Tourists click pictures while posing in front of scenic Pangong lake in Ladakh. (Express photo by Shuaib Masoodi)Shatrujeet Kapur, the Director General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), recently confirmed at an event that Indian and Chinese troops have faced off at several locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh since July. The ITBP works alongside the Indian Army to guard the border with China.Kapur also highlighted that countering China through traditional military methods alone would be tough, as Beijing has invested heavily in modernising its forces. Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Ranadhir Jaiswal responded during a press briefing that the situation along the LAC “gets disturbed from time to time when the Chinese forces diverge from the established patrolling patterns”. Personnel of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have reportedly pitched tents around 6-7 km inside India’s perception of the LAC.While high-level political engagements, such as between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, have led to the disengagement of troops from selected friction points, the underlying disagreements about the LAC remain unresolved. What complicates the situation is the PLA’s frequent deviations from established mechanisms to change the status of the LAC in its favour by resorting to ʻGrey-Zone’ Warfare (GZW) tactics.Grey Zone Warfare in China’s playbookThe ʻUS Special Forces Commandʻ White Paper of September 2015 defined GZW as “competitive inter action among and within state and non-state actors, (that) falls between traditional war and peace duality; characterized by ambiguity, opacity of parties involved or uncertainty about relevant policy and legal framework.”The Chinese concept of ʻUnrestricted Warfare’, which expands the definition of traditional armed conflict, closely meets these criteria. The four key components of Chinese GZW tactics are political action, economic clout, cyber warfare and incorporation of non-state actors. Of late, the PLA has adopted the strategy of “Three Warfares”, encompassing public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.Explained | An Expert Explains the LAC issue: ‘The Chinese are using ambiguity on the LAC… as a major pressure point against us’The PLA’s GZW strategy on the LAC operates on multiple fronts. Foremost is capacity building, particularly military infrastructure. Post the 2020 intrusions in Eastern Ladakh, China has transformed its Himalayan frontier by creating massive defence infrastructure and the wherewithal, specifically in Western Theatre Command, which guards the border opposite India.Story continues below this adMajor projects include the strategic highway G695, connecting Mazha in Xinjiang to Lhunze in Tibet. The new G580 highway connects military hubs in Xinjiang to Aksai Chin. Two strategic railway lines — Xinjiang to Lhasa, Tibet, and Gyirong (on the Nepal border) are under construction. China has built or comprehensively upgraded airfields in close proximity to the LAC; notable ones include Lhunze airbase, Ngari-Burang, Shigatse and Nyingchi airports, besides a dense network of heliports.By adopting the tactics of “nibble and negotiate”, the PLA incrementally alters the ground situation through patrolling and building infrastructure along the disputed borders. Post-2020, China has attempted to unilaterally alter the status quo of the LAC in Eastern Ladakh. The GZW strategy thus enables shifting the strategic baseline through accumulated minor tactical moves, without involving the costs and risks of response that a full-scale attack might evoke.Through the ʻborder villages’ project backed by its 2022 land border law, China has built 628 Xiaokang (moderately prosperous villages). Around 90% are concentrated along the border with Arunachal Pradesh. These function as military garrisons and forward defence posts. Beijing’s repeated recourse to renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh further illustrates cartography’s efficacy as a GZW tool.Through geopolitical positioning, part of the GZW strategy, China has enlarged its footprint across Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean Region with economic relationships, connectivity projects and security partnerships. The China-Pakistan partnership uses GZW to create two-front pressure.Story continues below this adWhat India needs to counter Grey Zone WarfareIndia’s principal weakness is not the absence of diplomatic or military mechanisms to deal with a hostile neighbourhood. It is the lack of an integrated, publicly articulated coherent national strategy, combined doctrines, and organisational structures — linking military preparedness to border management, infrastructure development, diplomacy and economic dimensions.Also Read | Why India lost the 1962 war with China, and the lessons that endureThe ambiguity around the LAC has compounded in Ladakh as the Patrolling Points (PPs), which earlier defined its alignment, have lost relevance post-2020. When this author last commanded the LAC in the early 1990s, PPs were observed as reference points by both sides.While border management remains indispensable, it is no substitute for broader strategy and compensation for the deficiencies in surveillance, intelligence, rapid reinforcement and logistics.Story continues below this adMore importantly, flat command and control structure is essential for speedy action. Chinaʻs ʻBorder Defence Regimentsʻ are under the PLA and on par with the regular units. In India’s case, the ITBP is under the Ministry of Home Affairs and is inadequately equipped. As the borders are contested, there is a requirement for a separate border guarding force, with state-of-the-art systems, under the Armyʻs operational control, to ensure timely response to an adversary’s misadventures.Diplomacy without delusionHistorically, Delhi’s approach towards Beijing has been to manage friction diplomatically, arguably to the extent of appeasement, which China has exploited. Frequent meetings between the top leaders is a positive step, but it does not imply restored normalcy in India-China relations. Some analysts even advocate that a state of ʻstrategic equilibrium’ has been reached. However, Beijing is known to use diplomatic thaw to screen its military activities.China’s approach has been to delink the border issue from broader bilateral ties while persistently laying claims to Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Therefore, it is obvious that normalisation of diplomatic relations may not lead to peaceful borders. In fact, a secure LAC can only be guaranteed when agreements are respected, which is contingent on India building credible deterrence, extending from land borders to maritime frontiers.India-China relations may have entered an era of ʻcompetitive coexistence’, but the reality is that this coexistence is profoundly asymmetric. India needs to be cognizant that its strategic edge does not lie in responding to future provocations but in preventing China from converting incremental advantages into the new normal. India’s diplomacy must be aligned with a comprehensive China strategy, which blends firmness and resilience and makes incremental changes in the status quo cost-prohibitive.Story continues below this adThe author is a war veteran who commanded on the LAC and served as Defence Attaché in China. He is currently a professor at Lal Bahadur Shastri Institute of Management.