Carbon removal projects need to get justice rightDownload PDF Download PDF Policy BriefPublished: 24 September 2026Climate governanceLivia Fritz ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7710-21931,2,Lucilla Losi ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9522-70852,Christine Merk ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1941-27023,Michela Boldrini4,5,6,Valentina Bosetti ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-4970-00274,5,6,Chad M. Baum ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6513-55182 &…Benjamin K. Sovacool ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4794-94032,7,8 Nature Climate Change (2026) Cite this articleSave articleView saved researchPublic support for carbon removal grows when people get a say and a share in the benefits, across diverse sociopolitical contexts. No amount of carbon removed can substitute for fair process and fair outcomes. Fairness must be designed into carbon removal governance from the start.Recommendations for policyGetting the technology right is insufficient. Even high removal capacity cannot compensate for unfair decision-making or profit distribution.Build fairness into carbon removal governance. Consulting local communities and scientific experts in the planning of carbon removal projects is the strongest driver of public support.Explore alternative profit and ownership models for carbon removal. The public favours benefit-sharing and not-for-profit models inspired by public utilities, whereas privatized profits attract the least support.Embed societal deliberation upstream, in the regional and national processes where the role and scale of carbon removal are decided, and treat contestation as an opportunity for learning.In national pledges, estimate the scale and pace of carbon removal prudently, given how fairness demands shape feasible deployment. Reliance on unrealistic future removals risks undermining the climate transition by weakening immediate emissions reduction efforts and jeopardizing long-term targets.SubjectsClimate-change mitigationMigration Patterns and Socioeconomic Dynamics in Regional DevelopmentBASED ON L. Fritz et al. Nature Climate Change https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-026-02741-7 (2026).The policy problemRemoving carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is set to become a key part of global climate policy, alongside the need to rapidly reduce emissions. Closing the gap between how much carbon dioxide removal (CDR) climate goals require and what current capacities can deliver will demand new infrastructures, institutions and governance processes on a scale comparable to today’s major industries. However, CDR governance is still in its infancy in most countries. Today’s decisions about who implements projects, how they are permitted and who ultimately profits will shape deployment for decades. Amid growing backlash against climate action, engaging with public concerns and expectations from the outset is critical for both the social legitimacy and practical feasibility of CDR. Policymakers therefore need to know which ways of implementing CDR people will support across different political and economic contexts, before technological and institutional choices become locked in.The findingsPeople’s support hinged on fairness in how decisions are made and how profits are distributed, across all six countries (Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Norway and the UK) and three carbon removal technologies. Consulting local communities or scientific experts before permitting a project raised support by roughly 1.0–1.7 points on a 10-point scale, depending on the country (Fig. 1). Sharing profits with local communities, or running projects on a not-for-profit basis, was the second most influential feature; projects in which developers retain all profits attracted the least support. How much carbon a project could remove mattered too, but high removal capacity could not compensate for unfair process or profit distribution: respondents were unwilling to trade fairness for performance. The findings reflect what people say they would support, in contexts of low familiarity. The limited ideological divides we observe are unlikely to last: as with renewables, controversy and polarization are likely to intensify as deployment advances and trade-offs become visible.Fig. 1: How governance and technical features change public support for carbon removal projects in six countries.Full size imagePoints show the average change in support (on a 1–10 scale) when a project is run by a company rather than a government, is permitted after consulting local people or experts, shares or forgoes profits, or removes more carbon, compared with a baseline project with no consultation and privatized profits. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. Figure adapted from L. Fritz et al. Nat. Clim. Change https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-026-02741-7 (2026), Springer Nature Limited.The studyWe conducted survey experiments with nationally representative samples totalling 10,852 respondents in 6 countries that vary markedly in political systems, political economies and geographic contexts: Brazil, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Norway and the UK. This institutional and sociopolitical diversity allows us to assess whether fairness-related drivers of support are context-specific or robust across heterogeneous settings and methods. Each respondent was assigned to one of three carbon removal methods (direct air carbon capture and storage, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, and enhanced rock weathering) and asked to rate five hypothetical projects within that method. These projects differed across four features: who implements them (a company or a regional government); whether local people or experts are consulted; how profits are handled; and how much carbon is removed. Because these features were varied experimentally, differences in support can be attributed to the features themselves, by calculating their average marginal component effects (AMCEs).Further readingLamb, W. F. et al. The carbon dioxide removal gap. Nat. Clim. Change 14, 644–651 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-01984-6 (2024). Quantifies the growing gap between national carbon removal proposals and the scale-up needed to meet global climate goals.Article CAS Google Scholar Nawaz, S., McLaren, D., Caggiano, H., Hudson, A. D. & Scott-Buechler, C. Carbon removal for a just transition. Clim. Policy 25, 926–937 https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2024.2418305 (2025). Argues that carbon removal deployment must be embedded in a just transition rather than treated as a purely technical challenge.Article Google Scholar Fritz, L., Baum, C. M., Low, S. & Sovacool, B. K. Public engagement for inclusive and sustainable governance of climate interventions. Nat. Commun. 15, 4168 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-48510-y (2024). Shows, based on focus groups from 22 countries, how public engagement can support inclusive and sustainable governance of carbon removal and other climate technologies.Article CAS Google Scholar Grubert, E. & Talati, S. The distortionary effects of unconstrained for-profit carbon dioxide removal and the need for early governance intervention. Carbon Manage. 15, 2292111 https://doi.org/10.1080/17583004.2023.2292111 (2024). Argues that unconstrained for-profit carbon removal can create distortionary incentives, making early governance intervention necessary.Article CAS Google Scholar Bosetti, V., Colantone, I., De Vries, C. E. & Musto, G. Green backlash and right-wing populism. Nat. Clim. Change 15, 822–828 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-025-02384-0 (2025). Documents the political backlash against climate action, underscoring the polarization risks that carbon removal governance must anticipate.Article Google Scholar Download referencesAuthor informationAuthors and AffiliationsDepartment of Geography and Environment and Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Geneva, Geneva, SwitzerlandLivia FritzDepartment of Business Development and Technology, School of Business and Social Sciences, Aarhus University, Herning, DenmarkLivia Fritz, Lucilla Losi, Chad M. Baum & Benjamin K. SovacoolKiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, GermanyChristine MerkDepartment of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, ItalyMichela Boldrini & Valentina BosettiCMCC Foundation–Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change, Lecce, ItalyMichela Boldrini & Valentina BosettiRFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan, ItalyMichela Boldrini & Valentina BosettiDepartment of Earth and Environment, Institute for Global Sustainability, Boston University, Boston, MA, USABenjamin K. SovacoolBennett Institute for Innovation and Policy Acceleration, University of Sussex Business School, Brighton, UKBenjamin K. SovacoolAuthorsLivia FritzView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarLucilla LosiView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarChristine MerkView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarMichela BoldriniView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarValentina BosettiView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarChad M. BaumView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarBenjamin K. SovacoolView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarCorresponding authorCorrespondence to Livia Fritz.Ethics declarationsCompeting interestsThe authors declare no competing interests.Additional informationFunding The authors of this study acknowledge funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 101056873, ‘Enabling and Leveraging Climate Action Towards Net-Zero Emissions’ (ELEVATE) and under grant agreement number 101081521, ‘Bridging current knowledge gaps to enable the UPTAKE of carbon dioxide removal methods’ (UPTAKE), and under the European Research Council (ERC) grant agreement number 951542-GENIE-ERC-2020-SyG, ‘GeoEngineering and NegatIve Emissions pathways in Europe’ (GENIE).Rights and permissionsReprints and permissionsAbout this article