As the world grows more complex, a leadership skill that is becoming increasingly crucial is that of persuasion and advocacy. From the correspondence between Darius Khambata of Tata Trusts and the response from Venu Srinivasan and Vijay Singh, vice chairmen of Tata Trusts, one aspect is intriguing. How did the Tata Sons board, which was initially opposed to listing (while Ratan Tata was alive), come to approve the RBI mandate for Tata Sons to list? Maybe they were persuaded, or maybe they lost the battle to persuade the authorities.It is the role of government and regulators to enunciate laws in the interests of the nation and the economy. It is the role of affected companies to adapt. They could constructively challenge the regulation or adjust their business to conform. If the proposed legislation is inimical to the strategic intent of the company, the leadership may find ways to adapt and conform.AdvertisementAlso Read | Tata feud isn’t just a boardroom fight — it dents national interestHere are two cases from my long career with Hindustan Lever, though my participation in their formulation and execution was only tangential.Unilever foreign equity in Hindustan Lever (HLL) under FERA: When India tightened controls on foreign companies in the 1970s, multinationals were required to reduce foreign ownership and align themselves with national economic priorities. Many foreign firms struggled with the new regime, and most just conformed, even if reluctantly.Unilever diluted some percentage of equity rather than exiting. The company issued shares to Indian investors, reducing foreign ownership from about 85 per cent to roughly 70 per cent, while retaining strategic control. This helped secure government approvals for new projects and expansion. In this way, the company aligned with national priorities by expanding into chemicals and other sectors considered strategically important to India. Unilever was uncomfortable about this move, but by understanding the Indian subsidiary’s dilemma, the dilution was undertaken. HLL built an export engine. The company significantly increased exports of chemicals, detergent inputs, and consumer products. Export growth demonstrated its contribution to India’s foreign-exchange earnings and strengthened its position with policymakers. The firm gradually deepened its Indian management base, shareholder base, manufacturing footprint, and supplier network, making it appear less like a foreign outpost and more like an Indian industrial enterprise.AdvertisementUnlike many multinationals that viewed the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act as an obstacle, HLL treated it as a strategic reality to be managed. By accepting partial dilution, expanding exports, investing in core sectors, and increasing its Indian identity, the company secured its long-term future in India and emerged as one of the country’s most successful blue-chip companies. It took the company about 12 years, over the tenures of two chairmen, to be able to retain 51 per cent foreign equity.The lesson: The company and the majority shareholder should join forces to avoid fighting regulation. Adaptation creates an advantage because it aligns its business model with government objectives while preserving its core strengths, turning a regulatory threat into a platform for growth.Rising labour power and industrial licensing: By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Indian industrial cities were experiencing rising labour militancy, stronger trade unions, frequent work stoppages, and increasing wage costs. The 1982-83 textile strike became a defining moment, highlighting the risks of concentrating manufacturing in large metropolitan areas. At the same time, India’s industrial licensing regime encouraged companies to invest in “backward areas” through easier approvals, tax concessions, subsidised land, and infrastructure support.HLL formulated a manufacturing plan to shift production from large metropolitan centres. Rather than continue to invest in capacity in high-cost urban locations, the company gradually located new factories in smaller towns and semi-rural regions. This reduced (i) dependence on militant urban labour markets, (ii) exposure to city-wide strikes and political disruptions, and (iii) wage pressures associated with large industrial centres.The company became highly adept at working within India’s licensing system. Instead of viewing licensing as a constraint, it used the government’s regional-development objectives to its advantage by proposing investments in designated backward areas. The company benefitted from faster project approvals, additional licensed capacities, access to incentives and subsidies, and better relations with state and central governments.Rather than relying on a few giant urban plants, Hindustan Lever developed a distributed manufacturing footprint. This provided lower operating costs, reduced labour concentration, greater resilience against local disruptions, closer proximity to agricultural and raw-material sources, and complemented the company’s broader business goals of expansion into rural markets and greater integration with national development programmes.By the late 1980s, while many Indian manufacturers remained locked into labour-intensive metropolitan facilities, HLL had built a geographically diversified manufacturing base. Its ability to combine regulatory adaptation to FERA, industrial licensing, and location strategy helped it maintain profitability and operational stability during a period of heavy regulation and labour unrest. Hindustan Lever recognised that government policy could be used not merely for compliance but as a source of competitive advantage.These cases are not meant to applaud HLL for any brilliant management. There are many who adapted successfully. The examples emanate from my professional association with the company and merely illustrate how a company can adapt to new regulations while advancing its own goals as well as the nation’s interests.Now, on to the Tata Sons listing case. From the public domain, we learn that Shanghvi Finance, which was required to list, adapted to the regulations and secured exemption from listing through its adaptation. It is unclear why the similar action by Tata did not get the same nod.What can Tata consider?you may likeWe learn that Tata has a reorganisation proposal to adapt to the new regulations by (i) restoring Tata Sons to its original form for many years of deriving significant non-financial income and (ii) nurturing a portfolio of nascent businesses as divisions within Tata Sons, as indeed Tata Consultancy was from the 1970s.The Tata Sons board should consider and refine it. If they then progress a persuasion and advocacy plan, then they would have heard the quiet voice of caution about avoiding a change to the nature and purpose (purushartha) of Tata Sons. That quiet voice must be heard by the Tata Sons board.Gopalakrishnan is a business commentator and the author of 21 books on human behaviour and enterprise leadership