ROBERT D. KAPLAN2026年9月22日Before Iran, before Iraq, before Afghanistan there is no country that America has gotten as wrong as China. If this is mystifying, it is only because historical memories are short. America struggled through the previous fiascos. Getting it wrong again would be catastrophic. This is why it is crucial that President Trump strike the right balance in his summit this week with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.在误判伊朗、伊拉克和阿富汗之前，没有哪个国家像中国这样，让美国产生如此严重的误判。如果这令人费解，那仅仅是因为人们的历史记忆太短暂。美国跌跌撞撞地熬过了一次次重大失策。若再次犯错，将是灾难性的。正因为如此，本周在与中国领导人习近平的峰会上，特朗普总统对分寸的拿捏至关重要。During World War II, the United States backed China’s Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese fascists who had invaded in the 1930s. The Roosevelt administration assumed that China under Chiang’s Nationalists would constitute one of the Big Four powers after World War II, along with the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. When the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong swept to victory in the 1946-1949 civil war, Washington was shocked that a movement it had barely acknowledged had toppled the beloved Chiang. It was also enraged that the Soviet Union and China were now both in Communist hands. Someone had to be held to account.第二次世界大战期间，美国支持中国的蒋介石对抗20世纪30年代入侵的日本法西斯。罗斯福政府设想，由蒋介石的国民党领导的中国将在二战后与美国、英国和苏联并列成为“四大国”之一。当毛泽东领导下的中国共产党在1946至1949年的内战中取得全面胜利时，华盛顿大惊失色——一个它几乎未曾正眼相看的运动竟然推翻了备受推崇的蒋介石。同时，华盛顿也对中苏两国双双落入共产党之手感到愤怒。必须有人为此承担责任。Thus was born the “who lost China?” debate, a critical element of the Red Scare of the 1950s. The State Department officials held to account were precisely the ones who during World War II had been warning, to no avail, that the Communists were likely to militarily triumph. Rather than being celebrated for their clairvoyance, these officials were denounced as traitors whose weak support for the Nationalists had led to Chiang’s fall. The idea that the State Department could have prevented a Communist takeover across a landscape of 550 million people — 37 times the population of South Vietnam during our war there — gravely misjudged the limits of American power.“谁弄丢了中国？”的争论由此诞生，并成为20世纪50年代“红色恐慌”的关键组成部分。被追究责任的国务院官员恰恰是那些在二战期间一直警告（尽管徒劳无功）共产党可能在军事上获胜的人。这些官员未能因其先见之明而受到赞赏，反而被斥为叛徒，指责他们对国民党支持不力导致了蒋介石的倒台。这种认为国务院本可以在一片5.5亿人口的广袤土地上阻止共产党夺取政权的想法是对美国实力的严重误判。5.5亿人是越南战争期间南越人口的37倍。The Foreign Service officers themselves weren’t innocent. Though accurate about Mao’s chances, they misunderstood the nature of his rule. They conceived of Mao’s Communists as benign compared with Chiang’s Nationalists. Based in the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing, they knew intimately Chiang’s authoritarian tendencies. They made only short visits to the Communist base camp in Yan’an, visits that were stage-managed by Mao and his propagandist Zhou Enlai. Impressed by the order and discipline of Yan’an, they were blind to Mao’s totalitarianism, which would eventually result in the murder and starvation of as many as 70 million Chinese.外交人员本身也并非毫无过错。虽然准确判断了毛泽东获胜的几率，但他们误解了其统治的本质。他们认为，相比蒋介石的国民党，毛泽东的共产党并无威胁。由于驻扎在国民党的战时首都重庆，他们对蒋介石的独裁倾向了如指掌。而他们对共产党的延安大本营仅仅进行了短暂访问，这些访问还是由毛泽东及其宣传家周恩来精心安排的。延安的秩序与纪律给他们留下了深刻印象，却让他们对毛泽东的极权主义视而不见，而这种极权主义最终导致了多达7000万中国人遭受杀戮与饥荒。The 1950s purge of State Department specialists actually lasted into the 1960s. The Vietnam War was encouraged by Europeanists and generalists because the China hands who would have warned against the dangers of guerrilla war in Asia, and who would have noted that Vietnam had never been a puppet of Communist China, were no longer in key positions in government. There is a direct historical link, through China, from the Red Scare of the early 1950s to the fiasco in Vietnam in the middle and late 1960s.20世纪50年代对国务院专家的清洗实际上一直延续到了60年代。越南战争受到了欧洲事务专家和通才们的鼓动，因为“中国通”们已不再担任政府要职，他们本会警告在亚洲陷入游击战的危险，并会指出越南从来不是共产主义中国傀儡。从20世纪50年代初的红色恐慌到60年代中后期的越南惨败，其间存在着一条因中国而相连的直接历史脉络。The diplomatic opening to China accomplished by President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, in 1972 finally ended the Who Lost China debate. China was no longer lost and had instead become a geopolitical chess piece to be played against the Soviet Union. Nixon’s and Kissinger’s conception held until 1989, when the combination of China’s brutal crackdown at Tiananmen Square and the end of the Cold War meant that China was now both reviled, and, with the demise of Communism in Europe, less of an asset.理查德·尼克松总统及其国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格在1972年实现的对华外交破冰终结了“谁弄丢了中国”的争论。中国不再是被“弄丢的”，而是变成了地缘政治棋盘上用来制衡苏联的一枚棋子。尼克松和基辛格的这一构想一直维持到1989年，当时中国在天安门广场的残酷镇压与冷战结束的双重因素意味着，中国不仅遭到唾弃，而且随着欧洲共产主义的终结，其作为一项资产的价值也大打折扣。It was China’s economic and technological flourishing, particularly in the 1990s, that required the United States to treat the country as a great power. So dynamic were Jiang Zemin and his deputy Zhu Rongji that both Democrats and Republicans assumed that if China were admitted to the World Trade Organization, the country would be on a path toward a capitalistic and liberal society. President Bill Clinton held this view — and he was far from alone.而使美国必须将中国作为大国来对待的是中国的经济与技术繁荣，尤其是在20世纪90年代。江泽民和他的副手朱镕基展现出了极大魄力，以至于民主党和共和党都认为，如果允许中国加入世界贸易组织(WTO)，它将走上一条通往资本主义和自由社会的道路。比尔·克林顿总统持有这种观点——但绝非只有他一人。That was Washington’s third misjudgment. The Washington establishment — the wind at its back following the triumphalist end to the Cold War — assumed China would follow Europe’s path toward freedom. Alas, China was not Europe. Admitted to the W.T.O., China would eventually turn back toward full-bore authoritarianism under Xi Jinping.这是华盛顿的第三次误判。乘着冷战胜利之势，华盛顿建制派理所当然地认为中国会效仿欧洲走向自由之路。遗憾的是，中国不是欧洲。被接纳加入世贸组织后，中国最终在习近平治下重新转向了全面的威权主义。Each of these mistakes has particular causes. They are also connected by China’s size, complexity and outright cultural difference. Only recently, thanks to pathbreaking scholarship by the Hoover Institution academic Frank Dikötter, have we learned the full story of just how much Stalin was aiding Mao during the civil war, making a Nationalist victory even more remote. Analysis of China, unlike that of the Middle East, is not distorted by intense partisanship, but even for an emotionally detached expert class, China is genuinely hard for the United States to fathom.这些错误中的每一个都有其具体原因。它们也因中国的规模、复杂性以及彻底的文化差异而交织在一起。直到最近，依靠胡佛研究所学者冯客(Frank Dikötter)开创性的学术研究，我们才充分了解到斯大林在内战期间为毛泽东提供了多少援助，这使得国民党获胜的希望更加渺茫。与对中东的分析不同，对中国的分析并未被强烈的党派偏见所扭曲，但即使对于一个情感抽离的专家阶层来说，中国对美国而言也确实难以看透。What stabilizes the bilateral relationship has been the deliberately vague understanding concerning Taiwan that emerged from Nixon’s visit, known as the Shanghai Communiqué. That formula signaled that there was only one China and its capital is Beijing, but that neither party would attempt violently to change the status quo on Taiwan.双方关系的稳定一直靠的是尼克松访华后达成的一项关于台湾的刻意模糊的谅解，即《上海公报》。该方案明确世界上只有一个中国，其首都在北京，但任何一方都不会试图通过暴力改变台湾的现状。For the first time since 1972, the Shanghai Communiqué may be in particularly serious danger. There have been slip-ups, as when President Joe Biden declared he would defend Taiwan, thus abandoning the Nixon formula of ambiguity. But generally presidents exercised rhetorical restraint.自1972年以来，《上海公报》可能首次处于极其严重的危险之中。尽管曾经出现过失误，比如乔·拜登总统曾宣布他将保卫台湾，从而放弃了尼克松的模糊方案。但总体而言，历任总统在言辞上都保持了克制。That is no longer the case in the Trump administration, with the president’s stated position on Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific forever volatile. As for China, it is no longer governed by a mandarinate of enlightened Communist leaders, but by Mr. Xi, a Leninist totalitarian with openly aggressive designs on Taiwan. The guideposts are wobbling. Despite the happy talk at summits, we are back to the Who Lost China era, when fundamental mistakes are possible, this time with incalculable consequences. In addition, because neither China nor the United States seems interested in cooperating to regulate A.I., competition over the technology is poised to further destabilize the relationship.特朗普政府时期情况已不再如此，总统在台湾和亚太问题上的公开立场总是变幻莫测。至于中国，它不再由开明的共产主义领导人组成的官僚阶层统治，而是由习近平这个对台湾抱有公开侵略意图的列宁主义极权统治者来统治。规则的路标正在动摇。尽管峰会上充满了乐观言辞，我们却又回到了“谁弄丢了中国”的时代，在这个时代可能犯下根本性错误，而这一次将带来无法估量的后果。此外，由于中美两国似乎都无意合作监管人工智能，围绕该技术的竞争势必将进一步破坏两国关系的稳定。The ultimate geopolitical catastrophe would be a military conflict over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Avoiding such a conflict is not merely a matter of reducing military tensions. As the Yale Sinologist Odd Arne Westad points out, it was Germany’s assumption that Britain might not come to the aid of its allies in 1914 that helped set off World War I. If China assumes the United States might not come to the aid of Taiwan, that might likewise increase the chances of war.终极的地缘政治灾难将是围绕台湾和南海爆发军事冲突。避免这种冲突不仅仅是缓解军事紧张局势的问题。正如耶鲁大学汉学家文安立(Odd Arne Westad)所指出的，正是德国在1914年认为英国可能不会援助其盟友的假设助推了第一次世界大战的爆发。如果中国假设美国可能不会援助台湾，那同样可能增加战争的几率。Wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran have led to severe differences of opinion among both the public and the elites, but have not fundamentally changed our lives. A high-end military conflict in the Western Pacific fought between the world’s largest economies would disrupt the most vital supply chains and change our world profoundly. The comparison with World War I is not an exaggeration.乌克兰、加沙和伊朗的战争导致公众与精英之间产生了严重分歧，但并未从根本上改变我们的生活。如果世界两大经济体在西太平洋爆发高烈度军事冲突，将破坏最至关重要的供应链，并深刻地改变我们的世界。将其与第一次世界大战相提并论毫不夸张。Who Lost China was born of an obsession and a misunderstanding. In the late 1940s, the obsession was with Communism, which replaced German Nazism and Japanese fascism as America’s principal enemy the moment World War II ended. Then, the United States thought it had the power to save Chiang’s weakened regime in a war fought over thousands of miles of territory.“谁弄丢了中国”的争论源于一种痴迷和误解。在20世纪40年代末，这种痴迷是针对共产主义的，从二战结束那一刻起，共产主义便取代了德国纳粹主义和日本法西斯主义成为美国的主要敌人。当时，美国认为自己有能力在一场跨越数千公里领土的战争中拯救蒋介石被削弱的政权。The obsession today is again with Communism, in the shape of China overtaking the United States as the world’s greatest military, economic and artificial intelligence power. The misunderstanding is that a softer, less resolute approach to defending Taiwan and our other Asian allies can somehow prevent a war. In reality, such an approach might embolden China to attack the island, leaving the United States in a hair-trigger crisis over the fate of the entire Pacific.今天的痴迷再次针对共产主义，表现为担忧中国超越美国，成为世界上最强大的军事、经济和人工智能强国。一种误解认为，在保卫台湾和其他亚洲盟友方面采取较为温和、不那么强硬的策略就能避免战争。在现实中，这种做法可能会助长中国攻击台湾的信心，使美国陷入一场一触即发的、关乎整个太平洋命运的危机。The most important element in preventing a great war is policy discipline. Boring but true, this leads to steady, predictable signaling. America should not want to confuse China, just as China should not want to confuse us. World War I was in part caused by a misreading of intentions. Mr. Trump, by his vacillation — including using military aid to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China and toying with the abandonment of Asia to a Chinese sphere of influence — irresponsibly encourages the kind of confusion that can lead to war.预防大国战争最重要的因素是政策纪律性。这听起来枯燥却是事实，它能带来稳定且可预测的信号传递。美国不应试图去迷惑中国，正如中国也不应试图去迷惑我们一样。第一次世界大战的部分原因就是对意图的误判。特朗普通过他的摇摆不定——包括将对台湾的军事援助作为与中国讨价还价的筹码，以及戏谑般地考虑将亚洲让给中国的势力范围——不负责任地助长了那种可能引发战争的困惑。The historian Barbara Tuchman followed her classic book about the outbreak of World War I in 1966 with “The Proud Tower,” about the glittering, cosmopolitan world of 19th-century Europe, and how its texture and brilliance and naïveté were lost because of the Great War. The theme Tuchman chose for her book was taken from an 1845 Edgar Allan Poe poem: “While from a proud tower in the town/Death looks gigantically down.”历史学家芭芭拉·塔奇曼在1966年出版了关于一战爆发的经典著作后，又创作了《高塔》(The Proud Tower)。这本书讲述了19世纪那个光辉灿烂、心系天下的欧洲，以及它的肌理、辉煌和天真是如何因那场“大战”而丧失的。塔奇曼为她的书选择的主题取自埃德加·爱伦·坡1845年的一首诗：“而在城中的一座高塔之上，死神正巍然地朝下眺望。”No geopolitical conflict in the world today has the capacity, if miscalculated, of bringing ruin upon us all like the one between the United States and China. China tore through our domestic politics three-quarters of a century ago. It could be worse this time.当今世界上，没有任何地缘政治冲突像美中之间的冲突这样，一旦出现误判，将给我们所有人带来毁灭。四分之三个世纪前，中国撕裂了我们的国内政治。这一次情况可能会更糟。Robert D. Kaplan是《中国耳语者：塑造美国对其主要地缘政治对手看法的声音》(“China Whisperers: The Voices That Have Shaped America’s Views of Its Chief Geopolitical Rival”)一书的作者，也是德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校的杰出高级讲师。翻译：纽约时报中文网点击查看本文英文版。