A framework for assessing climate costs and economic benefits of major entertainment events

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IntroductionLarge-scale international entertainment events (mega-events), while culturally and economically significant, are facing criticism due to their carbon intensive activities, including international travel, infrastructure construction, and large-scale consumption1,2,3,4. The live music industry has been called a “major carbon sinner”, while the FIFA Football World Cup has been projected to be “among the most polluting sporting events in history”, with calls to reduce its scope5,6.Entertainment and sports industries and their consumers are grappling with the associated environmental impacts, and several “greening” initiatives have been launched, including EARTHPERCENT, Football for Future, Julie’s Bicycle, Creative Industry Green and Coldplay’s “CO2 Drawdown” rebate. However, most are limited in scope, and there is a lack of a cohesive strategy for assessing and improving the sustainability of events7. Attempts at ‘net-zero’ events by organisers have been met with scepticism and claims of greenwashing8. For example, the Swiss Fairness Commission ruled that FIFA could not adequately support its carbon neutrality claims for the 2022 World Cup9. While carbon offsets were once seen as a viable tool for achieving sustainable events, recent findings have raised concerns over their integrity10,11. Their current market prices are also far below estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC)12,13. Due to regulatory failure, the price of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is substantially below its social cost in almost every jurisdiction12,14. This divergence raises the potential for an event to be commercially successful while producing a social loss.To address the current situation where the social viability of events is being questioned, and where there is a lack of cohesion and credibility in the industry’s response, we provide an interdisciplinary framework to both evaluate and achieve sustainable entertainment events. This paper is organised as follows: in the results section, we first present the theoretical framework and then demonstrate its application to two case studies as illustrative examples, namely the 2026 FIFA World Cup and Coldplay’s 2024 European tour. Our findings suggest that the consumer welfare gains from both events exceed the associated emissions costs, although the World Cup may not be viable under some higher carbon cost estimates. In the absence of adequate carbon pricing policies, we propose that the principle of shared responsibility be applied to reduce emissions. We then consider the implications of these results for organisers and spectators in the discussion section.ResultsA framework for environmentally sustainable entertainment eventsOur framework is based upon both welfare economics and the principle of shared responsibility. We apply a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to determine the viability of a given event. The economic benefit is determined by observing secondary ticket market prices to determine consumer willingness to pay (WTP). WTP is recognised as a legitimate estimate of benefits and has been used in government guidelines on CBA including the U.S.’s Office of Management and Budget15,16,17. Costs are calculated using the SCC to monetise the event’s emissions. If the benefits outweigh the costs, the event is considered climate viable. Still, the question remains of who should pay the costs of these events, for which we suggest the adoption of the principle of shared responsibility, a hybrid solution that allocates costs to both the consumers and the producer18.CBAs using the SCC have become a common tool for government decision makers12,19,20,21. Importantly, however, the CBA framework presented here uses a revealed preference method to determine consumer surplus. There are three steps to the framework (see Fig. 1). Our research merges four strands of literature across two fields of study: the environmental impact of music and sporting events, and the economic effects of music and sporting events. It is also applicable to events in other industries (e.g. theatre, conferences and vacations).Fig. 1: Framework for increasing the sustainability of entertainment events.Full size imageNWe refers the net welfare of the event. Step one includes the measurement of total surplus and the quantification of emissions costs.Work quantifying the damages associated with both music and sporting events is extensive. Carbon footprint analysis has become a popular tool for assessing environmental impacts1,4,22,23,24,25,26. However, these assessments often stand on their own and offer little policy guidance, essentially acting as hazard identification. Literature on the economics of entertainment events, especially live music, is large, with much of it falling under the term ‘Rockonomics’27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36.There are also studies comparing the costs and benefits of events, especially in the context of sporting mega-events37,38,39,40,41,42,43. Yet, these studies focus on concrete economic impacts such as employment and substitution effects, and do not normally consider the welfare, nor the environmental externalities. While there are some estimates of WTP for environmental measures in sporting events44, they rely on contingent valuation methods, and do not focus on overall welfare. Some work has investigated so-called “life satisfaction effects”, including a 2008 study that found WTP to host the London Olympics totalled £2 billion45. These studies, however, rely on contingent valuation methods, and the use of consumer surplus estimations to calculate the welfare effects of mega-events does not appear to have been conducted43,46.We build on the existing environmental pricing literature47, both conceptually and methodologically. We provide an inter-disciplinary conceptual framework for assessing and achieving the climate viability of an event via welfare economics and the principle of shared responsibility. Methodologically, we apply a revealed preference technique by collecting data from secondary ticket market platforms and quantify climate change externalities through the SCC. We note that our approach is limited in that it only considers consumer welfare, ignoring discrete economic impacts such as displacement and expenditure. However, our chosen metric of welfare – consumer surplus – is apt for this CBA framework, since we are concerned primarily with whether spectator utility is greater than or equal to the event’s emissions costs. Furthermore, our use of a revealed preference method for WTP via resale ticket prices represents a replicable strategy for any event with secondary ticket markets.We provide guidance for policy makers, regulators and organisers seeking an actionable approach to assessing and improving the sustainability of events. To establish the efficacy of this framework, we present both an ex-post and ex-ante case study. The ex-post analysis is conducted on the 2024 Coldplay European tour. The ex-ante analysis is performed on the 2026 FIFA World Cup’s expansion from 32 to 48 teams. This involves an ex-ante estimation of WTP and demonstrates how organisers can incorporate the framework into the decision-making process prior to an event. The differing contexts demonstrate that this framework provides cohesion in assessing and achieving sustainable large-scale entertainment events.Step 1 tests whether the event is climate viable. If benefits are greater than the costs, the event is deemed to be socially viable. Otherwise, the event should either be scaled down, re-planned to reduce emissions, or cancelled. That is:$${NWe}\,=\,{TSe}\,-\,{ECe}$$(f.1)Where NWe is equal to the net welfare gain or loss of the event, TSe is the total surplus of the event, and ECe is the emissions cost of the event. The decision criteria for organisers are thus:$${NWe}\, > \,0\to \,{{\mathrm{Viable}}}:\,{{\mathrm{operate}}}\,{{\mathrm{event}}}\,{{\mathrm{and}}}\,{{\mathrm{account}}}\,{{\mathrm{for}}}\,{{\mathrm{emissions}}}$$(1)$${NWe}\, < \,0\to \,{{\mathrm{Not}}}\,{{\mathrm{viable}}}:\,{{\mathrm{downsize}}},\,{{\mathrm{reorganise}}},\,{{\mathrm{or}}}\,{{\mathrm{cancel}}}$$(2)The finding that economic benefits outweigh environmental costs is not carte blanche for an event to operate. Rather, it is grounds for the reallocation of benefits such that the environmental externalities associated with the event are justly accounted for.The welfare gain can be measured by the consumer surplus (CS) of attendees28,30. CS is the difference between the price charged by the producer and the willingness to pay (WTP) of the consumer to attend the event (CS = WTP – Price). WTP can be measured by observing secondary (resale) ticket markets, where tickets are purchased from the organisers and then resold on a third-party platform33,34. Often, the price is higher than that charged by organisers27,35. The difference between the face value and the resale-value is consumer surplus captured by the reseller30. We observe the prices posted on reselling platforms, not the realised transaction prices, noting that posted and realised transaction prices in secondary ticket markets have been shown to be closely aligned48. Consumer surplus should be understood as potential consumer surplus here, as it depends on the extent of reselling: consumers who purchase on the secondary market at their maximum WTP would realise no surplus, with the difference instead captured by resellers.Importantly, most producers (i.e. sports clubs or concert organisers) have market power and price discriminate35,49. This sees ticket prices vary by section despite equal marginal production costs (e.g. for centre-stage). Price discrimination allows producers to capture a portion of the total surplus, the producer surplus (PS). The TS captures the total welfare generated by the event:$${TS}={CS}+{PS}$$(f.2)Estimating the emissions costs involves first estimating the GHGs in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) and then converting them into a monetary value through the SCC21,50. The SCC measures the cost of an incremental amount of carbon released into the atmosphere12. Emissions can be divided into direct emissions (scope 1 and 2) and indirect emissions (scope 3). Scope 1 refers to emissions from sources owned or controlled by the organiser, scope 2 to indirect emissions from purchased energy, and scope 3 to all other indirect emissions in the value chain, including spectator travel51. Estimating an event’s GHG footprint entails a four-step process51: (1) Scoping and boundary setting; (2) Data collection; (3) Baselining and (4) Scaling up (see methods for further details). The private costs of the event are assumed to be captured by the face value ticket price or made publicly available by the organisers. If the event is subsidised (for example, the building of stadiums) then the full economic cost should also be calculated. Other environmental costs (e.g. waste and habitat destruction) may also be consequential and underpriced, and would ideally also be incorporated.Step 2 incorporates the climate change costs into the pricing of the event. Even if the event is viable, emissions costs should be paid by those who generate them, both on economic efficiency and equity grounds. We propose direct emissions costs (scope 1 and 2) should be paid by the organisers. The price paid would be the amount of CO2-e multiplied by the SCC, minus any embedded fees already paid (e.g. carbon permits purchased by electricity producers). A mean SCC value is readily available, e.g. the truncated mean from Moore et al.14. Given monopoly power, organisers will likely have the capacity to pass most of these costs on through higher ticket prices52. However, due to the high willingness to pay by consumers this is unlikely to reduce consumer demand. Nonetheless, requiring the producer to internalise their social costs provides an incentive to reduce direct emissions.Indirect emissions are likely to far outstrip the direct emissions of an event, due to spectator travel. These need to be meaningfully addressed, particularly in the absence of a global transport pricing policy that adequately accounts for the climate costs of aviation, which seems unlikely in the near to medium-term53. Event organisers are not directly responsible for the emissions of spectators. These emissions depend on the travel choices of the spectators themselves. Nonetheless, spectator travel is induced by the event itself. Consumer agency may be limited by a variety of factors, including endogenous preferences and induced demand54,55. These factors highlight the interdependence of consumer and producer decision making, and that neither acts in isolation18,56,57.We propose that the principle of shared responsibility be applied in allocating the costs of indirect emissions. Shared responsibility is a concept that has been applied in ecological economics58,59, the management of environmental hazards60, and international law61. As noted by Nollkaemper and Jacobs, it applies in situations where “the contributions of each individual cannot be attributed to them based on causation”62. In this context, the principle of shared responsibility is an ethical guiderail that helps to assign the ownership of event emissions - especially indirect (scope 3) emissions.In the absence of meaningful carbon transport pricing (which is the first best solution), we propose applying the principle of shared responsibility with an insight from welfare economics. That is, to induce behavioural change, measures should be aimed at the activity most closely related to the source of emissions, likely to be distance travelled and mode of transport. While the principle of shared responsibility requires event organisers to own their indirect emissions, it does not require they pay for them at the prevailing SCC. In seeking emissions reduction measures under the principle of shared responsibility, event organisers should engage in a thought experiment where they consider their likely actions if they were deemed to be liable for their direct and indirect emissions at the prevailing SCC (that is, full internalisation of all emissions associated with the event). This would drive organiser decisions around event location and scale. It should also trigger Coasian bargaining between organisers and spectators, as long as transaction costs were low enough. In this scenario, organisers would be willing to pay for low-cost emissions reductions of spectators, potentially funded by higher ticket prices.Creative solutions to induce climate friendly behaviour change, which could be additive, include: (1) Raising the cost of tickets and offering rebates on proof sustainable travel; (2) Locating events in places that minimise travel (e.g. more venues in regional centres); and (3) Encouraging participants to voluntarily price their carbon using certified offsets and/or charitable donations when other options have been exhausted. A fourth option, which is difficult to quantify but may be impactful, is to utilise the public platform of entertainment events to promote climate focused policies. Each of these solutions has practical limitations which mitigate their effectiveness, but a combination may be successful.Step 3 involves the collection and allocation of funds. The mechanism for the collection of funds from a carbon pricing policy could be the event organiser itself, who could commission and publicly release an emissions audit. The organiser could then pay the social cost of its direct emissions to a registered charity (similar to the UK’s Single Use Plastic Carrier Bags Charge where retailers directly fund ‘good causes’ from the proceeds). The organiser could also collect part, or all, of the indirect emissions costs through a ticket price-sustainable travel refund scheme. Alternatively, collection could fall to industry associations or to the state (such as in France where the state collects 3.5% of ticket values to support live music63).The funds generated by a pricing mechanism would be substantial, even if limited to the direct emissions, and should be put to the highest value application. This portfolio of uses could include carbon insetting, research and development, adaptation, and carbon offsets. Allocation of funds could be assisted by an expert panel such as the music industry’s EARTHPERCENT. Alternatively, if the funds raised are collected by the state, the increase in revenue could be used to reduce market-distorting taxes. An essential nuance is that the allocation of collected funds is secondary to the economic rationale of a pricing mechanism, which is to alter behaviour. While we offer this as a complementary list of uses, we note that solutions should be prioritised such that offsets outside of the value chain are a last resort. In other words, solutions should move from the first-best option of altering behaviour via a pricing mechanism, to the second-best solution of reducing emissions elsewhere within the value chain (insetting), to the final option of reducing emissions outside of the value chain (offsetting).Case studies: 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2024 Coldplay European tourHaving introduced the framework, we will now apply it to two case studies as illustrative examples: the 2026 FIFA World Cup and Coldplay’s 2024 European tour. In doing so, we acknowledge that our back-of-the-envelope estimates contain a number of simplifying assumptions and that the method used for measuring consumer welfare has limitations. Following the structure of our framework, we will first estimate the GHG emissions and associated climate cost, and then secondly assess the welfare impacts.The selection of these case studies may seem incongruous insofar as they differ in scale. However, these cases are not meant to serve as a direct comparison to one another. Rather, they are intended to illustrate that the methodological framework presented herein can be applied in differing entertainment contexts. Firstly, as the World Cup is a sporting event and the Coldplay tour is a music event, this analysis bridges the gap between the two related industries. Secondly, the World Cup case study is an ex-ante analysis while the Coldplay case is an ex-post analysis. This demonstrates that organisers could implement the framework either in preparation for an upcoming event (ex-ante) or as a review of a previous event (ex-post). The total emissions for both events are presented in Fig. 2.Fig. 2: Total emissions of CO2-e for the Coldplay tour and 2026 World Cup.Full size imageThe Coldplay tour emissions are represented on the lefthand y-axis and the World Cup on the righthand y-axis. A bracket is included to illustrate Coldplay’s relative scale in comparison to the World Cup.For Coldplay’s tour, we estimate two footprints. First, we assess the tour assuming no measures to reduce emissions. This provides a generalisable, business-as-usual estimate for large-scale tours which do not implement reduction strategies. Second, we consider Coldplay’s reduction efforts (including solar panels, lower-carbon aviation fuels, and incentives for fans to make sustainable travel choices), which cut direct emissions from the band by 59% and audience travel by 48%64. Total unreduced emissions amount to 109.1 kt CO2-e, with virtually 100% of emissions coming from scope 3 sources, in particular audience travel (97%). Within audience travel, air travel generates 80.3 kt CO2-e (74% of total), followed by road travel with 21.5 kt CO2-e (20%) as the second largest contributor. Per-ticket CO2-e emissions are 56.2 kg. In the reduced case, total emissions amount to 58.5 kt CO2-e, representing a 50.6 kt CO2-e (~46%) reduction compared to the estimate without reductions. Still, audience travel accounts for the major share (97%). Using an SCC value of $186 per ton CO2-e, the associated emissions costs for the two footprints are $20.3 m and $10.8 m, respectively.For the World Cup, we again estimate two footprints to capture the expansion of the tournament from 32 to 48 teams. Resulting estimates for a 32- and 48-team formats are 3.64 mt CO2-e and 4.23 mt CO2-e, respectively. This means that the planned, 48-team tournament will result in approximately 594 kt additional CO2-e being released into the atmosphere compared to the smaller format (~16%). Note that this estimate of 4.23 mt CO2-e is much lower than in an independent report produced by The New Weather Institute (TNWI), who place the tournament at 9.02mt CO2-e6. This is largely driven by a lower assumed air travel rate (57% v. 75%) and the use of updated emissions factors (2025 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero factors are much lower than the 2024 factors used by TNWI)65,66.Of the 4.23 mt CO2-e projected emissions, roughly 3.07mt are from international travel, with 411,000 t from inter- and intra-city travel, meaning 3.48 mt of total emissions stem from travel (82% of total). Of the remaining 752 kt (18%), 287 kt (7%) are from accommodations, 191 kt (5%) from temporary stadium and facility construction, 78 kt (2%) from food and beverages, and 196 kt (5%) are spread over several minor emissions categories. Approximately 4.12 mt (97%) of total emissions are from scope 3 sources, with less than 1% of emissions being attributed to scope 1 and 2% to scope 2. The associated emissions costs at $186/t CO2-e are $676.3 m for the 32-team tournament and $786.7 m for the 48-team tournament. The additional emissions cost of the tournament’s expansion is $110.4 m.It is useful to contextualise the magnitude of these events’ GHG emissions: Coldplay’s 109 kt CO2-e is as much as nearly 20,000 Europeans emit in a year67. Triangulating against other live music GHG assessments confirms that Coldplay’s calculated per-ticket emissions are on the high side (e.g. refs. 22,68,69,70). This is likely because Coldplay’s tour attracted fans from across the continent and thus stimulated more air travel than a typical concert. Correspondingly, airports report sizeable increases in passenger volume and flight demand during Coldplay concerts71. Similarly, a spike in travellers to Qatar was recorded during the 2022 World Cup72. For the 2026 World Cup, we estimate that the tournament will result in approximately 3.4 million passenger flights. This amounts to 0.06% of total global air travellers (5.6 billion, projected from 4.4 billion 2023 using 8.4% growth73,74). Determining the additionality of these flights remains challenging, and there is evidence to suggest that mega-event spectators may displace typical tourist travel75. Given this potential for crowding-out, our estimate represents the upper bound of additional emissions caused by the event. Nonetheless, it accurately captures the emissions that can be attributed to the event.Against this backdrop, Coldplay’s emission reduction represents a noteworthy achievement, almost halving their business-as-usual emissions. This substantial impact was only possible because the band extended mitigation efforts beyond their own operations, which account for merely ~2% of total emissions. A 59% reduction of Coldplay’s direct emissions alone would have translated into a modest ~1% decrease of overall emissions. Instead, a major portion of the reduction (~98%) was achieved through voluntary actions by fans, who collectively reduced their travel-related emissions by 48%.In comparison to the World Cup, Coldplay’s emissions are rather small: our estimate for the 2026 World Cup of 4.23 mt CO2-e (48 team) is 39x higher than Coldplay’s tour. It is important to note, however, that the World Cup has 104 games while the Coldplay European tour consists of 32 shows: on a per-event basis, emissions are approximately 41,000 t and 3400 t CO2-e, respectively, a difference of about one order of magnitude. This difference is largely explained by differences in flight distances (1500–12,800 km vs. 1100 km), flight rate (57% vs. 10%) and accommodations required (65% vs 34%). Additionally, we have bounded the Coldplay analysis within the 2024 European tour to provide a more discrete event for comparison: it is reasonable to assume that if our inventory were expanded to all 225 Music of the Spheres concerts between 2022 and 2025, emissions would be at least 7x higher, around 760,000 t CO2-e.The emissions of the World Cup are equal to the yearly emissions of approximately 298,000 Americans, 488,000 Chinese, or 785,000 Europeans – regions which have particularly high per capita emissions67. The average attendee will emit around 1.8 t CO2-e in the 48-team scenario, while the emissions per ticket is equal to roughly 0.6 t CO2-e. 1.8 t is equal to 34% of Europe’s per capita emissions (5.4 t), meaning that the average European World Cup attendee will generate a third of their typical annual emissions attending this event67. For comparison, fan travel over the entirety of the 2018/19 Bundesliga season in Germany (approximately 306 games) was estimated at 370 kt CO2-e, only 11% of the expected travel emissions for the 48-team tournament in North America26. Performing a GHG inventory of these events highlights air transportation as a major driver of emissions for both, with accommodation and construction being secondary drivers of World Cup’s emissions.The economic surplus of Coldplay’s tour was calculated by comparing observed resale prices with the face value charged by the organiser. The tour sold 1.9 m tickets across 32 concerts. The total face value of these tickets was $232 m, while the aggregated resale market value (WTP) was $1096 m, with an average mark-up per ticket of 372%. Total surplus is estimated to be $987 m, of which $864 m is consumer surplus and $124 m is producer surplus. Total emissions costs (scope 1, 2 & 3) for the unreduced scenario are estimated to be $20.3 m using an SCC of $186/t CO2-e14. These costs are then incorporated into the decision formula: NWe = TSe – ECe. This reveals that Coldplay’s tour generated substantial net benefits: NW remains positive and equals $967 m. Over 32 concerts this implies average net benefits of $30.2 m and welfare losses of $0.6 m per concert. The benefit-to-cost ratio of Coldplay’s tour is around 49:1 for the unreduced emissions scenario, and 91:1 with the emissions reduction.Notably, there is a wide variation in predicted SCC values within the literature. For robustness, we calculate a ‘break-even’ cost of carbon at which point the event would cease to be climate viable (i.e. NWe = 0). We then contextualise this value by placing it within the distribution of SCC values in a 2025 database compiled by Tol13 ($186/t CO2-e = 54th percentile). For the Coldplay tour, the break-even cost is calculated to be $9045/t CO2-e. This is in the 98th percentile of SCC values13, and is nearly twice the predicted cost of remaining under 1.5 °C of warming50. This reinforces the highly positive net welfare of the Coldplay tour, since it is very unlikely that the emissions cost will be high enough to cancel-out the benefits.To calculate the total economic surplus associated with the World Cup prior to the event, secondary market ticket prices were collected from several other sporting events. The observed markup rates were then applied to the estimated 2026 World Cup prices to determine willingness to pay. Total surplus is estimated to be $2.15b for a 32-team format and $2.33b for the 48-team tournament (for scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions). This puts the World Cup on par with the economic scale of the Coldplay tour on a per show/match basis at $22 m and $31 m of surplus per event, respectively.If FIFA were utilising its previous pricing strategy, $1.70b would accrue to the consumer while $452 m would be captured by the producer in the 32-team tournament, while in the 48-team tournament CS would be $2.10b and producer surplus $240 m. However, given FIFA’s increase in pricing, it is likely they will capture most, or all, of the TS (see the methods section and the supplementary discussion). Moving from a 32- to a 48-team format increases overall welfare by around $178 m, excluding environmental externalities. Estimating emissions costs with an SCC value of $186/t CO2-e results in $676 m and $787 m in climate damages for the 32- and 48-team tournaments, respectively. Incorporating these costs into the net welfare equation results in positive NW values of $1.47b and $1.54b. The benefits-to-costs ratios are 3.2:1 and 3.0:1 – much lower than the Coldplay tour.Increasing the size of the tournament increases net welfare by approximately $67 m, despite adding $110 m in environmental costs. In other words, the additional benefits of increasing the tournament’s size are greater than the additional costs. From this perspective, expanding the World Cup is climate viable insofar as welfare remains positive after accounting for emissions. However, the break-even costs of the two tournament sizes are $591/t CO2-e (32-team) and $550/t CO2-e (48-team). These correspond to the 79th and 78th percentile of the Tol database. In contrast to the Coldplay tour, this finding suggests that a highly carbon-constrained world could render the World Cup unviable. Additionally, the 48-team tournament’s smaller break-even cost and reduced benefits-to-costs ratio illustrates that relative gains diminish as the tournament expands. Even in the central estimate, the costs are very high in absolute terms. The net benefit curves for both events along with the SCC distribution are presented in Fig. 3.Fig. 3: Net benefit curves of the Coldplay European tour and the 2026 World Cup (48-team format).Full size imagePanel B represents the net benefit curve of the 48 team World Cup. Panel C represents the net benefit curve of the Coldplay European tour. These are plotted against the distribution of SCC values from Tol’s13 database13, excluding observations over $4000/t, shown in Panel A. Several SCC values are highlighted to illustrate potential outcomes under differing scenarios, including the 10th and 90th percentiles of Tol13 as well as the break-even cost of the 48 Team World Cup. It is notable that the World Cup crosses into negative welfare results around 78th percentile of the distribution, which suggests that a heavily carbon constrained world could see the tournament rendered inviable under its current format. All values are in 2025 dollars for a 2025 pulse year.Pricing mechanisms such as a tax or fee per ton of CO2-e stand out as possible solutions. However, the way in which carbon costs are allocated substantially influences how welfare is distributed. The polluter-pays principle does not completely eliminate ambiguity in the case of entertainment events. Who should pay, the organiser or the spectator? For Coldplay’s tour, if the total carbon costs from all scopes ($20.3 m) are borne by the producer, approximately one sixth (16.4%) of the band’s surplus is eliminated. Assuming that FIFA’s new pricing strategy will capture most of the TS, they would be able to comfortably absorb the total carbon emissions cost of $787 m (all scopes). However, if they were still employing their historical pricing strategy, the emissions costs of the 48-team World Cup ($787 m) exceed FIFA’s surplus ($240 m). Of course, it’s likely that any carbon fee levied on the producer would be passed on to consumers. In this case, emissions costs would reduce the CS of Coldplay’s tour only modestly (around 2.3%). For the World Cup, CS would be reduced by around 38%.Discussions of a pricing mechanism of this kind may raise concerns about fairness and regressivity. If costs are distributed uniformly across ticket types, each ticket carries the same absolute carbon charge. For Coldplay, this would amount to $11 per ticket, while for the 48-team World Cup it would be $114 per ticket. This results in a higher relative welfare reduction for lower-priced categories, since identical charges represent a larger proportion of their total welfare. For example, in the case of the World Cup, those purchasing category four tickets to the opening match would see their ticket price increase beyond their estimated WTP, as can be seen in Fig. 4 ($122, see supplemental methods Table S12 for full range of estimated WTP). In contrast, allocating costs in proportion to each category’s baseline welfare produces a more balanced distribution of losses. That is, spectators who purchase higher-priced tickets could absorb greater absolute costs, while lower-priced spectators would still have a similar relative cost increase. The latter approach would ensure that environmental costs are internalised in a manner consistent with WTP, preventing regressive outcomes that would disproportionately affect lower-income consumers.Fig. 4: Total surplus from the FIFA World Cup and Coldplay European tour.Full size imageThe World Cup is represented in (A) and the Coldplay tour in (B). Consumer surplus is the area between the resale price and the face value price. Total surplus is the area between the resale price and the cheapest face value price. A line of best fit has been plotted to capture the functional form of the face value and resale value pricing: for resale values, this can be seen as tracing the WTP curve. The face value price + SCC assumes that costs are distributed evenly across ticket categories – note that this results in prices that exceed WTP for cheaper ticket categories in the case of the World Cup.Importantly, across all allocation methods, the inclusion of carbon costs reduces but does not eliminate the substantial net benefits for either event. Taken together, the results demonstrate that integrating carbon costs into entertainment events is both feasible and desirable, but that equitable allocation remains a challenge. As will be discussed, delineating between direct and indirect emissions and applying the principle of shared responsibility can help to achieve this.DiscussionHaving measured both the FIFA World Cup and Coldplay’s 2024 European tour via our welfare framework as illustrative examples, we now discuss the takeaways. Most importantly, we present policymakers, regulators, and organisers with a framework for assessing and achieving sustainable entertainment events in a climate constrained world. Our estimates from the two case studies suggest that both events generate positive net welfare when using average estimates of the SCC. The estimated welfare gains from the World Cup may turn negative on higher carbon cost estimates (with an indicative break-even SCC of $550). However, this does not account for the consumer benefits from broadcasting the event (estimated at approximately 175 million average viewers)76.For direct emissions (scope 1 and 2), internalisation could be achieved through a pricing mechanism paid by producers. These carbon costs accounted for 0.2% (196t CO2-e, equalling $36,000 or $0.02 per ticket) and 2.6% (109 kt CO2-e, equalling $20.3 m or $2.95 per ticket) of the overall emissions of Coldplay and the World Cup, respectively. These costs are relatively small, and owning the event’s direct emissions costs is the minimum step towards sustainability.Indirect emissions (scope 3) also require attention. For our two case studies, indirect emissions drastically exceed direct emissions. Travel is the main source of overall GHG emissions (97% for Coldplay; 82% for the World Cup) – with air travel accounting for most. Incorporating both direct and indirect emissions into ticket prices would increase Coldplay and World Cup prices by $11 and $114, respectively. However, we do not advocate this as a widespread solution, as these costs are highly contingent on the mode and distance travelled. In the absence of policies that directly address the underlying issue, namely the under-pricing of (air) travel’s climate costs, we propose a shared responsibility framework, where organisers take on responsibility for helping spectators to reduce their travel emissions.Our analysis reveals the ambiguity of responsibility for these emissions. Most emissions arise from consumer behaviour, i.e. choices about travel and lifestyle, but shifting full responsibility to consumers risks excusing producers for emissions that they induce. This would neglect the substantial influence producers can have through product design, marketing, and distribution77. We therefore propose the use of the principle of shared responsibility to overcome such ambiguity. Further, this can be done utilising insights from welfare economics to effectively and equitably internalise indirect emissions18,58. Our framework acknowledges that neither producers nor consumers act in isolation56,57.Proposed policies and initiatives under shared responsibility include sustainable travel rebates, event localisation to reduce travel, and spectator carbon-offset platforms. For example, Coldplay implemented such measures and achieved a 46% emissions reduction prior to offsetting. For the World Cup, relocating the event to Europe could cut travel emissions substantially, as ~40% of international attendees originate from there78,79. Another innovative fundraising mechanism would be a $4.50 broadcast fee per viewer, which would account for the $787 million emissions cost of the 2026 World Cup (for all scopes). Funds raised through pricing mechanisms should be strategically allocated to insetting, R&D (notably in aviation), adaptation programmes, or tax offsetting10,11,80,81,82,83,84,85. Additionally, as noted above, carbon offsetting should only be considered for those emissions which are not otherwise accounted for and which cannot be addressed via a first-best option. These instruments are complementary rather than exclusive, offering multiple pathways toward net-zero events.Alternatively, another strategy which embodies the principle of shared responsibility is for event organisers to utilise their platform as a space to promote emissions-reducing or climate friendly public policies. Such an approach has been implemented by the band AJR, who partnered with local advocacy organisations to engage their fans in grassroots climate advocacy86. A notable limitation of this approach is that it is not currently possible to quantify the CO2-e reduction achieved via political advocacy. Future research should be directed at quantification methods for climate advocacy so that such strategies can be used to account for indirect emissions.A key question is whether this framework can be implemented at scale by practitioners, not just academics. We believe it can. The WTP estimation draws on publicly observable secondary market data and simple markup calculations – tools already familiar to event promoters and ticketing platforms. Even simpler: previous studies have established transferable benchmarks such as Connolly and Krueger, who report WTP multiples of approximately 2–3x face value for top performers, providing organisers with ready-made reference values28. More granular estimates for direct application will become available as organisers assess their own events and share their findings.For shared responsibility, practical mechanisms are already in use: Coldplay’s app-based verification of sustainable travel demonstrates that technology can enable rebate schemes at concert scale, while France’s 3.5% ticket levy illustrates that state-led collection is administratively feasible. Regarding enforcement, given the current regulatory environment, it may be overly optimistic to count on regulators alone. This makes industry-led action even more urgent: federations and industry associations can, and must, codify shared-responsibility standards – without coordinated action, piecemeal voluntary efforts will continue to lack credibility and impact. The tools exist, and the surplus exists to fund them. What this framework intends to provide is not a theoretically complete policy, but an actionable, evidence-based toolkit that organisers can adopt incrementally and regulators can mandate when political will allows.Coldplay’s strategy exemplifies shared responsibility, converting part of their producer surplus into climate action by rewarding fans for sustainable travel. With 82% of World Cup emissions linked to audience travel, FIFA could increase their sustainability by implementing similar mechanisms. This interdisciplinary framework provides guidance on what, why, and how – reframing climate action from blame to collaboration, forging a sustainable equilibrium between those who create experiences and those who enjoy them.MethodsCarbon accounting approachWe quantify emissions along the World Resource Institute’s (WRI) GHG Protocol (GHGP), as it is an “internationally accepted GHG accounting and reporting standard”51, which in summary comprises four steps:1.Scoping and boundary setting defines organisational (who owns or controls emission sources) and operational boundaries (categorisation into direct scope 1 or indirect scope 2 and 3), creating a list of emission-generating activities2.Data collection involves selecting a calculation approach and collecting activity data alongside relevant emission factors3.Baselining refers to calculating emissions for a certain reference period, activity subset, or part of an organisation4.Scaling up aggregates this baseline to the full event or organisational levelBottrill et al.22 pioneered the application of the GHGP in the context of live music through a collaboration of the University of Oxford, Julie’s Bicycle (a non-profit focused on sustainability in creative industries), and the UK government’s Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA)22. This seminal live music sector GHG assessment informed subsequent studies1,87,88,89.Bottrill et al. define a GHG quantification method that we use in this study. First, they include CO2 and other GHGs (e.g. methane CH4, nitrous oxide N2O) by converting them to their equivalent global warming potential (CO2-e)22. Second, they focus solely on GHGs and exclude further environmental impacts (e.g. water pollution). Third, they include GHG emissions from activities enabling the concert experience in a narrow sense (e.g. venue energy, performer and audience travel), and exclude complementary activities (e.g. food and drinks, merchandise). Fourth, they implicitly apply the principle of marginality, including only additional emissions caused by the concert (e.g. venue energy, performer and audience travel). Emissions that would have occurred regardless are excluded to avoid double counting (e.g. food consumption, home energy use). Lastly, Bottrill et al.22 and others (e.g. ref. 87) draw on the Pareto-principle in scoping activities, according to which the majority of outcomes (here: emissions) comes from a small number of inputs (here: activities). Most live events’ emissions are caused by audience travel (typically >80%), and a short-list of activities represents virtually all emissions (typically >95%). The four steps outlined by the GHGP form the method of the emissions quantification: scoping and boundary setting, data collection, baselining, scaling up.To assess Coldplay’s emissions, we compile a list of 13 activities to quantify (GHGP step one), based on the work by Bottrill22,68 and others, which is presented in Table 1.Table 1 Coldplay tour GHG emitting activitiesFull size tableIn steps two and three (data collection and baselining), we define a GHG quantification logic for each of the 13 included activities, which we then populate with data from various sources (see supplemental methods for detailed data assumptions). Essentially, we develop a quantity structure for an activity of an individual concert, that we subsequently convert into CO2-e emissions via the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero’s GHG conversion factors. In step four (scaling up), we then aggregate this baseline across all 32 concerts. For an example of how these calculations were conducted, see supplementary Fig. 7.We use the above method for all activities where emissions are driven by number of concerts. However, activities under band and crew (activities 3–6) follow a different logic, since these emissions are not driven by number of concerts per se but by tour routing and itinerary. Consequently, we quantify activities 3–6 through an itinerary-based approach. In summary, the total emissions Etour are calculated as follows, where Econcert,i are concert-driven emissions from activity i, and Eitinerary,j are itinerary-based emissions from activity j:$${E}_{{{{\rm{tour}}}}}=\,{\sum}_{i=1}^{2}{E}_{{{{\rm{concert}}}},{{{\rm{i}}}}}+\,{\sum}_{i=7}^{13}{E}_{{{{\rm{concert}}}},{{{\rm{i}}}}}+\,{\sum}_{j=3}^{6}{E}_{{{{\rm{itinerary}}}},{{{\rm{j}}}}}$$(f.3)Lastly, we reflect Coldplay’s pledge “to reduce […] direct carbon emissions (from show production, freight, band and crew travel) by at least 50%” for their 2024 tour64. Indeed, Coldplay achieved a 59% cut in direct emissions from their 2016/17 tour and a 48% drop in audience travel via an app that helps fans plan environmentally conscious travel64. Though verified by MIT90, the initiative is funded by the band and partners. Greenwashing concerns persist among public figures, as seen with Taylor Swift91,92. Since most mega-events do not employ reduction efforts as extensive as Coldplay, we focus our analysis on business-as-usual (no reduction) as a more representative estimate (i.e. Discounting Coldplay’s direct emissions, activities 1–6, by 59%, and audience travel, activities 7–9, by 48%).For the World Cup, we rely on the FIFA’s own emissions categorisation to create a list of emissions generating activities. This approach is justified insofar as FIFA’s 2022 estimation was conducted in line with the GHGP. In their scoping phase, FIFA adopted an “operational control” approach to determine the discrete emissions categories within their organisational boundaries93,94. Using the boundaries and emissions categories as set by this 2022 inventory, our approach for calculating emissions was then determined via two steps. (1) Emissions categories were first assessed for whether the underlying assumptions would be constant between the 2022 and 2026 tournaments:(2) Categories were then assessed for if they would scale with the increase in games for 48-team format:(1) No → (2) No → Modelled with updated data(1) No → (2) Yes → 32-team scaled by 1.625 (% increase in number of games)(1) Yes → (2) Yes → 2022 value scaled by 1.625(1) Yes → (2) No → 48-team format = 2022 estimateThe full emissions modelling logic by emissions category is presented in Table 2. Emissions were differentiated by the country of attendance (USA, Mexico, and Canada), and assumptions varied based on tournament region. However, specific regional demographics were not considered. See the supplementary methods for detailed GHG modelling assumptions.Table 2 Emissions categories and estimation logic for the 2026 World CupFull size tableSCC assessmentThe SCC expresses “[t]he external costs of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions [as …] the present value of all future impacts from an additional metric ton of CO2 emissions”14. Thereby, it enables a CBA that includes environmental externalities, i.e. correcting economic output by environmental damages. The SCC critically depends on assumptions about population and GDP growth, climate sensitivity, economic vulnerability, discount rates, and mitigative policies or actions12. Consequently, the financial quantification of damages induced by CO2 “is far from straightforward”89 and assumptions taken are sometimes “highly controversial”50. As a result, different authors and studies arrive at diverging SCC values.A recent meta-analysis by Tol reviewed 14,152 SCC estimates and finds the 5–95% range to be $11-$2243/tCO2 (median $158/tCO2)13. In a more complex review of 1823 estimates, Moore et al. 14 find a 5–95% range of $45-$1231/tCO214. This paper involved two processes, firstly a meta-analysis of selected studies, and secondly a synthetic estimation using a forest-trained model. For our analysis, we adopted their truncated literature review mean of $186 (reported as $132 2020 USD and pulse year), as it was pulled from existing literature and is roughly in line with the median value in Tol13 (54th percentile).We apply the following SCC guidelines: first, we select Moore et al.’s 14 mean SCC of $132. Second, we adjust to 2025 values for both currency and pulse year – the year in which the emission is assumed to occur, which determines the time horizon over which damages are discounted ($186). As future emissions are expected to be more costly, pulse year is updated by applying 2.5% SCC growth p.a. taken from Barrage and Nordhaus50. We then calculate a ‘break-even’ SCC value to serve as a sensitivity analysis. This is the point at which the event would cease to be climate viable, or where net welfare is equal to zero. This provides a view of how sensitive the results of our two cases are to uncertainty in the SCC and thereby adds robustness.Welfare quantificationWe quantify welfare effects in two steps. First, we measure the welfare baseline, i.e. the total surplus generated by the event excluding environmental externalities. Second, we integrate the emissions costs as calculated via the SCC to determine the net benefits. Since we conduct an ex-post assessment of Coldplay’s tour, and an ex-ante assessment of the World Cup, approaches to estimating total surplus differ slightly.For Coldplay, we leverage observed WTP data obtained from secondary markets. To construct a comprehensive welfare baseline, we measure total welfare, independent of who captures it, as this is an allocative question, whereas the welfare assessment is concerned with the overall welfare from Coldplay’s tour. Consequently, welfare W consists of consumer surplus CS and producer surplus PS (f.4). Consumer surplus CSi of an individual i is the difference between i’s WTP for a Coldplay ticket and original face value, with WTP approximated through resale price on the secondary market (Presale, as in f.5). These individual CSi are then aggregated per concert j with a total of n attendees, to receive the consumer surplus per concert CSconcert (f.6). Finally, all CSconcert are summed over N concerts, to calculate the consumer surplus of the total European tour CStour (f.7).$$W={TS}\,={CS}+{PS}$$(f.4)$${{CS}}_{{{{\rm{i}}}}}={P}_{{{{\rm{resale}}}},{{{\rm{i}}}}}-{P}_{{{{\rm{face}}}},{{{\rm{i}}}}}$$(f.5)$${{CS}}_{{{{\rm{concert}}}},{{{\rm{j}}}}}={\sum}_{{{{\rm{i}}}}=1}^{{{{\rm{n}}}}}{{CS}}_{{{{\rm{i}}}}}$$(f.6)$${{CS}}_{{{{\rm{tour}}}}}={\sum}_{{{{\rm{j}}}}=1}^{{{{\rm{N}}}}}{{CS}}_{{{{\rm{concert}}}},{{{\rm{j}}}}}$$(f.7)For producer surplus it must be considered that performers deploy price discrimination and price the least expensive ticket category at its cost, which is completely fixed as marginal cost is effectively zero95. Higher-quality ticket categories are offered at higher prices but have the same cost, thus allowing producers to capture a surplus96. Therefore, producer surplus for an individual ticket i is the difference between face value per ticket Pface,i and cost to supply one ticket, which is equal to the face value of the tickets in the least expensive category Pface,inexpensive (f.8). These individual PSi are then aggregated per concert with n attendees for PSconcert (f.9). Finally, all PSconcert are summed over N concerts, to receive PStour (f.10).$${{PS}}_{{{{\rm{i}}}}}={P}_{{{{\rm{face}}}},{{{\rm{i}}}}}-{P}_{{{{\rm{face}}}},{{{\rm{inexpensive}}}}}$$(f.8)$${{PS}}_{{{{\rm{concert}}}},{{{\rm{j}}}}}={\sum}_{i=1}^{n}{{PS}}_{{{{\rm{i}}}}}$$(f.9)$${{PS}}_{{{{\rm{tour}}}}}={\sum}_{j=1}^{N}{{PS}}_{{{{\rm{concert}}}},{{{\rm{j}}}}}$$(f.10)To calculate baseline welfare for all 32 concerts across 10 cities of Coldplay’s 2024 European tour, we use two main data sources: an enhanced Pollstar dataset to model face value (i.e. market price), and Viagogo data to approximate WTP (i.e. resale price). To overcome data availability issues, we made certain methodological simplifications. While the above assessment is as robust as possible and we justify all assumptions with reference to previous applications, its potential limitations should be made transparent. Overall, the assessment draws on three simplifying assumptions: (1) resale price equals WTP, (2) resellers are excluded from the welfare assessment (measuring potential consumer surplus, i.e. surplus captured by both resellers or consumers), and (3) ticket price in the least expensive category equals production cost per ticket across all categories. Secondary data limitations are that we use only one reseller to model WTP (Viagogo with 1940 data points), only 18 data points are available for standing ticket resale prices, we simplify ticket categories as four, and assume similar splits of ticket categories and price differences across venues.Regarding the World Cup ex-ante analysis, we cannot use observed WTP data from the event itself. Instead, we draw on observations of secondary markets for similar events. Secondary ticket prices were collected from resale sites including Live Football Tickets, Ticketmaster, and Viagogo. Primary ticket prices were taken directly from a pricing document published by the club or organising competition, with the exception of the observed Club World Cup match, for which primary prices had to be calculated via observed standard tickets on Ticketmaster.In total, 37,835 observations were collected from 35 games across seven different competitions. The distribution of markup rates is displayed in Fig. 5. Games selected for analysis were chosen based on availability of data and to gain a wide-angle view of WTP across a range of sports in different settings. The two competitions with the highest number of observations were the NFL regular season and the National Basketball Association (NBA) finals (n = 32,484; n = 2490). These competitions were selected to capture the regional WTP of the United States, which will be hosting 75% of the WC matches. Additionally, the NBA finals provide an example of a pinnacle sporting event, which is important as WTP varies between games of differing quality97,98. These are the highest stakes games played in an NBA season and their winner-takes-all format makes them apt for comparison to a knockout-style tournament such as the World Cup.Fig. 5: Distribution of markup rates for observed sporting events.Full size imagen = 37,835, median = 67%, mean = 152%. Observations over 1000% are excluded from the figure.To assess WTP for European football in the U.S., data was also collected from the Club World Cup, being held in the U.S. in mid-2025. The remaining observations within the dataset were spread across six games in three competitions (n = 1067). All of these were European football competitions, with five based in the UK (n = 890) and one in Germany (n = 176). Observing a segment of the European football sporting market provided a more rounded picture of WTP for football. This is especially important given that an estimated 40% of the international attendees at the 2026 WC will be of European origin93,94.To calculate TS associated with the World Cup, markup rates for the tournament are assumed to be roughly in line with the markup rates recorded in the observed sporting events. This assumption allows us to estimate WTP by applying observed markups to the face value WC ticket prices. To determine the face values for each category, the 2022 Qatar WC category prices were adjusted for inflation to 2025 dollars. To establish the cheapest face-value price required to cover private costs, FIFA’s reported operational costs were divided by the number of tickets sold. For the 32-team format, the 2022 operational costs78 were updated to 2025 USD ($488 m/4.23 m tickets = $111). For the 48-team format, FIFA’s 2024 reported operational costs99 were used ($1.15b/6.88 m tickets = $168). The rationale for using these as the cheapest ticket values is that, historically, FIFA has subsidised the cheaper ticket categories to increase fan accessibility. Using the cheapest previously listed face-value ticket would therefore result in an under-estimation the private costs of the event. With the cover-price of the event established, TS can then be calculated by applying the same formulas (f.2-f.8) as in the Coldplay case.An important element of this estimation is the noted and observed difference in WTP between games of differing consequence. World Cup matches were decomposed into three categories: group stage games, knockout-matches, and the semi-finals and finals. Three different markup rates were chosen for each of these subcategories by taking the 50th (67%), 68th (101%), and 95th (651%) percentile markup rates from the total distribution of observations (n = 37,835). The 68th percentile value was also applied to the opening match and the third-place game. It is notable that over 3000 observations have a markup of greater than 300%. The long-tail shape of the distribution suggests that the observations may be capturing two qualitatively different kinds of events, supported by the notion that higher stakes games drive up WTP. This reinforces the decision to use the 50th, 68th, and 95th percentile markup rates. Resale prices were then calculated by applying the markup rates to the base prices, which allowed for the calculation of TS.We note that our analysis was performed prior to the release of the 2026 WC ticket prices and was in line with FIFA’s previous pricing strategies (e.g. from 2018 to 2022). Yet, the starting prices of the tickets are much higher than originally estimated, even exceeding estimated WTP in some cases100. Preliminary analysis of available secondary market prices suggests that resale prices will also be substantially higher, but at the time of writing there is major uncertainty about the secondary market: whether or not FIFA has released all of the available face-value tickets is not clear101. If they have not, resale prices may be overinflated by the limited supply. Additionally, while FIFA has announced that it will not be utilising dynamic pricing, they have stated that they will manually adjust the face value ticket prices to match the demand for each game.With these factors in mind, we determined that using our original estimation of face-value prices would produce the most consistent estimate of WTP. We acknowledge that this is a limitation of the ex-ante approach, which is limited to historical data. The likely effect of the higher face-value ticket prices is that FIFA will capture most or all of the TS. Notably, if we assume that FIFA is perfectly price discriminating (i.e face value = WTP), then TS is estimated to be $2.1b, which is in relatively close agreement with our 48-team estimate of $2.3b using their previous pricing strategy. This suggests that our estimate of WTP is in line with FIFA’s. If resale prices are indeed much higher than estimated, then the TS will be higher. Importantly, this does not change the decision outcome of the analysis, which is that net benefits remain high. However, we acknowledge that there is substantial uncertainty and controversy over FIFA’s ticket pricing strategy. With that in mind we have conducted a number of alternative pricing scenarios using different mark-up rates. See the supplementary discussion section for additional scenarios and discussion of preliminary resale listings.Finally, we multiply the SCC value (SCCk) by the emissions of the event (Eevent) to quantify the economic damages Dk from the event in our different scenarios, k (f.11). We then subtract these damages from the total surplus value, TS, and what remains is the event’s net welfare, NW (f.12). Note that this is a re-iteration of f.1: NWe = TSe – ECe, where ECe is replaced by Dk.$${D}_{{{{\rm{k}}}}}={{SCC}}_{{{{\rm{k}}}}}* {E}_{{{{\rm{event}}}}}$$(f.11)$${NW}={TS}-{D}_{{{{\rm{k}}}}}$$(f.12)Reporting summaryFurther information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.Data availabilityAll ticket data and emissions estimations by source are provided in the supplementary file “Supplementary Data 1”. The GHG and welfare modelling spreadsheets with detailed calculations are available via figshare at https://figshare.com/s/c5c80589761e13803622?file=61396198. Data on the social cost of carbon was extrapolated from the other publications referenced and should be retrieved directly from those works.ReferencesBrennan, M. The environmental sustainability of the music industries. In Cultural Industries and the Environmental Crisis (eds Oakley, K. & Banks, M.) 37–49. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49384-4_4. 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The Athletic https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7213118/2026/04/21/usa-paraguay-world-cup-tickets-fifa-sofi-stadium/ (2026).Download referencesAcknowledgementsWe thank Dr Stuart Parkinson (Executive Director of the Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR)) for sharing data and calculations for the report FIFA’s Climate Blind Spot: The Men’s World Cup in a Warming World (with Samran Ali, and Freddie Daley). This assisted us in validating our approach and reviewing the assumptions on emissions factors, travel distances and other similar assumptions. We also thank Dr Tim Williams for reviewing an earlier draft of the manuscript. All errors remain our own.FundingShaun T. Larcom acknowledges funding support from the Department of Land Economy Research Support Fund. No specific grant number.Author informationAuthor notesThese authors contributed equally: Jackson S. W. Goldman, Jascha Servi.Authors and AffiliationsUniversity of Cambridge, Cambridge, UKJackson S. W. Goldman, Sam Vosper & Shaun T. LarcomBoston Consulting Group, during educational leave at University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UKJascha ServiAuthorsJackson S. W. GoldmanView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarJascha ServiView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarSam VosperView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarShaun T. LarcomView author publicationsSearch author on:PubMed Google ScholarContributionsJackson S.W. Goldman and Jascha Servi collected the data, undertook the calculations, analysed the results and drafted the manuscript. Sam Vosper designed and produced the figures and the carbon accounting framework. Shaun T. Larcom led the research design and the development of the conceptual framework. All authors contributed to analysing the results and drafting the paper.Corresponding authorCorrespondence to Shaun T. Larcom.Ethics declarationsCompeting interestsThe authors declare the following competing interests: since the original submission of this research, Jackson S.W. Goldman has begun work with a climate advocacy organisation Planet Reimagined. However, the vast majority of this work was conducted prior to his hiring there. No other authors declare a competing interest.Peer reviewPeer review informationCommunications Sustainability thanks Brian McCullough and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Primary Handling Editors: Yann Benetreau. 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