AbstractCollective climate action requires shared beliefs aligned with scientific consensus, yet fallacious information leads people to misjudge arguments. The mechanisms behind these failures remain unclear. Here we isolate the independent effects of partisan identity, prior beliefs and cognitive limits on argument-quality detection. Across four preregistered studies (N = 4,000), we introduce a protocol that orthogonally manipulates argument quality and direction across realistic contexts. In neutral contexts, prior beliefs dominated judgements, with partisanship and argument quality having smaller effects. Contrary to identity-protective accounts, embedding arguments in hostile partisan contexts did not increase partisan bias or impair argument-quality detection. Instead, partisan attacks reduced reliance on prior beliefs, prompting participants to move away from their prior positions. Finally, minimal logic warnings indicating possible fallacies enhanced discrimination between weak and strong arguments. These findings show climate argument evaluation is context sensitive and can be improved with simple logic warnings.This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institutionAccess options Access through your institutionAccess Nature and 54 other Nature Portfolio journalsGet Nature+, our best-value online-access subscription27,99 € / 30 dayscancel any timeLearn moreSubscribe to this journalReceive 12 print issues and online access269,00 € per yearonly 22,42 € per issueLearn moreBuy this articlePurchase on SpringerLinkInstant access to the full article PDF.39,95 €Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkoutFig. 1: Study design in all studies.Fig. 2: Influences of prior beliefs, partisanship and argument quality across contexts.Fig. 3: Identity threat leads to ‘demotivated’ responding.Fig. 4: Logical warnings increased discernment between weak and strong arguments.Data availabilityAll data are available via Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21964407 (ref. 45).Code availabilityThe code to reproduce analysis is available via Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21964407 (ref. 45).ReferencesRojas, C. et al. 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Pennycook for comments on an earlier version of the paper.FundingZ.A.P. was funded by Agence National de France (ANR-23-AERC-0006).Author informationAuthors and AffiliationsDepartment of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, the NetherlandsBence BagoLaPsyDÉ, Université Paris Cité, CNRS, Paris, FranceZoe A. PurcellDepartment of Psychology, Health and Gender, The American University of Paris, Paris, FranceZoe A. PurcellAuthorsBence BagoView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarZoe A. PurcellView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarContributionsThe study was conceptualized by B.B. and Z.A.P., who also developed the methodology and conducted the investigation together. B.B. was responsible for curating the data, conducting the formal analysis and developing the experimental software. Z.A.P. secured the funding for this research and created the visualizations. The original draft of the paper was written by B.B. and Z.A.P., and both authors participated in reviewing and editing the final version of the paper.Corresponding authorCorrespondence to Bence Bago.Ethics declarationsCompeting interestsThe authors declare no competing interests.Peer reviewPeer review informationNature Climate Change thanks Tobias Brosch, Lea Nahon and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Peer reviewer reports are available.Additional informationPublisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.Extended dataExtended Data Fig. 1 Strength perception in Study 1 (Climate items), by participant subgroup.Bars show the mean percentage of Climate arguments judged “Strong”. The x-axis contrasts arguments that are consistent versus inconsistent with the participant’s prior climate belief; panels separate strong (valid) from weak (fallacious) arguments. Study 1 included no experimental manipulation. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals, N = 1195.Extended Data Fig. 2 Strength perception in Study 3 (Climate items), by participant subgroup.Bars show the mean percentage of Climate arguments judged “Strong”, by experimental condition (Control vs. Treatment). The x-axis contrasts arguments consistent versus inconsistent with the participant’s prior climate belief; panels separate strong (valid) from weak (fallacious) arguments. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. The Democrat and Republican panels are defined at the participant level, but the climate-skeptic and climate-believer panels are defined at the item level: each argument is classified according to the participant’s prior belief on the specific climate dimension that argument addresses (whether climate change is happening, whether it is anthropogenic, or whether it poses a risk). The same participant can therefore count as a believer for some items and a skeptic for others — for example, believing that climate change is happening (believer) but not that it is anthropogenic (skeptic) — and so contributes responses to both panels. Their Ns consequently do not sum to the total sample.Extended Data Fig. 3 Strength perception in Study 3 (Neutral items).Bars show the mean percentage of Neutral arguments judged “Strong”, by experimental condition (Control vs. Treatment), across all participants. The x-axis contrasts arguments consistent versus inconsistent with the participant’s prior belief; panels separate strong (valid) from weak (fallacious) arguments. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. The Democrat and Republican panels are defined at the participant level, but the climate-skeptic and climate-believer panels are defined at the item level: each argument is classified according to the participant’s prior belief on the specific climate dimension that argument addresses (whether climate change is happening, whether it is anthropogenic, or whether it poses a risk). The same participant can therefore count as a believer for some items and a skeptic for others — for example, believing that climate change is happening (believer) but not that it is anthropogenic (skeptic) — and so contributes responses to both panels. Their Ns consequently do not sum to the total sample.Supplementary informationRights and permissionsSpringer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.Reprints and permissionsAbout this article