Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu made a three-day state visit to Pakistan earlier this month. Both countries signed 20 MoUs “to strengthen their relations in various fields”, including socio-economic development sectors, cybersecurity, drug trafficking, and defence and maritime security. They aim to launch direct flights and increase trade from $13 million to $200 million in the next two years. The Maldives also organised a business forum to explore investments and economic opportunities.AdvertisementThe visit underscores Muizzu’s interest in pursuing strong relations with Sunni Muslim nations and diversifying ties beyond India. This, however, risks compromising India’s long-term security and strategic interests. India, which has largely accommodated the Maldives’ agency, should now gradually up the ante.Also Read | PM Modi’s engagement with the Maldives shows India is playing the long gameGeography and religion have largely shaped Maldives-Pakistan relations. Despite a stronger bond with India, the Maldives has, in principle, practiced neutrality and advocated for regional integration and peace between Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan has also assisted the country with medical and religious education and even supported the construction of the parliament building.Engagements with Pakistan have increased under Muizzu since his early days. This serves multiple purposes: It boosts his credentials as a nationalist, and diversifies Maldives’ foreign policy. This trend is more visible in defence partnerships. For instance, in addition to Pakistan, the Maldives has signed MoUs on defence cooperation with China and Turkiye. The latter has helped it procure a vessel and multiple UAVs. The Maldives has also procured armoured vehicles from the UAE, and even joined the Saudi Arabia-led maritime defence coalition. The Maldives is also aligned with Pakistan on the developments in the Middle East, especially with their stance on Israel and Palestine. Under Muizzu, the Maldives is thus enjoying growing defence ties with all members of the Mecca pact.AdvertisementFor Islamabad, the visit is an opportunity to challenge India’s strategic presence and interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) . It helps undo India’s decade-long policy to isolate Pakistan in the region. In fact, since Operation Sindoor, Pakistan and China have held trilaterals with Bangladesh and Afghanistan. Pakistan has advocated for SAARC revival, and even proposed a new South Asian bloc without India. It also plans to expand its naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. Its references to Kashmir and the Indus Water Treaty in its joint statement during this visit further reflect its not-so-benign calculations.On its part, India’s policy has been highly pragmatic on the Maldives. It has used economic assistance to create leverage and long-term goodwill. It offered multiple extensions for T-bills worth $150 million; restructured debts; extended credit lines worth 4,850 crores; and currency swaps worth $400 million and Rs 30 billion. In fact, India rolled over one of its T-Bills during Operation Sindoor even as the Maldives took a neutral stance. Last week, India rolled over its INR-denominated currency swap even when Muizzu’s visit to Pakistan was made public.Delhi’s policy has merit. With presidential elections just two years away and Muizzu’s growing unpopularity, India does not want to fuel anti-Indian rhetoric and nationalism. Given strong religious and historic ties, India knows that Pakistan cannot be completely isolated from the archipelago nation. Instead, some MoUs between Pakistan and the Maldives, like countering cyber crimes and drug trafficking, could even benefit India.you may likeBut, defence and security-related developments will have implications. Muizzu’s meeting with Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff to discuss military cooperation, regional security, and defence relations and their interest to strengthen institutional relations, defence partnerships, and professional exchanges have fueled fears of Pakistan being another stakeholder in the Maldives’ security architecture. These developments will crowd an already crowded IOR and bring a hostile country closer to India’s maritime boundaries.India will therefore have to make clear that exercising agency or sovereign choice cannot go unchallenged if they impede on its security concerns. Delhi will have to raise the stakes, communicate its red lines, and signal that respecting its concerns earns carrots, and failing to do so would lead to a gradual drying up of economic incentives and assistance.The writer is Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation