Larsen And Toubro Limited v. State of U.P. & 5 Others, Writ-C No. 10822 of 2026, decided on September 29, 2026 (Lucknow Bench) | Coram: Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary The Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) has held that where a tender expressly fixes eligibility with reference to the Bid Due Date, eligibility has to be tested on that date, and not on the later date of technical evaluation. Dismissing a writ petition filed by Larsen And Toubro Limited, a Division Bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary upheld the rejection of the company's technical bid in a tender floated by the Uttar Pradesh Expressways Industrial Development Authority (UPEIDA), holding that the bid was rightly declared non-responsive because a governmental debarment against it subsisted on the Bid Due Date.The Court summarised its approach in these words: "Eligibility must be judged strictly as on the Bid Due Date fixed by the Tender itself."Background of the TenderUPEIDA (respondent no. 2) issued a Notice Inviting Tender on 22.06.2026 for development of the Jewar Airport to Ganga Expressway link (Package-I), from Bhaipur Brahman (District Gautam Buddha Nagar) to Bichaula (District Bulandshahar), on EPC basis. The petitioner submitted its bid along with 11 other bidders.ChronologyThe Court recorded the following admitted facts:22.06.2026: Notice Inviting Tender issued. As per the corrigendum, the Bid Due Date was 07.09.2026, and technical bids were opened on 08.09.2026.13.04.2026: The Jal Jeevan Mission, U.P., debarred the petitioner. This order was in force on the Bid Due Date.Bid submission: The petitioner did not disclose the debarment in its bid. It furnished only the declaration under clause 2.2.2.10 regarding absence of catastrophic failure of structures or highways due to construction defects in the preceding five years.18.09.2026: After information in the public domain came to its notice, UPEIDA sought the petitioner's clarification under clauses 2.2.10 and 2.1.18.14.09.2026: The Mission, by a letter of this date, kept the debarment in abeyance.22.09.2026: In its response, the petitioner disclosed the abeyance letter for the first time. It also disclosed a further debarment by the State of Madhya Pradesh dated 13.08.2026, said to be under challenge before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.25.09.2026: The Technical Evaluation Committee declared the petitioner's bid non-responsive on the ground that it stood "debarred by the Jal Jeevan Mission, U.P." The financial bids of other bidders were then opened, and the petitioner stated that its price was about ₹252 crore lower than the L-1 price.The Petitioner's CaseAppearing for the petitioner, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. J.N. Mathur, Senior Advocates, argued that the rejection was contrary to the terms of the Request for Proposal (RFP). Their principal submissions were:Clause 2.1.18 only describes the entity who may apply and does not examine eligibility, and it mandates no declaration regarding debarment. Clause 2.2.2.10, which deals with catastrophic failure and requires an undertaking, was said to outshine clause 2.1.18. Since the petitioner had furnished that declaration, the rejection was said to rest on a reason not stipulated in the tender notice.Clause 2.1.18 requires the bar to subsist on the Bid Due Date, and by the date of technical evaluation (25.09.2026) there was no operative debarment, as it had been kept in abeyance on 14.09.2026.Relying on clause 1.2.2, under which bids remain valid for 120 days, it was argued that the date on which the technical evaluation was uploaded ought to be treated as the bid due date, with eligibility checked on that date.The Committee ignored the abeyance, and the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cure or clarify deficiencies, as other participants were.The issue was not one of substituting the Court's commercial judgment, but whether the bid was evaluated in accordance with the RFP. The price difference of over ₹252 crore was said to show actual prejudice.The petitioner relied on Kimberly Club Private Limited v. Krishi Mandi and others, Banshidhar Construction (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., National High Speed Rail Corporation Limited v. Monte Carlo Limited, U.P. Jal Sansthan Karmchari Sangh v. State of U.P. and Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries.The Respondents' CaseMr. Gaurav Mehrotra, Senior Advocate for UPEIDA, argued that clause 2.1.18 makes an entity barred by the Central/State Government ineligible if the bar subsists on the Bid Due Date, which was 07.09.2026, when the petitioner was admittedly debarred. He submitted that the abeyance could not relate back to the Bid Due Date, and that the petitioner had suppressed the debarment, amounting to a fraudulent practice under clause 4.3(b) of the RFP. He also referred to clause 2.6.3, under which eligibility may be evaluated during evaluation or at any time before signing of the agreement, and said that the opportunity to explain did not entitle the petitioner to furnish fresh documents after the due date. Relief to the petitioner, he submitted, would deny a level playing field to those who did not bid believing themselves ineligible.Mr. Pritish Kumar, Senior Advocate and Additional Advocate General for the State, adopted these submissions and added that clause 2.1.18 is in the nature of an eligibility condition, which the petitioner was duty-bound to satisfy before bidding. The respondents relied, among others, on Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium), Tata Motors Ltd. v. BEST, PSEB v. Bhatia International Ltd., Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, Najma Khatun v. State of W.B. and CJDARCL Logistics Ltd. v. Rites Ltd.The Court's ReasoningScope of reviewThe Court recalled that in tender matters it examines the decision-making process and not the decision, referring to Tata Cellular, Jagdish Mandal and Afcons Infrastructure. It accepted the petitioner's submission that a tender authority must act within the four corners of the tender document, citing Ramana Dayaram Shetty and Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries. The question, it said, was whether the respondents acted within the framework of the RFP or outside it.Clause 2.1.18 is an eligibility conditionThe Court found the language of clause 2.1.18 "plain and simple". A clause declaring a class of persons ineligible to submit a bid is, it held, "by definition an eligibility condition", and the heading of the section in which it appears cannot alter its substance. The Court also held that the absence of a prescribed declaration is of no consequence, since an eligibility bar "operates by its own force"; otherwise an ineligible bidder could sidestep the bar by remaining silent. The employer could verify eligibility during evaluation, and clause 2.6.3 reserves that power until execution of the agreement.Clause 2.2.2.10 does not displace itThe Court rejected the argument that the catastrophic-failure declaration disposes of the matter. Clause 2.2.2.10 tests the bidder's construction record and is a technical-capacity attribute, whereas clause 2.1.18 is "a threshold condition that goes to the very right to submit a bid". The debarment here was imposed by the Jal Jeevan Mission, not for a highway failure. The two clauses operate independently and cumulatively; the petitioner's reading would render clause 2.1.18 redundant.The relevant date is the Bid Due DateClause 2.1.18 itself fixes the reference point, requiring the bar to subsist "as on the bid due date". The petitioner did not dispute that the 13.04.2026 order was in force on 07.09.2026. On clause 1.2.2, the Court held that the 120-day provision "merely provides that bids remain valid", addressing how long a bidder is held to its offer and saying nothing about when eligibility is judged. A validity clause cannot amend an express provision fixing the date on which eligibility is tested. The date of evaluation, or the date the result was uploaded, is a stage in the process and not the Bid Due Date, which the RFP defines by reference to clause 1.3 and the corrigendum.The Court added that this is consistent with the principle that eligibility is tested by the conditions, and as on the date, stipulated in the tender, and that a bidder cannot cure an ineligibility after the cut-off. It referred to Central Coalfields, Rashmi Metaliks Ltd. v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority and Bhatia International.The abeyance does not relate backThe Court held that the Mission's letter of 14.09.2026 could not assist the petitioner because the debarment was not quashed, recalled or withdrawn, but merely kept in abeyance with effect from 14.09.2026, seven days after the Bid Due Date. "An order suspending the operation of a debarment operates prospectively," and does not make the debarment non-existent for any earlier period. Relying on Shree Chamundi Mopeds, the Court drew the distinction between a stay, which does not wipe out an order and operates from the date of the stay, and quashing, which restores the position as it stood on the date of the impugned order. The abeyance here was "akin to a stay". On 07.09.2026 the petitioner was therefore an entity "barred" within the meaning of clause 2.1.18. The Court noted that Najma Khatun was to the same effect, and observed that the petitioner's own case on abeyance amounted to an admission that an operative debarment existed on 07.09.2026.Essential condition; no right to cureThe Court noted that tender law distinguishes conditions that go to the root of the matter, which must be strictly complied with, from ancillary or procedural conditions that may be waived or rectified, referring to Poddar Steel Corporation, W.B. State Electricity Board v. Patel Engineering, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons, Central Coalfields, Bakshi Security, State of Jharkhand v. CWE-SOMA Consortium and Reliance Telecom.Applying these principles, the Court held clause 2.1.18 to be an essential condition for four reasons: (i) it is a threshold condition deciding who may not submit a bid at all, before technical merit arises; (ii) it is a public-interest and integrity safeguard, barring entities another arm of government has found unfit to deal with the State; (iii) it is tied to a fixed reference date, which is meant to be applied rigidly; and (iv) it affects persons outside the litigation, as prospective bidders read it and stayed away.The petitioner could not claim parity with bidders allowed to rectify non-essential lapses such as an unsigned page, a missing annexure or a formatting defect. Those do not change a bidder's status, whereas the petitioner sought a change in its status "from 'barred' to 'not barred'" by reference to an event after the due date. In the Court's words, that "is a change in the eligibility of the bidder."Clarification cannot introduce a post-deadline factThe Court held that clarification exists to explain what is already in the bid and does not permit a bidder to supply, after the due date, a document or a fact that did not exist on the due date. The abeyance letter did not exist on 07.09.2026, and accepting it would amount to what Central Coalfields and Bhatia International forbid. The Court also found that an opportunity had in any event been given: the petitioner was asked on 18.09.2026 about the very clauses on which it was later rejected, it answered, and the Committee took the reply on record before deciding on 25.09.2026.Level playing fieldThe Court agreed with UPEIDA that relief to the petitioner would prejudice those who read clause 2.1.18, considered themselves ineligible and did not bid. Citing Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd. and the Delhi High Court's decision in CJDARCL Logistics, it held that permitting the petitioner to participate on the strength of a post-due-date abeyance would treat other entities unequally, which would be arbitrary and "in the teeth of Article 14" of the Constitution.Lower price confers no rightOn the ₹252 crore price difference, the Court said it was conscious of the importance of public money, but the argument presupposes that the petitioner was eligible to have its financial bid opened. Financial competitiveness is examined only for bidders who clear the eligibility stage. Referring to Jagdish Mandal, Afcons and Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies, it held that a bidder has no vested right to have its bid accepted, and that "a lower quote by an ineligible bidder does not translate into a right to be considered." The Court also noted that interference at this stage would disturb a project of public importance and delay the ongoing tender process.No arbitrariness or perversityThe Court held that an employer enforcing an express, unambiguous eligibility bar, as on its own stipulated date, "is on firm ground". The Technical Evaluation Committee acted within the terms of the RFP, and its decision was neither arbitrary, irrational, mala fide nor perverse.The petitioner's authoritiesThe Court held that the petitioner's authorities did not assist it. Banshidhar Construction permits interference where a decision is arbitrary or the process unfair, which was not the case here, and National High Speed Rail Corporation v. Monte Carlo supported the respondents. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries recognises that the State must act fairly but also that tender terms are applied as written. As for Kimberly Club and U.P. Jal Sansthan Karmchari Sangh, the Court said it had not been shown any ratio holding a debarment subsisting on the Bid Due Date to be irrelevant, or fixing the date of evaluation as the reference date contrary to an express clause.Non-Disclosure and ConductThe Court held that the absence of a specific "no debarment" declaration did not excuse the petitioner: eligibility was not conditional on a declaration; a bidder that knows it is barred and gives a certificate on its record under clause 2.2.2.10 cannot claim its silence was innocent; and the disclosure came only after UPEIDA's letter of 18.09.2026, with the Madhya Pradesh debarment surfacing only in that reply and no explanation offered for the silence at the time of bidding.The Court held that this conduct weighed against the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, citing the clean-hands principle (Ramjas Foundation, K.D. Sharma and Dalip Singh) and, by analogy, Avtar Singh v. Union of India. It noted that the petitioner's pleadings presented the matter as one of interpretation while understating the sequence of disclosure.The Court was categorical, however, that it had "not come to any finding of fraud against the petitioner". The conclusion on the tender rests on ineligibility under clause 2.1.18, and the non-disclosure is relevant only to the equities and to the Court's discretion under Article 226.On the second debarment, by the State of Madhya Pradesh dated 13.08.2026, the Court noted that it fell within clause 2.1.18 and that the petitioner had not shown it to be stayed or quashed on 07.09.2026. It observed, however, that the petitioner was marked non-responsive only on the ground of the Jal Jeevan Mission debarment, and, citing Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, that reasons cannot be supplemented by later affidavit or argument. It therefore declined to rule on the Madhya Pradesh debarment.Principles Summarised by the CourtThe Court summarised the principles emerging from the authorities as follows:An express eligibility condition barring an entity if a governmental debarment "subsists on the bid due date" is an essential and threshold requirement.Eligibility must be judged strictly as on the Bid Due Date fixed by the tender itself, and a subsequent abeyance or stay of the debarment operates only prospectively.The tendering authority has no power to waive, relax or cure non-compliance with such an essential condition after the due date, nor can a Court compel it to do so; selective accommodation would destroy the level playing field and offend Article 14.Judicial review is confined to whether the decision is so arbitrary, irrational, mala fide or perverse that no reasonable authority could have reached it.A bidder has no vested right to have its bid accepted, and a Court cannot, in the name of price advantage, direct the respondents to ignore an express eligibility clause.OutcomeFinding no ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, made no order as to costs, and vacated any interim order. The Court clarified that its observations are confined to the petition, and that nothing in the judgment prevents the petitioner from pursuing its remedies against the debarment orders before the competent forum, nor prejudices the pending challenge before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.The petitioner was represented by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. J.N. Mathur, Senior Advocates, assisted by Ms. Mahima Pahwa and Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh. The State was represented by Mr. Pritish Kumar, Senior Advocate and Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Rahul Kapoor, and UPEIDA by Mr. Gaurav Mehrotra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Abhineet Jaiswal and Mr. Sharad Tewari.Important Link Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams