copyediting; consistency← Previous revisionRevision as of 12:01, 9 October 2026 Line 39: Line 39: The Green Run took place at the [[Hanford nuclear site]] in [[Washington (state)|Washington]], where plutonium production involved irradiating uranium fuel and chemically separating [[plutonium-239]]. The project took its name from the processing of uranium at the Hanford [[B Reactor]], an open-loop, water-cooled nuclear reactor used to irradiate [[uranium-238]] and produce fissile [[plutonium-239]].{{r|DOE B Reactor}} Because other unwanted and highly radioactive decay products were also formed, normal batch processing took place 83 to 101 days after reactor extraction, allowing radioactive isotopes to decay before the plutonium-239 was extracted more safely.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} The Green Run took place at the [[Hanford nuclear site]] in [[Washington (state)|Washington]], where plutonium production involved irradiating uranium fuel and chemically separating [[plutonium-239]]. The project took its name from the processing of uranium at the Hanford [[B Reactor]], an open-loop, water-cooled nuclear reactor used to irradiate [[uranium-238]] and produce fissile [[plutonium-239]].{{r|DOE B Reactor}} Because other unwanted and highly radioactive decay products were also formed, normal batch processing took place 83 to 101 days after reactor extraction, allowing radioactive isotopes to decay before the plutonium-239 was extracted more safely.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} For the Green Run test, the batch was fresh from the reactor and had only a scheduled 16-day decay period before it was processed and vented into the atmosphere.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} The irradiated fuel for the Green Run was supplied by the "F" reactor.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} As a result, the unfiltered exhaust from the production facility was much more radioactive than exhaust from a normal batch.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} For the Green Run, the batch was fresh from the reactor and had only a scheduled 16-day decay period before it was processed and vented into the atmosphere.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} The irradiated fuel for the Green Run was supplied by the "F" reactor.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} As a result, the unfiltered exhaust from the production facility was much more radioactive than exhaust from a normal batch.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} The Green Run test occurred shortly after the first [[RDS-1|Soviet nuclear test]], during heightened U.S. concern about Soviet nuclear capabilities.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} The Green Run was reportedly designed to test [[United States Air Force]] nuclear weapons [[Nuclear MASINT|monitoring systems]] intended for use against the [[Soviet Union]] and their [[Soviet atomic bomb project|evolving nuclear weapons program]].{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}}{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} Before the experiment, Hanford staff, using radiation air samples from equipment on [[Rattlesnake Ridge]] with Air Force assistance, had detected evidence of the first Soviet nuclear detonation, reportedly the only successful sampling of it within the United States.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=7}} The test results from the Soviet nuclear samples were entirely confiscated by the Air Force the same night they were confirmed.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=7}} According to a test participant cited by the GAO, the Green Run was premised on the idea that aerial monitoring and sampling of a radioactive cloud, even at long distances, could reveal evidence of nuclear materials.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} The Green Run testing was also related to United States government fears of [[radiological warfare]] and [[dirty bomb]]s; part of its purpose was to study how an unexpected release of radioactive gases over a populated area could be detected.{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} ORNL-341, a secret [[Oak Ridge National Laboratory]] document that examined the proposed Green Run in April 1949, had recommended releasing even higher doses of radiation into Washington state.{{r|Zehner 2012|p=83,85}} The Green Run occurred shortly after the first [[RDS-1|Soviet nuclear test]], during heightened U.S. concern about Soviet nuclear capabilities.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} The Green Run was reportedly designed to test [[United States Air Force]] nuclear weapons [[Nuclear MASINT|monitoring systems]] intended for use against the [[Soviet Union]] and their [[Soviet atomic bomb project|evolving nuclear weapons program]].{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}}{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} Before the experiment, Hanford staff, using radiation air samples from equipment on [[Rattlesnake Ridge]] with Air Force assistance, had detected evidence of the first Soviet nuclear detonation, reportedly the only successful sampling of it within the United States.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=7}} The test results from the Soviet nuclear samples were entirely confiscated by the Air Force the same night they were confirmed.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=7}} According to a test participant cited by the GAO, the Green Run was premised on the idea that aerial monitoring and sampling of a radioactive cloud, even at long distances, could reveal evidence of nuclear materials.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} The Green Run was also related to United States government fears of [[radiological warfare]] and [[dirty bomb]]s; part of its purpose was to study how an unexpected release of radioactive gases over a populated area could be detected.{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} ORNL-341, a secret [[Oak Ridge National Laboratory]] document that examined the proposed Green Run in April 1949, had recommended releasing even higher doses of radiation into Washington state.{{r|Zehner 2012|p=83,85}} ==Planning== ==Planning== Unknown [[United States Atomic Energy Commission]] officials authorized the Green Run operation on October 25, 1949.{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} Jack Healy, a [[chemical engineer]] at Hanford who worked on Green Run, was interviewed in 1995 by staff from the DOE, [[Battelle Memorial Institute]], [[Los Alamos National Laboratory]], and the [[Pacific Northwest National Laboratory]].{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=1}} Healy and Lieutenant W.E. Harlan prepared the plans for Green Run locally at Hanford in 1949.{{r|ACHRE Chapter 11 Footnotes}}{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=6}} Healy reported that he and other science staff at the time were unaware of the full risks of [[environmental radioactivity]] and the "[[Environmental_radioactivity#Cows|milk-to-man pathway]]", and that he believed the staff would have objected to Green Run. He said the milk contamination theory was only proven ten years later due to the [[United Kingdom]]'s [[Windscale fire#Health effects|Windscale nuclear accident]].{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=8}} Unknown [[United States Atomic Energy Commission]] officials authorized the Green Run on October 25, 1949.{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} Jack Healy, a [[chemical engineer]] at Hanford who worked on the Green Run, was interviewed in 1995 by staff from the DOE, [[Battelle Memorial Institute]], [[Los Alamos National Laboratory]], and the [[Pacific Northwest National Laboratory]].{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=1}} Healy and Lieutenant W.E. Harlan prepared the plans for the Green Run locally at Hanford in 1949.{{r|ACHRE Chapter 11 Footnotes}}{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=6}} Healy reported that he and other science staff at the time were unaware of the full risks of [[environmental radioactivity]] and the "[[Environmental_radioactivity#Cows|milk-to-man pathway]]", and that he believed the staff would have objected to the Green Run. He said the milk contamination theory was only proven ten years later due to the [[United Kingdom]]'s [[Windscale fire#Health effects|Windscale nuclear accident]].{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=8}} The Air Force conducted multiple aerial surveys of the region in the weeks before Green Run began.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=11}} A dedicated air sampling station was set up in Spokane before the test began.{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} The Air Force managed its own radiation monitoring operations separately from the DOE during the Green Run.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=12}} The [[General Electric|General Electric Company]] was involved with the Green Run and had set several conditions that were to be met before the test could be initiated safely and successfully, including that the test could not be run while [[precipitation]] was underway in the area.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} General Electric's Health Instrument Division had laid out specific conditions required for the test to succeed.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} The U.S. Air Force was responsible for all [[meteorology|meteorological]] data and determinations related to the Green Run experiment.{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} The final test conditions required a cold layer of air near ground level, with an inversion that would deflect gases away from soil contamination; no precipitation or rainfall; wind speed at an altitude of 200 feet below 15 MPH; wind from the west or southwest; and all of those conditions remaining in place until the experiment ended.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} The Air Force conducted multiple aerial surveys of the region in the weeks before the Green Run began.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=11}} A dedicated air sampling station was set up in Spokane before the test began.{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} The Air Force managed its own radiation monitoring operations separately from the DOE during the Green Run.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=12}} The [[General Electric|General Electric Company]] was involved with the Green Run and had set several conditions that were to be met before the test could be initiated safely and successfully, including that the test could not be run while [[precipitation]] was underway in the area.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} General Electric's Health Instrument Division had laid out specific conditions required for the test to succeed.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} The Air Force was responsible for all [[meteorology|meteorological]] data and determinations related to the Green Run.{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} The final test conditions required a cold layer of air near ground level, with an inversion that would deflect gases away from soil contamination; no precipitation or rainfall; wind speed at an altitude of 200 feet below 15 MPH; wind from the west or southwest; and all of those conditions remaining in place until the experiment ended.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} By December 2, particularly bad weather in the local [[Palouse]] area had already caused the government's preferred Green Run testing schedule to fall increasingly behind.{{r|Goliszek|p=130-131}} The next recommended release window was designated for December 3 at 1:00 a.m. because favorable weather was predicted then.{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} However, the Green Run began releasing radioactive gas early, at 8:00 p.m. on December 2.{{r|Goliszek|p=130-131}} The weather was reportedly fine at the initiation of the test, near 8 P.M., but by 2 A.M., the wind had fully calmed and then began blowing more southward along the [[Columbia River]].{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=12}} Michele Gerber, the Hanford Site Historian, explained that the military had been waiting for the opportunity to begin the Green Run.{{r|AtomicHeritage Green Run 2019}} By December 2, particularly bad weather in the local [[Palouse]] area had already caused the government's preferred Green Run testing schedule to fall increasingly behind.{{r|Goliszek|p=130-131}} The next recommended release window was designated for December 3 at 1:00 a.m. because favorable weather was predicted then.{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} However, the Green Run began releasing radioactive gas early, at 8:00 p.m. on December 2.{{r|Goliszek|p=130-131}} The weather was reportedly fine at the initiation of the test, near 8 P.M., but by 2 A.M., the wind had fully calmed and then began blowing more southward along the [[Columbia River]].{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=12}} Michele Gerber, the Hanford Site Historian, explained that the military had been waiting for the opportunity to begin the Green Run.{{r|AtomicHeritage Green Run 2019}} Line 57: Line 57: [[File:HanfordContamination.jpg|thumb|A sign at Hanford warning of contamination.]] [[File:HanfordContamination.jpg|thumb|A sign at Hanford warning of contamination.]] [[Douglas C-47 Skytrain]] airplanes were involved in monitoring the active Green Run experiment.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=7}} By sunrise on December 3, U.S. Air Force pilots [[Surveillance aircraft|observing]] the secret test conditions had begun reporting problems, as prior Air Force [[meteorological]] predictions were upended by sudden and unexpected increases and shifts in wind speed, along with the unplanned appearance of a [[Inversion (meteorology)|temperature inversion]].{{r|AtomicHeritage Green Run 2019}}{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} Testing equipment necessary for Green Run's experiment was known to be contaminated by radiation before the test, causing high background signals; the already bad weather conditions during the release worsened this by concentrating radioactive materials at the release stacks.{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} Other portions of the test included a lost weather balloon and failing air pumps.{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} [[Douglas C-47 Skytrain]] airplanes were involved in monitoring the Green Run.{{r|DOE Healy Oral History 1995|p=7}} By sunrise on December 3, Air Force pilots [[Surveillance aircraft|observing]] the secret test conditions had begun reporting problems, as prior Air Force [[meteorological]] predictions were upended by sudden and unexpected increases and shifts in wind speed, along with the unplanned appearance of a [[Inversion (meteorology)|temperature inversion]].{{r|AtomicHeritage Green Run 2019}}{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} Testing equipment necessary for the Green Run was known to be contaminated by radiation before the test, causing high background signals; the already bad weather conditions during the release worsened this by concentrating radioactive materials at the release stacks.{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} Other portions of the test included a lost weather balloon and failing air pumps.{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} The complete discharge of iodine-131 and xenon-133 from the beginning of the Green Run operation took a total of 12 to 17 hours.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-11}}{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} Sources cite {{convert|5500|to|12000|Ci|TBq|lk=on}} of [[iodine-131]] released, along with an even greater amount of [[xenon-133]].{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}}{{r|Miller|p=71}}{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} Robkin's 1992 reanalysis calculated 0.40 PBq ± 30% (11,000 Ci ± 30%) of iodine-131, somewhat larger than the earlier estimates of 0.15-0.30 PBq (4,000-7,780 Ci) from Singlevich (1950) and Jenne and Healy (1950).{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-9}} Robkin also estimated that approximately 29,000 Ci (1.07 PBq) of xenon-133 was released.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-13}} Goliszek gave the Green Run release as almost 8,000 curies of iodine-131 and 20,000 curies of xenon-133 in 2003.{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} For unknown reasons, double the initially expected amount of iodine-131 and nearly triple the expected amount of xenon-133 were released in an initial wind-swept plume that was {{cvt|200|mi|km}} long and {{cvt|40|mi|km}} wide.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=7}}{{r|Goliszek|p=131}}{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} Approximately 8,000 curies of iodine-131 were released during the incident.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=5}} The Green Run was the single largest one-day release of radioiodine from Hanford during its peak years of operation at the height of [[World War II]].{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} The complete discharge of iodine-131 and xenon-133 from the beginning of the Green Run took a total of 12 to 17 hours.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-11}}{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} Sources cite {{convert|5500|to|12000|Ci|TBq|lk=on}} of [[iodine-131]] released, along with an even greater amount of [[xenon-133]].{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}}{{r|Miller|p=71}}{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} Robkin's 1992 reanalysis calculated 0.40 PBq ± 30% (11,000 Ci ± 30%) of iodine-131, somewhat larger than the earlier estimates of 0.15-0.30 PBq (4,000-7,780 Ci) from Singlevich (1950) and Jenne and Healy (1950).{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-9}} Robkin also estimated that approximately 29,000 Ci (1.07 PBq) of xenon-133 was released.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-13}} Goliszek gave the Green Run release as almost 8,000 curies of iodine-131 and 20,000 curies of xenon-133 in 2003.{{r|Goliszek|p=131}} For unknown reasons, double the initially expected amount of iodine-131 and nearly triple the expected amount of xenon-133 were released in an initial wind-swept plume that was {{cvt|200|mi|km}} long and {{cvt|40|mi|km}} wide.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=7}}{{r|Goliszek|p=131}}{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=4}} Approximately 8,000 curies of iodine-131 were released during the incident.{{r|Olson Allison Green Run 2023|p=5}} The Green Run was the single largest one-day release of radioiodine from Hanford during its peak years of operation at the height of [[World War II]].{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} Officials involved in the test said the release was not considered unsafe at the time, and GAO noted that no regulatory limits then existed for the amount of such emissions, despite the release being highly concentrated over a 12-hour period.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=10}} GAO reported conflicting recollections among AEC contractor officials about who approved the weather conditions for the test, with one account placing the decision with AEC contractor officials and another stating that the AEC did not want to proceed but the Air Force ordered the test.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=10}} The U.S. government in 1949 designated the Green Run as top secret for national security reasons, but declined to classify it as human experimentation because the test was "not undertaken with the intent of testing the effects of radiation in humans or designed to measure human exposure."{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} Officials involved in the test said the release was not considered unsafe at the time, and GAO noted that no regulatory limits then existed for the amount of such emissions, despite the release being highly concentrated over a 12-hour period.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=10}} GAO reported conflicting recollections among AEC contractor officials about who approved the weather conditions for the test, with one account placing the decision with AEC contractor officials and another stating that the AEC did not want to proceed but the Air Force ordered the test.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=10}} The U.S. government in 1949 designated the Green Run as top secret for national security reasons, but declined to classify it as human experimentation because the test was "not undertaken with the intent of testing the effects of radiation in humans or designed to measure human exposure."{{r|Goliszek|p=130}} Line 74: Line 74: After references to the Green Run appeared in declassified AEC documents, [[Freedom of Information Act (United States)|Freedom of Information Act]] requests led by Karen Dorn Steele, a reporter from ''[[The Spokesman-Review]]'', uncovered the evidence that led to the disclosure of the Green Run in the spring of 1986.{{r|NPS Bennett Dorn Steele 2024}} The Green Run remained a government secret until 1986.{{r|Wise Green Run}}{{r|Zehner 2012|p=83}} FOIA requests pursued by the Hanford Education Action League and ''[[The Spokesman-Review]]'' in [[Spokane, Washington|Spokane]] revealed some details of the experiment.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} A May 1950 [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] report on the Green Run test remained classified in full, leaving the test undisclosed, for almost four decades.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} Appeals led to the test report being largely declassified in 1989.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} After references to the Green Run appeared in declassified AEC documents, [[Freedom of Information Act (United States)|Freedom of Information Act]] requests led by Karen Dorn Steele, a reporter from ''[[The Spokesman-Review]]'', uncovered the evidence that led to the disclosure of the Green Run in the spring of 1986.{{r|NPS Bennett Dorn Steele 2024}} The Green Run remained a government secret until 1986.{{r|Wise Green Run}}{{r|Zehner 2012|p=83}} FOIA requests pursued by the Hanford Education Action League and ''[[The Spokesman-Review]]'' in [[Spokane, Washington|Spokane]] revealed some details of the experiment.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} A May 1950 [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] report on the Green Run test remained classified in full, leaving the test undisclosed, for almost four decades.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} Appeals led to the test report being largely declassified in 1989.{{r|GAO RCED-94-51FS|p=6}} Portions of reports detailing aspects of Green Run written in the 1950s were among the releases, with notably variable views of the experiments and the amounts of released contaminants at the time.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} The State of Washington had conducted a Hanford Health Effects Study in response to the releases.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} The successor Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project (HEDRP) began in 1988 due to the revelations, administered by the Pacific Northwest Laboratories.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} As of May 2000, the [[State of Washington]] reported that, despite later disclosures, the United States government still withheld critical Green Run-related information, including the names of those responsible for ordering and carrying out the release of radioactive materials into public communities for scientific testing.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} Portions of reports detailing aspects of the Green Run written in the 1950s were among the releases, with notably variable views of the experiments and the amounts of released contaminants at the time.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} The State of Washington had conducted a Hanford Health Effects Study in response to the releases.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} The successor Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project (HEDRP) began in 1988 due to the revelations, administered by the Pacific Northwest Laboratories.{{r|Robkin Green Run 1992|p=A-10}} As of May 2000, the [[State of Washington]] reported that, despite later disclosures, the United States government still withheld critical Green Run-related information, including the names of those responsible for ordering and carrying out the release of radioactive materials into public communities for scientific testing.{{r|WA DOH Hanford releases}} The [[Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments]] (ACHRE) in a 1995 report stated that the Green Run "clearly did not conform to the practices designed to ensure public safety at Hanford in 1949 or even during the rush to produce plutonium for the first atomic bombs."{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} The United States in the ACHRE report maintained that "there may be conditions under which national security can justify secrecy in intentional releases like the Green Run, even as we recognize that secrecy can increase the risk to the exposed population."{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} In a 1995 oral history, health physicist Carl C. Gamertsfelder, Ph.D., described his recollection of the Green Run's purpose, attributing it to the Air Force's interest in tracking Soviet radioactive releases.{{r|Office of Human Radiation Experiments 1995}} The [[Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments]] (ACHRE) in a 1995 report stated that the Green Run "clearly did not conform to the practices designed to ensure public safety at Hanford in 1949 or even during the rush to produce plutonium for the first atomic bombs."{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} The United States in the ACHRE report maintained that "there may be conditions under which national security can justify secrecy in intentional releases like the Green Run, even as we recognize that secrecy can increase the risk to the exposed population."{{r|ACHRE Ch 11 1995}} In a 1995 oral history, health physicist Carl C. Gamertsfelder, Ph.D., described his recollection of the Green Run's purpose, attributing it to the Air Force's interest in tracking Soviet radioactive releases.{{r|Office of Human Radiation Experiments 1995}}