Since World War II, Japan has deliberately defined itself as a peaceful nation. Relying on the US for its security, Tokyo built one of the world’s largest economies while renouncing nuclear weapons, avoiding the use of force, and refusing to project its conventional military power. That era is now drawing to a close.China’s growing regional assertiveness and America’s ambivalence in Asia, especially regarding the defence of Taiwan against potential Chinese aggression, have caused much of Asia to complain about Trump’s administration and mutter about its likely abandonment of the region. Tokyo, however, is not wringing its hands; it is acting to defend itself and help others secure themselves against Chinese expansionism and US volatility.AdvertisementAlso Read | Japan PM gambles when she buys security in Trump’s worldAt the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last week, Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi unveiled three broad directions of a new security policy: To step up national defence spending and military modernisation, increase defence cooperation with friendly nations, and lift restrictions on the export of arms. The shift marks one of the major transformations in Asian geopolitics since the end of the Cold War.For decades, Japan’s defence industry was largely inward-looking. Strict policy controls limited arms exports and constrained military cooperation with foreign partners. Tokyo has now reached a very different conclusion. It argues that preserving peace in Asia requires active participation in shaping the regional balance of power. The result is a historic relaxation of arms exports announced in April this year.The most visible symbol of this change is the agreement last month to supply eleven upgraded Mogami-class frigates to Australia. The contract, estimated at nearly $7 billion, is the largest defence export in Japan’s post-war history, and goes beyond a simple commercial transaction. It creates a framework for Japan’s long-term defence-industrial collaboration with Australia and other regional partners. It also points to the construction of regional defence networks that are not dependent on Washington.AdvertisementIn Singapore, Koizumi announced that New Zealand is also interested in the purchase of Mogami-class frigates from Tokyo. The emerging Japan-Australia-New Zealand security triangle is not a formal alliance but part of a new web of defence cooperation involving production, logistics, technology sharing and interoperability. Similar conversations are unfolding between Japan and the Philippines, as well as with other maritime states anxious about the changing balance of power in Asia.Koizumi rejected China’s high-pitched accusations about Japan’s militarism and rearmament. Pointing to China’s expanding nuclear arsenal and growing conventional military power, Koizumi gently suggested that “the pot is calling the kettle black.” China can’t dramatically build up its own military capabilities, indulge in coercion of all kinds and accuse others of rearmament and militarism.What is driving Tokyo’s new military doctrine is not nostalgia for great-power status in the imperial era, but anxiety about the future balance of power in Asia. The Taiwan question has sharpened these concerns. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Japan has moved closer than ever to publicly acknowledging that its own security is linked to peace in Taiwan.Tokyo is not breaking from its One China policy. But it has increasingly signalled that a military conflict over Taiwan would have direct consequences for Japan. Chinese reactions have been predictably fierce, with Beijing accusing Tokyo of crossing red lines and interfering in China’s internal affairs.But Takaichi’s Japan is not willing to quiver under Chinese bullying. Tokyo believes preservation of peace in the Taiwan Strait is critical to regional stability. This does not mean Japan seeks confrontation. Rather, it reflects a growing belief that deterrence requires both clarity and capability.The Taiwan issue has become a litmus test for Japan’s strategic evolution. For decades, Tokyo preferred ambiguity. Today, it believes peace in Taiwan is critical for Asian security. That the US Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, tiptoed around the question of Taiwan at the Shangri-La Dialogue is widely viewed as part of Trump’s effort to please China’s leader, Xi Jinping, after the Beijing summit last month.To be fair, Hegseth reaffirmed the US commitment to the balance of power in Asia; he also argued that the US will not allow China to exercise hegemony over Asia. But the way Trump is going about it has triggered anxieties all around. Hegseth also called on the allies and partners to do more for themselves.On its part, Japan is trying to reconcile two strategic imperatives. The first is preserving the American alliance, which has been the foundation of its security. The second is reducing excessive dependence on the United States by strengthening regional security partnerships and creating Asian defence-industrial networks.you may likeThe imperatives for Delhi are similar — engage Washington on defence where beneficial, but also simultaneously enhance strategic collaboration with regional powers like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the ASEAN countries. Plans for India’s bilateral and regional defence collaboration already exist in Delhi. What India needs is an urgent and purposeful transformation of plans into concrete outcomes.Unlike China, India has long welcomed Japan to play a larger security role in Asia. What has changed is Tokyo’s willingness to act upon that logic. The old Japan was an economic giant and a military minimalist. The new Japan seeks to be something different: A security partner, a defence-industrial power and an active participant in shaping the balance of power in Asia. Tokyo’s strategic reorientation is not merely a Japanese story. It is part of Asia’s wider search for a new equilibrium in an era of Chinese power and American reorientation.The writer is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is a distinguished professor at the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University and holds the Korea Foundation Chair on Asian geopolitics at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi