LYDIA POLGREEN2026年5月21日In January, Stephen Miller gave a blustery and revealing interview to the CNN journalist Jake Tapper. Flush with the triumph of the military raid to abduct Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, Miller was taking a victory lap. America was done being the world’s nice guy, footing the bill for a global order that no longer served its interests. From now on, he said, the gloves were off. America would act boldly and with unapologetic force to impose its will on the world.1月，史蒂芬·米勒接受CNN记者杰克·塔珀采访时，言辞嚣张，却也透露了不少情况。当时，美国成功发动军事突袭，绑架了委内瑞拉总统马杜罗，米勒正沉浸在胜利的喜悦中。他宣称，美国不再做世界的老好人，不愿为一个不再符合自身利益的全球秩序埋单。他说，从今往后，美国将不再手下留情，美国将大胆行动，毫不掩饰地动用武力，将自己的意志强加给世界。This was seemingly the purest expression of Donald Trump’s theory of power, spoken by perhaps the most hard-line member of the administration. Indeed, America is the most powerful nation the world has ever known. Its economy is, by most measures, the world’s largest, and its currency dominates global markets. Above all, it commands the most advanced military on the planet, fueled by expensive, high-tech wizardry and the derring-do of its special forces.这似乎是对特朗普权力理论最直白的表述，出自本届政府中最强硬的人物之一。诚然，美国是有史以来世界上最强大的国家。从大多数指标来看，它的经济规模全球第一，货币主导全球市场。最重要的是，它拥有地球上最先进的军事力量，由昂贵的高科技装备和勇猛果敢的特种部队支撑。It was with this pugnacious certainty that the Trump administration barreled into a reckless, unprovoked war against Iran more than two months ago. Trump clearly thought it would be a showcase of American might, unshackled from what Miller called the “niceties” of international law and powered by ruthless “kinetic” action, to borrow a favorite word of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s.正是带着这种好战的笃定，两个多月前，特朗普政府对伊朗发动了一场鲁莽且毫无来由的战争。特朗普显然认为，这将是美国实力的一次展示，得以摆脱米勒口中国际法的“繁文缛节”，并且由国防部长海格塞思喜欢说的那种无情的“动能”行动来驱动。It hasn’t worked out that way. Despite losing its leader and many other top officials, Iran has mounted a formidable response, inflicting widespread damage on America’s regional allies and military bases. By seizing control of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has grasped something akin to an economic nuclear weapon, sending fuel prices soaring and prompting shortages of key goods in many parts of the world.但事与愿违。尽管失去了最高领导人及众多高官，伊朗仍展开了强有力的反击，对美国在该地区的盟友和军事基地造成广泛破坏。通过控制霍尔木兹海峡，伊朗掌握了堪比经济核武器的筹码，导致全球油价飙升，多地关键物资短缺。“We live in a world,” Miller told Tapper, “that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.” The painful fallout of the Iran war provides an eloquent rebuttal. But the Trump administration has done more than misjudge American force and the wherewithal of its adversary. It has fundamentally misunderstood what power is, conflating it with the capacity to inflict violence when the two are, in truth, opposed.米勒对塔珀说：“我们生活在一个由实力主宰、由武力主宰、由权力主宰的世界。”伊朗战争带来的惨痛后果正是对这一论调最有力的反驳。然而，特朗普政府不仅误判了美国的武力和对手的实力，更从根本上误解了权力的本质，将权力等同于施加暴力的能力，事实上，二者是截然对立的。Miller’s chest-thumping recalls one of the most ancient and influential texts about war, Thucydides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War.” Across eight detailed books, it tells the story of an epic fight between two rival hegemons in the Mediterranean, Athens and Sparta. “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” the powerful Athenians tell the citizens of Melos, a neutral Greek island, ordering them to submit or be slaughtered.米勒的夸夸其谈让人想起关于战争最古老且最有影响力的著作之一——修昔底德的《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》。这部八卷本著作详尽讲述了地中海两大霸权城邦雅典与斯巴达之间的史诗对决。强大的雅典人对中立的米洛斯岛民说：“强者为所欲为，弱者逆来顺受”，并勒令他们臣服，否则将遭屠杀。This declaration is often cited as an ur-realist iron law of might equaling right. But there’s an irony that often escapes those who cite the line, perhaps because they didn’t read the whole text. If they had, they’d discover that the Melians were not powerless victims but cleareyed prophets. “And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?” the Melians asked their attackers.这句话常被奉为强权即公理这一现实主义原初铁律。但引用这句话的人往往忽略了这其中存在的讽刺，或许是因为他们没读完整部作品。若他们读过全文，便会发现，米洛斯人并非无能为力的受害者，而是目光如炬的预言家，他们反问入侵者：“你们这样做，不正是在你们现有敌人的基础上更多树敌吗？原本无意与你们为敌的人也会被迫成为你们的敌人。”Unmoved, the Athenians laid siege to the city, slaughtering all its men and enslaving its women and children. But the triumph at Melos was a false victory. Drunk on the violence they mistook for power, the Athenians blundered on to a far riskier gambit, an invasion of Sicily. The Athenians, initially divided on the war, were eventually persuaded by leaders who believed that the Sicilians were weak and corrupt. They were sitting ducks, unable to defend themselves against so fearsome a foe. It would be an easy victory bringing Athens greater glory.雅典人不为所动，围攻这座城市，屠杀所有成年男性，将妇女儿童卖为奴隶。但他们在米洛斯的胜利是虚假的。雅典人沉迷于这种被误当作权力的暴力，贸然发动了一场风险更大的冒险——入侵西西里。起初，雅典人对战争意见不一，但最终被那些认为西西里人弱小腐败的领袖说服，认定西西里人如同待宰的羔羊，面对如此可怕的敌人根本无力自卫，胜利唾手可得，为雅典带来更大荣耀。But strength was not enough. The timbers of Athenian ships, enforcing a long blockade, rotted; supply lines dried up. The Athenians, increasingly short of money, had to impose new taxes to fund the war. Finally, in a fierce battle at Syracuse, they were routed. It wasn’t the end of Athens’ hegemony, but it was the beginning of the end. Eventually, Sparta took its place as the Mediterranean’s pre-eminent power.但仅有武力远远不够。执行长期封锁的雅典战船木材腐朽，补给线也枯竭了。雅典人资金日益短缺，只能加征新税支撑战争。最终，在锡拉库萨的激战中，雅典军队溃败。这虽非雅典霸权的终结，却是其衰落的开端。最终，斯巴达取代雅典，成为地中海的主导力量。It is not hard to see the parallels to America’s situation. Like the Athenians, the Trumpians saw their romp in Venezuela as a sign of their irrefutable power. And like the Athenians, they overreached — attacking an enemy they underestimated with muddled motives, uncertain support at home and no clear plan for victory. Entranced by their own capacity for violence, they thought their power to effect their will was limitless.不难看出，这与美国当下的处境何其相似。如同当年的雅典人，特朗普阵营将他们在委内瑞拉的肆意妄为视为自身不可撼动权力的证明；也如同雅典人，他们过度扩张——在动机混乱、国内支持不稳、缺乏清晰胜利计划的情况下，去攻击一个被他们低估的敌人。他们沉迷于自身的施暴能力，误以为贯彻自身意志的力量是无穷无尽的。Their strategic mistake rested on a misreading of power. In 1970, the philosopher Hannah Arendt published a slim book, “On Violence.” In it, Arendt argues that violence is not a form of power but its opposite. Written amid America’s failing war in Vietnam, the book was partly critiquing the calls for violence among left-wing radicals who opposed the war. Yet reading the book in recent weeks, I was struck by how resonant it is for the American predicament in the Persian Gulf.他们的战略错误源于对权力的误读。1970年，哲学家汉娜·阿伦特出版了一本薄薄的小册子《论暴力》。在书中，阿伦特指出，暴力并非权力的一种形式，而是其对立面。这本书写于美国深陷越战泥淖之际，一定程度上是批判那些反对战争却主张暴力的左翼激进分子。然而，近几周重读此书，我深感它对美国在波斯湾的困境有着惊人的现实针对性。Power, Arendt argued, is collective, consensual and relational. Violence, by contrast, is instrumental and coercive, its strength evaporating the moment the threat is evaded or withdrawn. “Violence can always destroy power,” Arendt wrote. “Out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power.”阿伦特认为，权力是集体的、基于共识的和关系性的。暴力则截然相反，它是工具性的、强制性的，一旦威胁被规避或撤除，其力量便烟消云散。“暴力固然能够摧毁权力，”阿伦特写道，“枪口之下生出最有效的命令，带来最即时、最彻底的服从。但从枪口之下生长不出来的，是权力。”We see this dynamic playing out in the stalemate with Iran today. For all America’s military prowess, its endless ability to inflict violence, including Trump’s barely veiled threat to use a nuclear weapon, Iran has not capitulated. Its brutal theocratic regime may be widely reviled by its own people, but in the face of obliteration many Iranians have rallied around their government. Years of economic isolation wrought by sanctions have honed the country’s survival skills.这种动态正在当今与伊朗的僵局中上演。尽管美国拥有强大的军事实力，拥有无尽的施暴能力，包括特朗普几乎不加掩饰的动用核武威胁，伊朗依然没有屈服。这个残暴的神权政权或许遭到本国民众的唾弃，但面对覆灭的威胁，许多伊朗人反而团结到政府周围。多年制裁带来的经济孤立早已磨砺出这个国家的生存技能。Trump has been reduced to playing down Iranian attacks on American destroyers trying to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, calling them “a trifle.” Evidence has emerged of widespread damage to American military bases across the Gulf, turning barracks and mess halls into heaps of rubble and ash. The war has already cost $29 billion, according to the Pentagon, in what is surely a huge underestimate. And American intelligence officials have reportedly concluded Iran could endure the blockade for months.特朗普被迫淡化伊朗对试图封锁霍尔木兹海峡的美国驱逐舰发动的袭击，将其称为“小事一桩”。同时有证据显示，美国在海湾地区的多个军事基地遭受了大范围的破坏，营房和食堂变成瓦砾与灰烬。根据五角大楼的说法，这场战争已耗费了290亿美元——而这个数字几乎可以肯定是严重低估的。据报道，美国情报官员也得出结论，伊朗能够承受封锁数月之久。Trump’s support back home, meanwhile, is in free fall. In poll after poll, large majorities of Americans say they oppose the war, do not understand its purpose and deeply dislike the havoc it is wreaking on their pocketbooks. Seeing the political peril ahead, Trump has urgently sought an offramp, promising an imminent deal even as he issues empty threats of total annihilation and baseless claims of total victory. Few seem to believe him.与此同时，特朗普在国内的支持率正在直线下降。一项又一项民调显示，大多数美国人表示反对这场战争，不明白它的目的所在，并且对于战争对个人财务状况造成的严重冲击深为不满。眼见政治风险逼近，特朗普急切寻求退路，一边声称即将达成协议，一边又发出空洞的彻底毁灭威胁和取得全面胜利的无稽之谈。几乎没有人信他的话。“All governments rest on opinion,” as the Federalist Papers famously declare. Yet Trump has been unable to persuade Americans to accept a modicum of suffering to achieve his strategic aims. For all his defiant projection of unbound command, the war has revealed extraordinary weakness at the core of his presidency, the true puniness of his power.正如《联邦党人文集》中的名言：“一切政府皆以民意为基础。”然而，特朗普始终无法说服美国人为实现他的战略目标承受哪怕一丁点痛苦。尽管他摆出一副不受任何约束、号令天下的张扬姿态，但这场战争暴露了他总统之位核心处的极度虚弱，也让人看清了他的权力又是何等微不足道。This weakness is hardly limited to the war. When Trump tried to use violence to prosecute his harsh deportation agenda in Minnesota, he was defeated by the relentless efforts of a coordinated, nonviolent civic opposition, which rallied public opinion against him. The vast operation in Minneapolis has been almost entirely abandoned, the presence of federal agents in the state dwindling from thousands to hundreds of agents, not many more than before the operation began.这种弱点并不局限于这场战争。当特朗普试图在明尼苏达州使用暴力推行他严厉的驱逐出境议程时，他败给了一场持续不断、协调有序的非暴力公民抵抗运动，这场运动成功地将公众舆论动员起来反对他。明尼阿波利斯的大规模执法行动几乎已被完全放弃，该州联邦特工人数从数千人下降到数百人，仅比行动开始前略多。Many of Trump’s attempts to rule through the different force of executive orders have met a similar fate — be they imposing tariffs, slashing government spending or building opulent monuments to himself. In the court of public opinion and even, at crucial moments, at the Supreme Court, Trump keeps losing his fights. Perhaps it is no surprise that Miller has been awfully quiet of late. His entire theory of power, and perhaps Trump’s presidency, is in peril.特朗普试图借助行政命令这种独特的强制力进行统治的许多尝试，都遭遇了同样的命运——无论是加征关税、削减政府开支，还是为自己建造华丽纪念工程。在民意法庭上，乃至在关键时刻的最高法院，特朗普屡屡失利。难怪米勒近来格外沉寂。他整套权力理论乃至特朗普的总统生涯都处于危险之中。Yet America, unlike Athens, faces no Sparta. Its only credible rival for global hegemony, China, has shown little interest in foreign adventurism. Instead, it has set about strengthening its power in an Arendtian fashion: through the accumulation of willing allies rather than coerced vassals, using trade deals, foreign investment and diplomacy. These are precisely the tools that the United States once used to great effect to build its power and wealth.不过，与雅典不同，美国面对的不是斯巴达。唯一能对其全球霸权构成真正挑战的中国对海外冒险并没有什么兴趣。相反，中国已经开始以阿伦特式的方式增强自己的权力：利用贸易协议、外国投资和外交手段，聚拢心甘情愿的盟友，而非强制压服的附庸。这些恰恰是美国曾经用来有效建立自身实力与财富的工具。The Trump administration, however, has shown nothing but contempt for the patient work of building durable power based on consensus, preferring the blitzkrieg of violence. Last week’s long-awaited summit in Beijing underscored the divergence. “Our two countries should be partners rather than rivals,” China’s president, Xi Jinping, pointedly said. For the beleaguered Trump, the scale of defeat must have been unmissable.而特朗普政府对基于共识建立持久权力的耐心工作表现出的只有蔑视，更喜欢暴力的闪电战。上周，备受期待的北京峰会凸显了这种分歧。“我们两国应该成为伙伴而不是对手，”中国国家主席习近平意味深长地说道。对于陷入困境的特朗普来说，败局之惨烈，他无法忽视。Lydia Polgreen是时报专栏作者。翻译：晋其角、杜然点击查看本文英文版。