C Raja Mohan: Four calculations behind Putin’s bid for a table for three in Shenzhen

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Why is Vladimir Putin invested in bringing Donald Trump and Xi Jinping together in Shenzhen this week? Why is Russia, which promoted a “strategic triangle” between Moscow, Beijing and Delhi in the 1990s, now backing a potentially more consequential triangle involving Russia, China and America?For the Indian strategic community convinced that Russia will forever remain an adversary of America, Moscow’s enthusiasm for the trilateral summit deserves reflection. This, in turn, demands a better appreciation of Russian strategic traditions and Moscow’s contemporary geopolitical compulsions. In Delhi’s discourse, Russia has been reduced to a simple sum of bilateral considerations — oil, weapons, nuclear energy and propulsion, and past vetoes in India’s favour at the UN Security Council. In Delhi, which takes Russia for granted as the “best friend forever”, there is little political empathy for Moscow’s structural challenges.AdvertisementAlso Read | C Raja Mohan writes: The ghosts of 1945 are being recruited for today’s contest over AsiaWhy is Moscow, which helped create the Russia-India-China (RIC) forum, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), now seeking a table for three with Washington and Beijing? The apparent contradiction erodes once we separate Russia’s opposition to American primacy in Eurasia from its interest in accommodation with American power. Although Russian and Chinese think tanks reportedly discussed a trilateral summit for some time, the Russian initiative came to light at the SCO summit in September. Putin’s top aide, Yuri Ushakov, told the press that the proposal had been discussed with Xi. Putin subsequently pursued it with Trump.The simplest explanation for Putin’s initiative is about restoring Moscow’s standing as a great-power peer of America and China. Russia’s economic weight cannot sustain that claim. But its nuclear arsenal, military capabilities, natural resources and geography give it strategic significance beyond its economic size. A G3 would translate these assets into political status. Russia would sit alongside the two leading powers and participate in the joint management of global challenges.The second consideration is Ukraine. Although Moscow has long sought to push America out of Eurasia, it knows that a favourable settlement in Ukraine is difficult without Washington’s support or acquiescence. Putin also sees opportunities in the growing differences between Trump and Europe on transatlantic security.AdvertisementThe third consideration is China. Beijing has helped Russia withstand Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. But the partnership has become increasingly unequal. Russia has no interest in exchanging American domination for Chinese domination. A strategy of triangulation widens Moscow’s options.The fourth consideration is economic. Putin has floated cooperation with American companies in energy and the Arctic. His investment envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, has promoted commercial opportunities. Sanctions relief, investment and technology could ease Russia’s economic constraints. These proposals appeal to Trump’s transactional instincts. For Moscow, economic engagement with America would strengthen its freedom of manoeuvre.These calculations are rooted in a deep historical tension within Russia’s geopolitics. In Russia’s national emblem, the double-headed eagle, one head looks west and the other east. Russia has long struggled to reconcile its European inheritance with its Eurasian geography and ambitions.Peter the Great sought to Europeanise Russia as part of its modernisation. That inevitably produced a backlash from the so-called “Slavophiles”, who opposed westernisation and demanded that Russia follow its own distinctive path.In 1881, Fyodor Dostoevsky captured a powerful current in Slavophile thinking: “In Europe we are followers”, he wrote, “whereas we shall go to Asia as masters”. He also noted the paradox: “In Europe we are Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans.” Dostoevsky gave a remarkable expression to the impulse to compensate for marginalisation in Europe with imperial expansion in Asia.The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution saw Moscow embrace the radical Western ideology of communism and become the fount of a new global political trend. But the capitalist backlash deepened Soviet Russia’s separation from the West. Meanwhile, Russia’s anti-communist émigré intellectuals who left the Soviet Union developed the idea of Eurasianism. Russia, they argued, was neither European nor Asian but a separate civilisation. The idea re-emerged after the Soviet collapse and gained political traction under Putin. Moscow’s 2023 foreign policy concept describes Russia as a “unique country-civilisation” and a Eurasian power.Yet the Russian eagle never stopped looking West. The Soviet Union allied with America and Britain against Nazi Germany in World War II. The détente of the 1970s with America combined rivalry with arms control and economic engagement. After the Cold War, Moscow sought integration into the Western-centred order.Mikhail Gorbachev imagined a “common European home”. Addressing the German Bundestag in September 2001, largely in German, Putin waxed lyrical about the possibilities of Europe becoming stronger by combining its capabilities with Russia’s resources. He visualised a free trade pact, joint development of natural resources, and visa-free travel. Putin’s early pursuit of a “harmonious economic community from Lisbon to Vladivostok” reflected the complementarities between Russian resources and European capital, technology and markets.you may likeNATO’s expansion and Western reluctance to address Moscow’s security concerns saw the collapse of this vision. Putin’s angry Munich speech in 2007 marked a turning point. The invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions have since shattered much of Russia’s economic relationship with Europe.But resentment does not eliminate the strategic importance of the West in the Russian calculus. Delhi should take note, not offence. India’s warm Cold War memories should not mask Russia’s natural preoccupation with America, Europe and China. Nor should Delhi mistake the anti-Western rhetoric from Moscow for the pursuit of a permanent confrontation with Washington. A Russia with greater room for manoeuvre in Asia and at peace with Europe and America would serve Indian interests.The writer is consulting editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is also professor and director, Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, O P Jindal Global University. His new book, India Pivots to Europe: In Search of a Eurasian Balance, is published this month