Background. In 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) experienced the largest recorded outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, with epidemiologically linked importations and secondary transmission in Uganda. This study analysed the publicly reported trajectory and assessed the risk of introduction and onward transmission in North Africa and Europe. Methods. Public surveillance reports from the World Health Organization (WHO), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Africa CDC, national ministries of health, and peer-reviewed sources were synthesised through 15-17 July 2026. Headline counts and crude case-fatality ratios were restricted to laboratory-confirmed cases. Average notification rates were calculated from cumulative DRC counts. Exact Poisson intervals used the Garwood method, and the June-July rate ratio was estimated on the log scale. Risk was assessed across introduction likelihood, conditional onward-transmission likelihood, impact, and confidence. Results. By 15 July, the DRC had reported 2,124 confirmed cases and 828 deaths (crude confirmed-case fatality ratio, 39.0%) across 46 health zones in five provinces. Uganda had reported 20 confirmed cases and two confirmed deaths: 15 imported infections and five secondary cases, with no documented community transmission. DRC notifications averaged 47.4 per day during 1-15 July versus 35.9 per day during 2-29 June (rate ratio 1.32; counting-model 95% interval 1.20-1.46). WHO reported that more than 80% of new cases were detected outside known contact lists, while 119 confirmed healthcare-worker infections and 36 deaths had occurred. Introduction likelihood was assessed as very low to low for North Africa and very low for the general European population; delayed recognition in routine healthcare was the principal scenario for limited secondary transmission. Interpretation. Available indicators were inconsistent with effective control in eastern DRC at the data cut-off. Public reporting-date series cannot separate transmission from changing ascertainment, but they showed no sustained decline. Preparedness in North Africa and Europe should prioritise complete exposure histories, rapid isolation, validated diagnostics, protected clinical care, and contact management rather than reliance on border screening. Keywords: Bundibugyo virus; Ebola disease; outbreak surveillance; rapid risk assessment; importation; North Africa; Europe; Algeria; International Health Regulations.