By Aidan J. Simardone – Nov 5, 2026Algiers’s first foreign ground deployment since 1973 signals a broader struggle over Sahel security, Moroccan influence, and control of Africa’s energy corridors.Algerian troops have crossed into neighboring Niger, marking the country’s first acknowledged foreign ground deployment since the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. A military convoy reportedly reached Arlit in late October, days after Algeria’s parliament authorized a mission to protect energy interests in northern Niger. Since the 1970s, Algeria has largely pursued a policy of military restraint abroad while maintaining its anti-imperialist commitments and support for liberation movements across the Global South.Algiers is moving closer to Niger and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formed by Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, as western military influence recedes and competing powers seek a foothold across North and West Africa. The rapprochement also comes amid Algeria’s worsening confrontation with Morocco, whose ties with Israel and the UAE have deepened, which Algiers views as threats to its sovereignty. The deployment also gives Algiers a stronger position in the Sahel, where competition over trade routes, energy infrastructure, and regional influence is intensifying.Algeria’s assistance to Niger will not only strengthen the AES but also provide greater energy autonomy. Its intervention will help protect Niger’s oil fields along the border and provide the security for the proposed Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP), which would transport gas from Nigeria, through Niger, to Algeria. Despite Nigeria maintaining close relations with the west, the recent opening of the Dangote refinery – the largest in Africa – shows a desire to develop domestic energy infrastructure. Algeria’s more assertive foreign policy also signals its willingness to work with neighboring states to develop regional energy infrastructure, support opponents of western imperialism, and resist external interference.Algeria’s tradition of military restraintFrance incorporated Algeria into its metropolitan administration in the 19th century, and a brutal war of liberation from 1954 to 1962 left deep scars.Upon independence, Algeria became known as the “Mecca of Revolutionaries,” where anti-imperialists across the world sought refuge – including the Polisario Front, which sought Western Sahara’s independence from Morocco. When the 1973 Arab–Israeli War broke out, Algeria mobilized fighter jets and sent aid to Egypt and Syria.Algeria’s foreign policy became more cautious in the 1980s, under the leadership of President Chadli Bendjedid and amid growing fears of the Soviet Union’s decline. The possibility of a bolder foreign policy was killed by the 1992–2002 civil war between the Algerian government and Islamist groups. This war not only turned Algeria inward but also to the west, as it cooperated with Washington in the fight against Al-Qaeda. This alignment, however, was pragmatic rather than ideological. When NATO launched its war against Libya, Algeria was one of the fiercest opponents, worried that the removal of the late prime minister Muammar Gaddafi would destabilize the Maghreb – worries that proved correct.Yet, even as chaos spread throughout the Maghreb and the Sahel, Algeria avoided foreign military involvement, instead pursuing diplomacy. In 2012, war broke out in Mali when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad declared independence. Rather than send in the military, Algeria negotiated a ceasefire in what became the 2015 Algiers Accords. In neighboring Libya, Turkiye and Qatar sent arms to the Government of National Unity, and Egypt and the UAE supported the rival Government of National Stability. Despite bordering Libya, Algeria did not send any weapons, instead emphasizing a peaceful resolution to the conflict.Morocco and the Sahel challengeEverything began to change in 2020. As part of the Abraham Accords, Morocco normalized relations with Israel, in exchange for the US formally recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This was a major blow to Algeria, which has supported Western Sahara since independence. It also risked emboldening Morocco, which claims parts of western Algeria. Worse, Morocco became a center of operations for Israel and the UAE, the latter of which also normalized relations with Tel Aviv. In 2023, Israel participated for the first time in military exercises in Morocco, and did so again in 2025. This year, the countries agreed to deeper military cooperation. Meanwhile, closer relations with the UAE came just as Abu Dhabi was supporting separatism and rival governments in Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. With the UAE’s support of Libya’s Government of National Stability, Algeria feared it would be squeezed from both the west and east.In response, Algeria severed ties with Morocco in August 2021, accusing Rabat of supporting Kabyle separatism. It would later make the same claim when it cut relations with the UAE in September 2026. It also increased its military budget from $9 billion in 2022 to $25 billion last year. Algeria also faced a changing landscape to its south. Coups were launched in Mali in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023, which together would form the AES. On the surface, these developments should have been welcomed by Algiers, given their mutual hostility to France. Instead, it rejected the coups.Relations were already shaky. Over the past decade, Mali has accused Algeria of supporting Amazigh rebels and Niger has denounced its mistreatment of migrants. With the coups, Algeria feared the region would further destabilize and opposed the use of military force to resolve political disputes.Allegations that the UAE was assisting Mali and Niger also raised fears that these countries would become another base of operations for Abu Dhabi. Algerian diplomacy was also undermined when Mali terminated the Algiers Accords in January 2024.In 2023, Mali recalled its ambassador from Algeria, accusing them of meeting with rebels. In March 2025, relations worsened when a Malian drone was shot near the border (Algeria claims it entered its territory, while Mali claims it was on its side). The next month, Algeria withdrew its ambassador and banned flights with Mali. In solidarity with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger recalled their ambassadors from Algeria.Algiers rebuilds ties with the SahelTensions with the AES would not last. Despite continued insurgent violence, the AES governments have made some territorial gains, easing Algeria’s earlier concerns over the political upheaval in the Sahel. Since the Mali coup, insurgents have failed to further capture and hold onto major towns or cities, while Mali recently captured the strategic northern town of Kidal. Territorial control in Niger has remained largely unchanged. In Burkina Faso, the government claims to have increased its control of territory from 69 percent in 2023 to 74 percent in 2025. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also reported that the security situation has improved since Ibrahim Traore came to power. The AES also did not become a base of operations for the UAE. Most recently, tensions have actually risen. In August 2026, a UN report found that the UAE paid a $50 million ransom to Al Qaeda-linked militants in Mali. According to Africa Intelligence, Amazigh rebels in October reached out to the UAE seeking finance and weapons in exchange for gold.Russia also helped calm AES–Algerian tensions. According to Le Monde, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov encouraged the AES to restore relations with Algeria. The effort was successful. In February 2026, Nigerien President Abdourahamane Tiani and Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune met in Algiers. Diplomatic relations were restored, and the countries agreed to security cooperation along the border and the development of infrastructure, including the TSGP. In July 2026, Algeria and Mali announced the restoration of relations. In August, Algeria donated four military helicopters to Niger and sent fighter jets to stop a coup attempt in Niamey. Navi Pillay’s Nobel Rewards an Epic LieAlgeria moves beyond diplomacyThe AES’s disputes with the UAE, alongside Russia’s diplomatic efforts, helped ease tensions with Algiers. What it does not explain, however, is why Algeria would not only pursue diplomacy, but send its military – challenging decades of restraint over foreign deployments.On 21 October, 2026, Algeria and Niger signed a military cooperation protocol, which four days later was unanimously approved by the Algerian parliament. The protocol calls for the deployment of Algerian troops in Madama, a former French military base close to the Libyan border. It was then revealed that the Algerian convoy arrived in Arlit, close to the Algerian border. With Arlit and Madama 740 kilometers from each other – the same distance between Paris and Berlin – Algeria has a huge area of operations. According to Algiers, their mission is to protect oil investments in northern Niger. But Algeria has had investments in this region since 2022, raising the question: why now?Relations with Morocco quickly deteriorated over Western Sahara. Over the last two years, around a dozen countries, including Security Council members France and the UK, and Western Sahara’s former colonizer, Spain, have endorsed Morocco’s “autonomy” proposal for Western Sahara. Four countries – Colombia, Ghana, Mali, and Peru – have withdrawn their recognition of Western Sahara. Rabat has also sought to extend its influence across West Africa through the Atlantic Initiative, offering landlocked Sahel states access to Moroccan ports through the Atlantic Initiative.Algeria thus faced pressure to pursue a more active foreign policy to counter its rival. Deploying troops to northern Niger also provides experience with operations in a desert environment similar to the Algerian–Moroccan border region and Western Sahara. It may also help Algiers compete with Morocco for influence in the Sahel. And it signals that Algeria is prepared to use force to protect its interests.One of the risks, however, is western backlash. Libya’s bold foreign policy resulted in NATO’s overthrow of Gaddafi and the division of the country. A comparable western intervention would face far greater obstacles today. The US has deployed its carriers near the Persian Gulf, and munitions are running low from the Iran War. France, over the past few years, has withdrawn its military from five African countries and greatly reduced its military presence in two (the Europeans and Americans have also withdrawn from the AES). Algeria has reduced its trade with France, thus lowering the impact of any possible sanctions. Recently, Algeria blocked sending $219 million worth of fertilizer to France in response to its support for Morocco. In place of the west, China has increased its trade with Africa, while Russia and Turkiye have provided military assistance. The rise of multipolarity has also given African states greater scope to determine how their resources are developed, rather than simply exporting raw materials for processing abroad. Now, there is greater agency. Proposals for the TSGP – running from Nigeria, through Niger to Algeria – go all the way back to the 1970s. But Nigeria lacked the processing facilities necessary for gas. This was part of the imperial model, where Africa sent raw resources to the west, where they were then processed. But despite close ties with the west, Nigeria is now developing its own energy infrastructure. In January 2024, the Dangote oil refinery began production, becoming Africa’s largest refinery, with plans for further expansion. The project demonstrated Nigeria’s growing commitment to developing its domestic energy infrastructure, strengthening the case for further regional cooperation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also provided further incentive, with higher prices and Europe looking for suppliers other than Moscow. Algeria became one of the largest suppliers of gas. With the Iran War, Nigeria has now become the third-largest supplier, displacing Qatar. In 2022, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the TSGP. In 2025, an agreement was signed to accelerate construction. Algeria has begun construction, and Niger is expected to begin in early 2027.But as long as there is an insurgency in Niger, the pipeline will be vulnerable. As Morocco continues to offer the Atlantic Initiative as a route, Algeria fears time is running out. Hence its decision to intervene in Niger.Algeria’s changing regional roleFor half a century, Algeria has tried to maintain stability in its neighborhood through negotiations and diplomacy. This strategy avoided the wrath of western countries and lessened conflict in countries like Mali. But diplomacy can only go so far. Algeria denounced coups in the Sahel and, in doing so, alienated itself from an anti-imperialist alliance that was progressing against the insurgency. As it avoided getting involved in conflicts, Morocco was building relations with Israel and the UAE, and getting its sovereignty over Western Sahara recognized.Algeria has increased its military budget amid growing tensions with Morocco and is now deploying troops to Niger as it strengthens cooperation with the AES. The move also reflects Algiers’s determination to protect its regional interests and secure the infrastructure needed to develop the TSGP.Serious challenges remain. Morocco keeps making overtures to the Sahel states. Insurgencies and conflicts continue. Algeria’s more active approach could strengthen regional security cooperation and give Sahel states greater influence over the development of their resources, although its success will depend on conditions on the ground. (The Cradle)