In November 2010, former President Jerry John Rawlings questioned political parties’ dependence on financiers who “naturally expect to be rewarded when elections are won”. His warning captures a problem that Ghana’s constitutional reforms must address: the growing cost of winning power and the pressure to repay political sponsors afterwards.Political competition is essential to democracy. But when participation increasingly depends on financial strength, public service risks becoming an investment from which candidates and their backers expect returns.Ghana needs reforms that reduce these pressures, enforce existing obligations and protect the independence of institutions responsible for political finance.Competition and financial dependenceWhen one candidate increases spending on advertising, rallies, transport and mobilisation, rivals feel compelled to respond. The result can be escalating expenditure without a lasting advantage for anyone.Research by CDD-Ghana and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy reported a 59 per cent increase in parliamentary campaign costs between 2012 and 2016. Competition is one driver; inflation, constituency demands and transport costs also matter.At the NPP’s 2018 conference in Koforidua, UK Conservative representative John Hayward questioned the proliferation of campaign posters. His observation illustrated how internal rivalry can generate considerable spending before a national election even begins.The danger arises when candidates depend on sponsors whose support carries expectations of appointments, contracts or privileged access after victory. Where public office provides opportunities to satisfy those expectations, campaign financing becomes a governance problem with consequences for public expenditure and development.Existing laws require enforcementArticle 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution requires democratic internal party organisation. Article 55(14) requires public disclosure of party revenues, assets and their sources, together with annual publication of audited accounts. Article 55(15) restricts contributions and donations to Ghanaian citizens.The Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), gives practical effect to these obligations. Section 14 requires pre-election statements of assets and liabilities and post-election expenditure reporting. Section 21 requires annual returns and audited accounts, provides access for public inspection and empowers the Electoral Commission to order audits on reasonable grounds.The Act also provides sanctions for specified failures and false statements. Ghana’s problem therefore includes inconsistent implementation alongside gaps in the safeguards.Daily Graphic reported in June 2017 that only seven of 25 registered parties had submitted financial statements by the EC’s May 2016 deadline, with the NDC and NPP submitting late.CitizenGhana Movement subsequently secured a High Court order in February 2018 requiring publication of party accounts. According to Citi News, the EC missed the reported September deadline, with publication eventually taking place in March 2019 following further advocacy. Citizens should not repeatedly need litigation to obtain routine financial information.My own experience reinforces this concern. On 28 January 2025, I wrote to the EC under section 21(2), requesting the NPP’s and NDC’s 2023 financial returns and audited accounts, including details of inspection and copying fees. Receipt was acknowledged, but despite repeated follow-ups, I had received no response as of 1 November 2026.This does not establish whether either party submitted its accounts. It demonstrates the difficulty of exercising a statutory right to inspect them.Who accounts for the regulatorThe accountability gap extends beyond parties’ disclosures. Act 451 requires the EC’s own accounts to be audited annually, but contains no equivalent express requirement for an annual report to Parliament explaining its oversight of political finance. Auditing the Commission’s expenditure does not establish whether it has effectively scrutinised party expenditure.The UK offers a useful comparison. Its Electoral Commission must report annually to Parliament on the performance of its functions. Separately, it publishes campaign spending returns under a legal duty and produces election-specific expenditure analysis. These are distinct reporting mechanisms that make political finance and regulatory performance open to scrutiny.Without regular consolidated reporting, Parliament and the public cannot readily determine which parties complied, whether accounts were checked, what discrepancies emerged or what action followed. Silence can obscure both party non-compliance and regulatory inaction, weakening pressure for corrective measures.Ghana should require an annual political-finance oversight report and a report after each general election. These should identify returns received and outstanding, declared income and expenditure, audits, investigations, sanctions and recoveries. Parliamentary scrutiny should assess performance while respecting independence in individual investigations.Disclosure must enable scrutinyReceiving accounts is only the beginning. Information must be accessible, sufficiently detailed and checked for completeness. A six-month post-election reporting window provides little help to voters assessing campaign expenditure before polling day. Citizenship restrictions also require verification of the ultimate sources of donations, including money channelled through intermediaries.Reports of the Supreme Court’s July 2026 decision on party candidate selection underline the importance of broader member participation. However, expanding participation will not automatically reduce monetisation. Credible membership registers, fair eligibility rules and financial controls remain necessary.CDD-Ghana’s exploratory research identified relationships between campaign financing and activities including illegal mining, procurement infractions and contract kickbacks. Its reliance partly on informant accounts means these findings identify risks rather than establish convictions against particular financiers.Article 284 prohibits conflicts between personal interests and public responsibilities. Article 286 establishes asset declaration obligations and addresses wealth not reasonably attributable to legitimate sources. These provisions complement the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921), and the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), as amended by Act 914.In OccupyGhana v Attorney-General, decided on 14 June 2017, the Supreme Court affirmed the Auditor-General’s obligation to exercise disallowance and surcharge powers where the relevant conditions arise. Effective political-finance regulation must be reinforced by consequences for qualifying unlawful expenditure and losses.Constitutional protection and practical resultsThe Constitution Review Committee proposes a constitutionally established independent regulator of political parties and campaigns. Government accepts an independent regulator in principle but favours establishment through ordinary legislation.The central disagreement concerns institutional protection. The Constitution should secure the regulator’s existence, independence, core mandate and appointment safeguards. Legislation should specify reporting procedures, financial thresholds, expenditure limits and sanctions.Constitutional status alone cannot guarantee performance. Reliable funding, specialist staff, transparent decisions and public accountability are equally necessary.African experience supports this practical approach. South Africa publishes compliance information, but reporting remains uneven. Morocco’s audit process has produced recoveries while leaving outstanding amounts. Cabo Verde links electoral subsidies to approved accounts. These are measurable oversight results, although they do not conclusively demonstrate lower corruption or campaign costs.Priorities for reformProtect the regulator through transparent recruitment, secure tenure, defined removal procedures and predictable funding. Any transfer of responsibilities from the EC should avoid a gap in oversight.Publish party accounts and compliance records online. Require timely campaign disclosures covering significant donations, loans, guarantees and contributions in kind, with verification of ultimate funding sources.Introduce realistic contribution and expenditure limits covering presidential campaigns, parliamentary elections and primaries. Define campaign periods and coordinated third-party spending while protecting independent civic advocacy.Strengthen internal democracy, asset verification, conflict disclosures and recusal. Provide fair access to state media, shared candidate platforms and clear procedures for challenging irregularities.Apply proportionate sanctions consistently. Support smaller parties with reporting tools and training, distinguish correctable mistakes from deliberate concealment, provide independent appeals and publish enforcement outcomes.Political rivalry will continue. Constitutional reform should ensure that competition rewards ideas, competence and public service, and that electoral victory creates obligations to citizens rather than debts to private sponsors.