Barely two weeks after the publication of my memoir India and I, interviewers and readers have repeatedly asked why I believed the Opposition deserved preferential treatment by the Election Commission (EC).The answer lies at the heart of what I believe is the constitutional philosophy of election management: The ruling party needs regulation. The Opposition needs reassurance. The EC must provide both.AdvertisementThe framers of our Constitution deliberately placed the EC beyond the reach of the executive. Elections could not command public confidence if the referee was perceived to be close to one of the contestants, especially the ruling party. The Commission was therefore created as an independent constitutional authority, entrusted with protecting the integrity of the electoral process.That independence is not merely legal; it is institutional.A serving civil servant appointed as Election Commissioner relinquishes his service and assumes a constitutional office. In my case, I resigned from the Indian Administrative Service a year before retirement. That separation reflects a profound constitutional principle. Once appointed, an Election Commissioner no longer serves the government of the day. His allegiance belongs exclusively to the Constitution.The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this constitutional vision. In TN Seshan v. Union of India and, more recently, in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, it underscored that an independent EC is indispensable to free and fair elections, which form part of the Constitution’s basic structure.AdvertisementBut constitutional independence cannot be measured only by legal safeguards. It must also be reflected in institutional behaviour. The EC must consciously maintain an arm’s-length relationship with the executive. Any perception of a cosy relationship between the executive and the EC is antithetical to the constitutional scheme and corrosive of public confidence.That constitutional distance has an important implication. The party in power commands the administrative machinery, public visibility and official resources. The Opposition has only its voice and its confidence that an impartial constitutional authority will hear it fairly.Recognising this asymmetry does not compromise neutrality. It fulfils it.When I became Chief Election Commissioner, I gave my officers a simple instruction. If Opposition parties sought an appointment, they should receive one at the earliest. Sometimes requests came with barely 15 minutes’ notice. We did our best to accommodate them. Not because they deserved favours, but because they were entitled to confidence that they would always receive a patient hearing.An EC trusted only by the ruling party has failed just as surely as one trusted only by the Opposition. It must command the confidence of both. But the confidence of the Opposition is often the more exacting test because those without power are naturally more anxious about the fairness of the referee.One incident from the Bihar Assembly election of 2010 illustrates why.Around 11 o’clock on the eve of counting, Lalu Prasad Yadav telephoned me with an unusual request. He wanted only bank employees to supervise counting in his constituency. Although all arrangements had been finalised, I asked the Chief Electoral Officer to accommodate the request, come what may.The following evening, after he had lost, he telephoned again. This time he appeared inclined to question the Electronic Voting Machines. I told him candidly that people would laugh if he did so. He accepted the advice. A modest accommodation had preserved something far more valuable than administrative convenience. It had preserved confidence in the electoral process.Throughout my tenure, the Bharatiya Janata Party sat in the Opposition. Its leaders frequently approached the Commission with complaints and representations. They received the same patient hearing. Arun Jaitley initially viewed me with some reservation, but that disappeared as he experienced the Commission’s even-handedness. Years later, he generously described me as “one of India’s most mature and credible Chief Election Commissioners.” I treasured those words because they reflected confidence earned through institutional fairness rather than personal friendship.The philosophy I followed was not an individual innovation. It is reflected in India’s own Model Code of Conduct (MCC). Significantly, one of its most important chapters is devoted to the “Party in Power”. It restrains ministers from using official machinery for campaigning, prohibits the misuse of public resources and bars policy announcements that may influence voters. The constitutional instinct is unmistakable: Those who wield power require greater restraint because they already possess overwhelming advantages.One of India’s greatest democratic achievements has been the extraordinary legitimacy of its electoral verdicts. Governments changed. Prime Ministers lost office. Powerful Chief Ministers were voted out. Candidates gracefully accepted the verdict and began preparing for the next election. This confidence in the process made our elections a model for emerging democracies.It is precisely because that reputation is so precious that recent developments should concern us all. During the 2024 general election, Opposition parties repeatedly complained that their representations alleging violations of the MCC were not receiving prompt and transparent consideration. Even Election Commissioner Ashok Lavasa protested, for which he was hounded out. More recently, 23 Opposition parties took the extraordinary step of writing to the Chief Justice of India expressing serious concerns about the EC’s handling of the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls. Around the same time, the Trinamool Congress publicly alleged discourtesy in its interaction with the Commission, an allegation firmly denied by the Commission.Whether these grievances are ultimately upheld is not the central issue. The deeper concern is that a significant section of the political spectrum felt compelled to seek relief from another constitutional institution rather than the EC itself. No EC should ever allow such a perception to develop.In my experience, most defeated candidates can accept defeat. What they find difficult to accept is the feeling that nobody listened to them before they lost.you may likeEvery EC is judged twice: First by how efficiently it conducts elections, and then by the confidence it inspires among those who lose them. The first test is statistical. The second is constitutional. Together, they determine the health of our democracy. That conviction shaped my own philosophy as Chief Election Commissioner.The ruling party needs regulation. The Opposition needs reassurance. The EC must provide bothQuraishi is former chief Election Commissioner of India and the author of India and I – A Hundred Memories, Not a Memoir