Delhi witnessed an extraordinary mobilisation of state power on October 10 to prevent a public mobilisation. Over 7,000 people reportedly detained, at least 600 detentions in the advanced crackdown, more than 250 railway services cancelled and closure of 45 metro stations: These were measures one might associate with a grave public-order emergency. Yet, the police reportedly anticipated around 7,000 protesters, which could have been easily managed. Numbers alone cannot determine risk, but what specific threat justified restrictions affecting an entire capital?The spectacle handed the Cockroach Janta Party a publicity victory. Its three principal leaders, detained inside their aircraft upon arrival, acquired international fame that an orderly demonstration might never achieve. The state prevented a gathering but magnified its message.AdvertisementA useful comparison comes from London. In November 2023, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley resisted political pressure to prohibit a pro-Palestinian march on Armistice Day. He explained that the intelligence did not meet the threshold under Section 13 of the Public Order Act 1986: Serious public disorder that could not be prevented through lesser measures. The principle was straightforward: political displeasure cannot substitute for a professional assessment.Why could Delhi not adopt that approach? A police commissioner brings decades of experience in handling demonstrations. Was the decision grounded in an independently assessed threat, or did political preference determine the operational response? The public deserves an answer. Without disclosure of the reasons, sweeping restrictions invite the suspicion that professional judgment has yielded to political wishes conveyed by a compliant bureaucracy.Also Read | Look back and see how protests in Delhi travel far beyond the CapitalThe police repeatedly become the target of public anger over grievances directed at governments and institutions. Their first responsibility should, therefore, be to open channels of dialogue, assess risks and negotiate workable arrangements. A designated site, limited hours, agreed attendance, volunteer marshals and clear conditions against violence or damage could have provided a practical framework.AdvertisementSuch an offer would also have placed responsibility on organisers to honour their commitments. Body cameras, videography and liaison officers could document misconduct by protesters and police alike. Identifiable offenders could then face targeted action. Collective restrictions should require a demonstrable necessity, not merely administrative convenience.The explanation that the application arrived only three days before the protest is insufficient by itself. Police deployed tens of thousands of personnel. If such extensive preparations were possible, why was a negotiated demonstration impossible? The relevant question is whether the danger could be managed, not whether every procedural formality had been satisfied.Protests in India are an age-old tradition and, after Independence, have become an integral part of democracy. Jumping over barricades, marching in human chains or lying on the ground resisting arrest are age-old practices. They should not be condemned but celebrated as the ritual dance of democracy. Stone-pelting, assault and destruction are different: They demand lawful action. Professional policing must distinguish between the two. Its public face should be that of a facilitator protecting rights while enforcing reasonable limits and not the face of the ruling party.Unfortunately, political parties discover police accountability when they are in the Opposition. In office, the same parties defend restrictions they previously condemned. Few press consistently for implementation of the Supreme Court’s police-reform directions or for institutions that protect professional decision-making.A credible State Security Commission would help establish policy, evaluate performance and curb unwarranted interference. Operational autonomy must come with accountability in the form of recorded reasons, independent scrutiny of excessive force and transparent review of restrictions. Autonomy is neither immunity nor permission to disregard elected authority. It means that ministers set lawful policy while professionals decide how to implement it.Training matters equally. Negotiation, de-escalation, behavioural skills and proportionate use of force cannot be improvised at a barricade. Constant deployment leaves too little time to develop these capabilities. Governments that demand better crowd management must invest in it.The Home Ministry’s bureaucratic layer also deserves scrutiny. Its task should be to support professional policing, test the necessity of extraordinary restrictions and advise ministers candidly. When it merely transmits political messages, it adds hierarchy without adding judgement. There is a strong case for an experienced internal-security professional as Home Secretary, capable of articulating operational realities and constitutional obligations to the executive.you may likeThe protests will carry on. October 10 has again shifted attention from the original grievance to police conduct. That is a familiar and avoidable failure. But ultimately the ruling establishment will have to take a call on the cost of allowing a Chief Election Commissioner to continue against continuing opposition and a massive deployment of state resources. The government must explain why restrictions of this scale were necessary and consider whether dialogue would have served the public better.Another protest lurks round the corner. Hopefully the lesson is learnt that a capital kept quiet by closing all its gates is no proof of a democracy kept secure.Azad, a retired IPS officer, is the author of Policing The Republic and has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court for a ban on pellet guns in crowd control. He has served as the Central Information Commissioner, Secretary, Security, GOI, and as Special Director, Intelligence Bureau