5 min readJul 31, 2026 06:20 AM IST First published on: Jul 31, 2026 at 06:20 AM ISTThe verdict on the Saudi civil nuclear agreement arrived before the text itself. On July 22, Washington and Riyadh signed a Section 123 agreement and a safeguards accord. Their texts remain unpublished, and the agreement awaits congressional review. President Trump then said there would be no enrichment and that he would not proceed unless Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords, leaving the deal’s meaning and future more uncertain.Washington and Riyadh began the process in 2008 with a memorandum on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Negotiations continued under Barack Obama, the first Trump administration and Joe Biden. That continuity reflects a resilient partnership despite periodic political strains. The concern is that the agreements may enable American reactor sales while leaving open the possibility of Saudi enrichment. Reactors, enrichment capacity and access to centrifuge technology are different questions. The agreements should be judged by who controls the technology and what inspectors can see. Talk of a “gold standard” can obscure the international legal baseline. The term is a policy label drawn from the UAE agreement, not an IAEA category or universal norm. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force with the IAEA. The treaty prohibits it from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. It requires neither an Additional Protocol nor renunciation of safeguarded enrichment. The Protocol improves information and access, especially concerning undeclared activities, but is not a universal legal requirement.AdvertisementThe reported terms do not immediately authorise an enrichment plant. They first envisage a study lasting two years. If the study establishes a commercial case and Washington agrees, American companies could build a facility using a “black box” model without transferring the underlying centrifuge technology. If Washington rejects enrichment, Riyadh would reportedly undertake for 10 years not to enrich independently or through another supplier. The question is deferred, not decided.Saudi Arabia has a credible civilian case for nuclear power. Nuclear power could conserve oil for export and complement renewables. Riyadh links domestic enrichment to fuel cycle autonomy, uranium development and industrial capability. Domestic enrichment would not create an independent fuel cycle. No Middle Eastern commercial plant fabricates power reactor fuel assemblies. Enriched uranium would therefore go abroad to become reactor fuel unless Riyadh later built such a plant. This limits the autonomy enrichment would provide without removing the proliferation concern attached to centrifuges.Five of the 31 states operating nuclear power reactors lack an Additional Protocol in force: Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Iran and Pakistan. Belarus has signed one but not brought it into force. Iran has unresolved safeguards issues and Pakistan is outside the NPT. Argentina and Brazil combine IAEA safeguards with the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Brazil enriches at Resende; Argentina retains pilot and research enrichment capabilities.AdvertisementAs an international civil servant with the IAEA, I accompanied Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to Resende. Brazil owns its centrifuge technology and shields parts of its cascade design, while IAEA and ABACC inspectors verify material flows, samples and output. The reported Saudi model would not transfer the supplier’s centrifuge technology to the host. In that narrow respect, it would be more restrictive than Resende. It would not eliminate operational learning. Resende taught me to resist both alarmism and complacency.Any enrichment arrangement should combine IAEA material accountancy and inspector access with bilateral limits on enrichment, technology controls and consequences for breach. The IAEA has said it awaits a formal request to undertake the proposed verification. Any bespoke arrangement would then go to its board of governors for approval. US participation would add consent rights, export controls and congressional scrutiny. American refusal would not necessarily end Saudi nuclear plans. Riyadh could turn to another supplier offering Washington less visibility and leverage. Iran and Israel will shape how any Saudi programme is read. Saudi leaders have linked their nuclear choices to Iran, making verification essential. A Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone remains a distant prospect. The 1988 India-Pakistan agreement offers a modest precedent for protecting nuclear installations from attack, but a Gulf equivalent remains unlikely.you may likeIndia should support access to peaceful nuclear technology, insist on verification that can detect misuse and reserve judgement on enrichment until the study is complete and any governing terms are public.The world gains little by treating Saudi nuclear power as a weapons programme simply because enrichment remains unresolved. What matters is whether the agreement limits the spread of sensitive technology and enables early detection of diversion of safeguarded nuclear material. A Saudi reactor is not a Saudi bomb.The writer is former permanent representative of India to the UN, and dean, Kautilya School of Public Policy, Hyderabad