Ethiopia is preparing for a national election on 1 June amid deep political uncertainty and growing insecurity. Officially, the polls are expected to reinforce the country’s democratic transition and political stability. But the conditions suggest that the elections are unlikely to be genuinely competitive.Elections are competitive when parties campaign openly, voters participate freely, and political actors engage without fear of violence or intimidation. There are two main reasons why this will not be the case.First, opposition actors remain fragmented, weakened or excluded from effective political participation. Second, there are armed conflicts and political tensions in several parts of the country. The most tense regions are Amhara, Oromia and Tigray. This has created an unstable environment for electoral competition.Together, these conditions may make the upcoming elections among the least politically competitive Ethiopia has held since multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s.Ethiopia has held six national elections since adopting the federal constitution in 1995. Most took place under conditions of strong ruling-party dominance. The 2005 election was widely considered the country’s most competitive contest. But violence, mass arrests and a severe crackdown on opposition supporters followed, after disputed results and protests.Elections in 2010 and 2015 took place in a more restrictive political environment dominated by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. The 2021 election happened under Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party during the Tigray war. It was marred by delays, insecurity and opposition boycotts. No voting took place in several constituencies. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent won in a landslide.The current electoral environment appears even more challenging.As a scholar of federalism and Ethiopian politics, I see the present conditions as particularly restrictive to meaningful political competition. Opposition fragmentation and exclusionEthiopia’s opposition parties remain fragmented along ideological, ethnic and regional lines. Many lack strong national organisational structures or the capacity to mobilise voters effectively across the country.Attempts to build durable opposition coalitions have faltered. This is due to political mistrust, leadership rivalries, and competing visions of the Ethiopian state. Some parties want stronger regional autonomy and ethnic self-determination. Others favour a more centralised national political framework. These divisions prevent a unified electoral challenge. Even those in the same camp, such as parties advocating for ethnic self rule, are unable to a form united front.Opposition actors continue to face political and institutional constraints too. Several have previously been arrested or detained. Civic actors have come under pressure. During the 2021 elections, prominent Oromo opposition leaders were detained. This prompted the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Federalist Congress, the two main opposition groups in the region, to boycott the polls.Ethiopia formally operates a multiparty system. But meaningful political competition depends also on parties’ ability to organise, campaign and compete on relatively equal terms. Genuine opposition actors have struggled to do so effectively.Political tensions and armed conflictThe second major challenge is the country’s deteriorating security environment. Ethiopia is experiencing armed conflict and political instability in several regions. It is difficult to conduct competitive elections in these conditions.In the Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has intensified over the past two years. Large areas have experienced insecurity, militarisation and disruptions to normal political activity. Oromia continues to face violence linked to the conflict between the government and the Oromo Liberation Army. The conflict has contributed to displacement, insecurity and political tensions in Ethiopia’s largest, most populous and vital region.Tigray also remains politically fragile. This is despite the 2022 Pretoria agreement. The pact formally ended the civil war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.Important aspects of the agreement remain unresolved. These include:the return of internally displaced peoplethe return of pre-war Tigray territoriessecurity arrangementsrelations between regional and federal authorities. Recent tensions inside Tigray’s political leadership have raised fears of renewed instability.Such conditions narrow political space and reduce the possibility of open electoral competition.Elections without competitiveness?The incumbent is running uncontested in 64 of Ethiopia’s 547 constituencies. Voting will not take place in Tigray. And voting will not happen in notable constituencies in Oromia and Amhara because of security concerns. But it’s not enough for voting to take place. Political competitiveness depends on whether opposition parties can take full part, whether citizens can engage freely and whether the broader political environment allows genuine contestation for power.Current conditions raise serious doubts about those requirements. Even compared with previous elections held under authoritarian conditions, today’s environment may prove more restrictive. Insecurity and conflict now intersect with longstanding political constraints.This does not necessarily mean the elections will lack administrative significance or political consequences. For example, the Oromo Liberation Front is running for the first time since 1992. This is symbolically meaningful.But elections alone will not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper political crisis. The country continues to face unresolved disputes over political representation, federalism, security and state authority. Without broader political inclusion and a reduction in armed conflict, the elections are unlikely to provide the level of political competition associated with genuinely open democratic contests.Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.