Commander of the Indian Army’s Chinar Corps and now Governor of Bihar