In Niger, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) are fighting for territory while both groups continue to expand across the Sahel and beyond. Photo courtesy of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point.As two rival jihadist organizations, the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province, compete for dominance across the Sahel, their parallel campaigns of military attacks, economic warfare, and territorial expansion are spreading the insurgency into countries that until recently had largely been spared.On June 18, 2026, gunmen attacked Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, the capital of Niger, at approximately 6:00 a.m. local time. Niger’s Ministry of Defense reported that 11 soldiers and 2 civilians were killed, 22 attackers were killed, and approximately 20 suspects were arrested. Four security personnel were also wounded. The airport resumed civilian operations the same day, though FlightRadar24 reported several inbound flights were diverted or delayed during the fighting.Gunmen arrived at the airport security checkpoint by taxi and minibus before encountering resistance from security forces. Fighting lasted roughly two hours. By evening, the al-Qaeda-linked group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) had claimed responsibility via a statement posted by its propaganda arm Az-Zallaqa on Chirpwire, describing the operation as “a suicide attack” on both the airport and the neighboring military base.Diori Hamani is not merely a civilian transit hub. The complex hosts the Nigerien Air Force’s primary base, the headquarters of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) joint force, drawing together Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Russian forces, a drone unit conducting counterinsurgency strikes, and a stockpile of uranium that Niger is seeking to sell, a stockpile whose destruction would pose a serious environmental risk. In recent weeks before the attack, authorities had been demolishing thousands of illegally built homes near the airport perimeter in what they described as efforts to counter a terrorist threat.It was also the second attack on the airport in five months. On January 29, 2026, the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP) and its West Africa affiliate launched a coordinated assault on the same complex using motorcycles, drones, and explosives. That attack destroyed a Nigerien ammunition depot, damaged several civilian aircraft, and killed approximately 20 attackers, with four Nigerien soldiers wounded.ISSP claimed it had struck the air command headquarters and “delivered a direct blow” to Niger’s anti-insurgency operations. On March 9, 2026, ISSP struck again, targeting Tahoua military airport, known as Base 401, which housed Niger’s TB2 drone capabilities. Two drones were damaged, and the control station was destroyed. The June attack reflects the collapse of the counterterrorism architecture that the United States and France spent over a decade constructing in West Africa’s Sahel.The two groups responsible for these sequential strikes on Niamey’s airport are rivals, not allies. JNIM was founded in Mali in March 2017 as an al-Qaeda affiliate, uniting several jihadist factions under Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghaly and Fulani commander Amadou Koufa. It remains the most powerful jihadist organization in the Sahel, with operations across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Togo.ISSP, formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, was formed in May 2015 and became a standalone Islamic State province in March 2022. It operates primarily in the tri-border Liptako-Gourma region where Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger converge, though it has expanded its reach into Nigeria and beyond.For several years after their founding, the two groups coexisted and occasionally cooperated, a dynamic the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point termed the “Sahelian anomaly.”That period ended around 2019 to 2020, when ideological tensions hardened. JNIM began labeling ISSP “khawarij,” a pejorative term for the first extremist sect in Islamic history, known for indiscriminate violence and rejection of legitimate Islamic authority. ISSP, meanwhile, pursued a more brutal territorial strategy.Since then, the groups have repeatedly fought each other while simultaneously attacking state forces. This has compounded the security crisis across the region.JNIM attempts to portray itself as a protector of local communities. It fills service gaps left by absent governments and implements what it presents as a moderate form of Sharia through local Islamic judges and traditional authorities.ISSP, by contrast, relies more heavily on coercion and mass violence. It has prioritized high-profile attacks on airports, drone bases, and military convoys as propaganda victories.The June 18 JNIM attack reflected this competitive dynamic. The airport had already been struck by ISSP in January, giving the Islamic State a propaganda claim over one of Niger’s most strategic sites. JNIM’s assault was, in part, an effort to challenge that claim.As one analyst told the Associated Press, “JNIM in Niger is trying to mark its territory. This is a message to the government but also to IS.”Their clashes have been frequent and bloody. ISSP claimed to have killed 35 JNIM fighters in Niger’s Tillaberi region in April 2026. A September 2025 ambush near Sebba, Burkina Faso, left between 50 and 70 JNIM members dead, according to ISSP. The two groups clashed again at the Pétél Kolé border crossing in Niger’s Téra Department later that same month.Tillaberi, the region surrounding Niamey, became the deadliest region in the central Sahel in 2025. ISSP was responsible for most of the violence, followed by the Nigerien military and then JNIM.ISSP’s significance extends beyond the Sahel. The Soufan Center has described it as “a formidable entity in the global and African jihadist landscape, leveraging sophisticated strategies to internationalize its operations and expand its reach.”Islamic State central command has issued directives to fill power vacuums in West Africa and promoted closer coordination among its African affiliates through the General Directorate of Provinces.In February 2025, Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations arrested 12 members of an ISSP-linked cell and disrupted a plot to detonate bombs at financial and tourist sites across the country. Raids recovered Islamic State flags, cash, nail bombs, dynamite, firearms, and knives.Spanish authorities arrested approximately 90 people on suspicion of jihadist links during the first eight months of 2025. Some had intended to travel to Mali before shifting to attack planning inside Spain.Foreign Policy analysts wrote in March 2026: “Policymakers have long treated Sahelian violence as a local insurgency best handled by regional partners. But the global hub of jihadism is shifting, and as ISSP attracts foreign fighters, facilitates plots in Morocco and Spain, and integrates more tightly into the Islamic State’s command structure, its reach is expanding.”Both JNIM and ISSP launched kidnapping campaigns targeting foreigners in Mali and Niger in 2025, resulting in the highest number of recorded foreign abductions in both countries.ISSP operations that year targeted a Spaniard, an American pilot near Niger’s presidential palace, two elderly European women, one Austrian and one Swiss, as well as Indian mining workers and Moroccan truck drivers.ISSP is also deepening ties with Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which operates in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. Linguistic cues in ISSP attack footage, including Hausa and Kanuri, languages spoken in northeastern Nigeria, suggest ISWAP participation in some Sahel operations, including the January 2026 Niamey airport attack, according to the Soufan Center.The relationship has involved ISWAP sending fuel, weapons, and fighters to support ISSP in Burkina Faso and Mali. The Lakurawa terrorist group in northwestern Nigeria has pledged allegiance to ISSP, giving the group an additional foothold for coordination with ISWAP through the Nigeria-based entity Maktab al-Furqan.While ISSP has prioritized high-profile military strikes and transnational operations, JNIM has pursued a different form of expansion focused on territory and economic pressure.Beginning in September 2025, JNIM deployed forces from Burkina Faso to impose a fuel and transport blockade on Bamako and the surrounding regions. The group attacked fuel tankers and abducted drivers, causing nationwide fuel shortages and price increases.JNIM has simultaneously expanded south into Benin, Togo, northern Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, raising concerns about a jihadist corridor reaching the Gulf of Guinea.In March 2026, the group attacked military barracks in Benin’s Pendjari Park, killing at least 15 soldiers and capturing a U.S.-made M113 armored personnel carrier.In April 2026, JNIM and the Tuareg-dominated Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched a coordinated offensive that forced Russia’s Africa Corps to negotiate an evacuation from Kidal in northern Mali.The June 18 attack on Niamey’s airport was the second strike on the facility in 2026 and the third attack on Niger’s military aviation infrastructure in five months.That these attacks are occurring at a headquarters facility in a national capital, carried out by two competing jihadist organizations seeking dominance over one another, reflects a security environment that has deteriorated dramatically since the military coups of 2020 to 2023.The repeated targeting of Diori Hamani, a site that also stores more than 1,000 metric tons of yellowcake uranium amid a dispute between Niger’s junta and French nuclear company Orano, underscores that the stakes extend beyond counterterrorism.The airport is simultaneously a military command center, a uranium depot, a regional alliance headquarters, and a Russian military installation. A successful attack on any of these facilities would carry consequences well beyond West Africa.As JNIM pushes toward the Gulf of Guinea and ISSP extends its reach into Nigeria, Morocco, and Spain, the question for West Africa’s governments and their partners is no longer whether the insurgency is expanding, but how far it will go before an effective response is mounted.The post Rivals in Terror: How JNIM and ISSP Are Spreading the Sahel Islamist Insurgency Across West Africa appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.