Amid much hullabaloo, India’s BRICS chairship reached a diplomatic high point on 12 September, Saturday with the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration at the 18th BRICS Summit, held at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi. This was one of the two most anticipated gatherings in the non-western world that India will be sitting on after Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in the 25th Anniversary Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The Bishkek Declaration condemned the attacks on Iran and pushed for resolving the conflict in the region through political and diplomatic means while affirming Iran’s rights as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also reiterated that any path to peace in the Middle East must go through resolving the Palestinian issue. Apart from that, there was also notable resistance to “unilateral coercive measures”, pointing to sanctions on Iran and Russia.The BRICS Summit, themed, “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”, convened with an expanded membership constituting Egypt, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE along with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The New Delhi Declaration recognises the growing contribution of the partner countries. The declaration’s framework is centred around three pillars, namely, security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural and people-to-people cooperation.However, one must also look not only at the number of initiatives under the Declaration, but also at what it reveals about the institutional character of BRICS. Amidst a fractured world order, the BRICS is working alongside a crowded set of overlapping institutions that address issues of finance, development, and technology. This, therefore, makes it interesting to see what India wants BRICS to do. This is where the idea of regime complexity becomes important.BRICS Expansion Tests India's Balancing Act Between China, Russia and the WestRegime Complexity: A Messier World by Design?The existing body of literature on international relations tends to describe today’s world not in uniform, neat terms or as a hierarchical pyramid. This brings to mind Kal Raustiala and David Victor, who, in one of their 2004 works, used the term ‘regime complex’ to argue that global issues today are not governed by a single treaty or organisation; instead, there is an “array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area”. In such a system, there is no hierarchy, and states engage in ‘forum shopping’, preferring institutions that give them greater room to advance their interests.In trade, we have the WTO alongside other regional and bilateral agreements. In finance, the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, coexist with other regional development banks, credit lines, and institutions like the New Development Bank. Similarly, national payment systems are being used across borders, even as the dollar continues to occupy a central position.The New Delhi Declaration is a reflection of this institutional pluralism. It calls for reforms to the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the WTO; greater use of local currencies; effective cross-border payment systems; cooperation on AI and digital public infrastructure; development finance; and coordination on climate, health, food, and energy security.The BRICS finds itself in this ever-increasing web of institutions that often deal with overlapping and intersecting issues. Its significance lies in adding another node, rather than being an alternative to the West, and providing a platform where states can bargain and hedge in line with their interests.So, for nations like India, which are navigating a fragmented world order, this proves helpful in serving their interests.The Timeless Pair: China, India, and the New Delhi Moment What’s in It for India’s Chairship?Through this Declaration, India seems to be trying to make BRICS more pragmatic, but not at the cost of making it more rigid. First, India is seeking to consolidate BRICS’ role in development finance. The NDB (New Development Bank, formerly called the BRICS Development Bank) has been touted in the Declaration as a strategic agent of development and modernisation. It advocates expanding the Bank’s capacity to mobilise resources, increase local-currency financing, diversify funding sources, support infrastructure investment, and promote sustainable development. The Declaration exemplifies this.It describes the NDB as a strategic agent of development and modernisation in BRICS countries and the wider Global South, and encourages the Bank to expand its capacity to mobilise resources, increase local-currency financing, diversify its funding sources, support infrastructure investment, and promote sustainable development and economic integration. India is trying to strengthen complementary institutions that can open up policy space for emerging economies, and the NDB has, therefore, been positioned as one such institution that can meet the needs of emerging markets.Secondly, it discusses advancing a more realistic economic agenda on payments; the common BRICS currency remains conspicuously absent. The New Delhi Declaration, instead, supports interoperability between payment and messaging systems and the creation of faster cross-border payments. It also recognises that members have different national priorities.Thirdly, India is using BRICS to amplify demands for a more representative global order. The Declaration supports reforms to the UN and the UNSC, as well as greater representation of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This became particularly significant as China and Russia, both permanent members of the UNSC, reiterated their support for Brazil’s and India’s aspirations to play a greater role in the UN.Fourthly, the Declaration calls for diplomacy, peaceful conflict resolution, civilian protection in West Asia, and a two-state solution for Palestine, while condemning the Pahalgam attack of 2025. It also supports India’s concerns over cross-border terrorism. As part of a regime complex, BRICS cannot be the answer to every conflict. However, one must not discount its ability to provide an additional diplomatic channel and enable limited cooperation among otherwise divided states.Modi’s Peace Pitch to Putin Has One Big Problem—India’s Own Foreign PolicyIndia’s Multi-Alignment and Regime ComplexityGiven the context and India’s long-standing preference for multi-alignment, it becomes all the more important to conceive of BRICS as one such ‘venue’ within a regime complex. Multi-alignment has often been depicted as opportunism. But this line of thinking risks missing the underlying logic. Today, India is increasingly working through several overlapping arrangements, each aligned with different, often overlapping, interests.The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) provides a framework for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, while the G20 provides a resilient platform for global economic governance among advanced and emerging economies. The SCO ( Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) opens the gates of cooperation across Eurasia. In a similar vein, BRICS provides access to major emerging economies and a platform for articulating the concerns of the Global South. At the bilateral level, India continues to develop and deepen partnerships with the US, Europe, Japan, and others. These are not all mutually exclusive. The usefulness of BRICS is contingent upon this ‘incompleteness’ and ‘looseness’, which allow countries with divergent interests to remain in conversation. Currently, BRICS comprises countries with sharply divergent strategic interests, and this diversity hampers consensus.However, it also brings to the fore representatives of diverse economic and political constituencies that are shaping the emerging order. Therefore, India currently needs to work through this diversity rather than seek to eliminate it.To conclude, New Delhi has little incentive to turn BRICS into a rigid anti-Western bloc. India’s comparative advantage lies in keeping BRICS open and issue-based, while retaining the flexibility to work simultaneously with the G7, G20, Quad, and bilateral partners. The New Delhi Declaration reifies this orientation. It blends demands for institutional reforms with practical initiatives and provides space for the Global South without requiring all members to adopt a common position. This is more consistent with a world characterised by regime complexity, in which the representation of the Global South can be strengthened without coming at the expense of the strategic autonomy of nation-states.(Pulkit Buttan is a PhD Scholar at TISS Mumbai who works at the intersection of international relations and migration. Dr Khushboo Srivastava is a political scientist and writes on democracy, political discourse and contemporary governance. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)