There is a fundamental shift underway in US trade policy. After more than a year in which President Donald Trump relied mainly on executive powers to impose tariffs, the US Congress is now moving to strengthen and expand his tariff strategy through legislation.The clearest example is the Russia sanctions Bill. On July 28, the US Senate voted 86-12 to advance the Bill, which would authorise Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on countries buying Russian oil, including India. The strong bipartisan vote makes Senate approval highly likely. The Bill must still pass the House of Representatives and be signed by the President before becoming law.AdvertisementThe message is clear: Tariffs are no longer just presidential actions under existing laws — they are increasingly becoming an instrument of US economic and foreign policy, backed by Congress. India should recognise this structural shift and frame its trade strategy accordingly, rather than treating each new tariff measure as temporary or isolated.The events of July 24 had already pointed in the same direction. Exporters had expected the temporary Section 122 tariff to expire and US imports to revert to normal WTO most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff rates. Instead, Washington kept the tariff in place by replacing one legal instrument with another.Just hours before the Section 122 tariff expired, the US Trade Representative imposed new Section 301 tariffs on imports from 60 economies, citing forced-labour concerns. The tariff burden remained largely unchanged; only its legal basis changed. This showed that maintaining higher tariffs had become a policy objective, regardless of the legal instrument used.AdvertisementIndia’s experience illustrates this shift. Although Washington reduced India’s tariff from the proposed 12.5 per cent to 10 per cent after recognising its ban on imports made with forced labour, it still imposed the tariff despite producing no credible evidence that India imports goods made with forced labour. The objective appeared to be not simply to remedy an unfair trade practice but to preserve a broader tariff-based strategy.The result is a US tariff system that is becoming increasingly permanent, layered and unpredictable. Tariffs are now imposed through multiple legal authorities — including MFN tariffs, Section 232, Section 301, and potentially new legislation such as the Russia sanctions Bill. A cotton T-shirt imported into the United States now faces a 26.5 per cent tariff (16.5 per cent MFN plus 10 per cent under Section 301), while an auto part attracts 27.5 per cent (2.5 per cent MFN plus a 25 per cent Section 232 duty). Some products, including smartphones and generic medicines, remain duty-free — for now.This marks a sharp departure from the traditional trading system. For decades, WTO commitments kept tariffs in countries broadly stable. The United States is now using an expanding range of executive and legislative powers to raise tariffs in violation of its commitment at the WTO.More measures are in the pipeline. The US is expected to conclude another Section 301 investigation into alleged excess manufacturing capacity, including India’s textiles, steel and petrochemicals. Trump has also proposed 100 per cent tariffs on imported generic medicines from August 2028, rising to 200 per cent a year later unless production shifts to the US. Given that India supplies nearly half of all generic prescriptions dispensed in the US and almost 38 per cent of its pharmaceutical exports go to the US market, these proposals ignore the impact on American consumers.The scope of US trade action is also expanding beyond traditional trade disputes. Washington is increasingly using Section 301 to challenge domestic policies that it believes disadvantage US commercial interests. The recent investigation on Brazil illustrates this trend. In June 2026, the US imposed an additional 25 per cent tariff on most Brazilian imports after investigating issues ranging from digital trade rules and Brazil’s Pix instant-payment system to preferential tariffs, intellectual property, anti-corruption enforcement, US ethanol restrictions and illegal deforestation.India should take note. Many of the same issues regularly appear in the US National Trade Estimate Report on India, including high tariffs, digital trade policies, data localisation, intellectual property, agricultural restrictions, technical standards, government procurement and the broader regulatory framework. Brazil’s Pix system is comparable to India’s UPI, which some US credit-card companies argue disadvantages them and want India to restrict.While Washington continues to expand its tariff arsenal, India has steadily made unilateral concessions to US commercial interests. It has reduced tariffs on bourbon whiskey, premium motorcycles, ICT products, medical devices, and metals; extended duty-free treatment for imports used in nuclear power projects; offered tax incentives for foreign cloud-service providers to set up data centres; eased access for US agricultural products; and allowed foreign-funded e-commerce companies to own inventory for exports. Yet these concessions have neither slowed US tariff actions nor secured meaningful commercial gains. Instead, they have weakened India’s negotiating position.In any trade negotiation, concessions are exchanged for reciprocal benefits. When a country makes unilateral concessions outside the negotiating process, the other side simply accepts them without offering anything in return. That is why countries negotiating trade agreements avoid unilateral concessions and keep all offers on the table until a balanced deal is reached.This has important implications for the proposed India-U.S. bilateral trade agreement (BTA). Although officials say the agreement is “99 per cent complete”, the main US concession no longer exists. Under the February 6, 2026 joint statement, Washington had offered to reduce reciprocal tariffs on Indian exports from 25 per cent to 18 per cent. But that offer disappeared on February 20 when the US Supreme Court struck down the reciprocal tariff regime. Since then, the United States has been unable to offer any comparable commercial benefit, making it difficult to justify further Indian concessions.India has little reason to rush into a BTA. Unlike many US allies in Europe and East Asia, it does not depend on American security guarantees and is therefore under less pressure to accept an unbalanced deal. More importantly, a trade agreement would not shield India from future tariffs. The European Union, Japan and South Korea — all close US partners with trade agreements — continue to face new Section 301 investigations and other trade actions.you may likeIn 2019, India imposed retaliatory tariffs on 28 US products in response to steel and aluminium tariffs, arguing that such action was permitted under WTO rules. Today, however, retaliation appears far less feasible.Rather than negotiating under pressure, India should strengthen its competitiveness, diversify export markets and preserve its policy autonomy. Temporary export losses are a smaller cost than permanent concessions that weaken India’s long-term interests.India should sign a trade deal only when it delivers stable, reciprocal commercial benefits; not short-lived relief from an unpredictable U.S. tariff regime. A lasting trade partnership cannot be built on a foundation of changing tariffs.The writer is founder, GTRI