Countries: Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, Uganda Source: Migration Policy Institute Please refer to the attached file. By Ahmed Gamal EldinSudan’s ongoing civil war has created the world’s largest and fastest-growing displacement, yet this crisis has been largely overshadowed by conflicts and political tensions elsewhere around the globe. Violence began spreading across the country in April 2023 and had claimed an estimated 150,000 lives by June 2024. An estimated 12 million people had been forced to leave their homes as of July 2025, including 7.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)—more than half of them children. Approximately 4.1 million of the displaced have left Sudan to seek protection: 3.2 million Sudanese as well as about 800,000 refugees from other countries who returned to their place of origin or relocated elsewhere. Famine has been declared in parts of the country, including in an IDP camp. Displaced people have been pushed into at times hostile environments where access to basic services and protection is severely limited.The war escalated from a power struggle between two rival factions within the country's military establishment: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). A UN fact-finding mission in September 2024 concluded that both sides have committed human-rights violations and international crimes, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, arbitrary arrests, rape, torture, and extrajudicial executions. The U.S. government has accused the RSF of committing genocide against non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur and the SAF of deploying chemical weapons against civilian and military targets alike. The conflict and its associated displacement are likely to have serious repercussions that will shape the future of Sudan and its neighbors for years to come.While Sudan has suffered civil wars before, the scale of the current crisis marks an unprecedented and deeply troubling chapter in its history. At the same time, global cuts to humanitarian aid have reduced the amount of support available for displaced people and may prolong the crisis.This article traces the current civil war-related displacement and situates it historically. It provides data on various types of forced movement, broader humanitarian impacts, and the repercussions of international aid cutbacks.Crisis Follows Decades of Recurring DisplacementIn many respects, the war represents a continuation and escalation of historical patterns of violence and displacement that have afflicted Sudan for decades. Many people newly forced to move had been displaced previously. Before civil war erupted in 2023, Sudan hosted an estimated 3.8 million IDPs. Many had fled years of conflict stemming from the failures of successive postcolonial governments; the present war should be understood within this history.The longest and most devastating of these conflicts began on the eve of independence in 1956 and lasted until June 2011, when southerners voted to establish South Sudan as an independent country. The protracted war crippled the economy, devastated both the North and South, claimed the lives of more than 2 million people, and displaced more than 5 million within Sudan and beyond. Even after the South’s secession, violence persisted near border regions.In 2003, amid conflict in the South, a new civil war erupted in the western Darfur region. This conflict resulted in the death of more than 300,000 civilians and the displacement of 5 million Darfurians within the country and across the world. The Darfur crisis led the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict President Omar al-Bashir and other senior officials for genocide and war crimes.At times, authorities in Sudan have deliberately displaced communities to achieve social, economic, political, or military objectives. Historical patterns of intentional displacement can be traced back to the Turco-Egyptian rule of Sudan (1821-85). Nineteenth-century colonial powers and successive post-independence governments adopted strategies to displace marginalized communities or else failed to adequately respond to environmentally induced displacement. Often, this displacement was done under the pretext of security and safety concerns, urban planning, or development projects including agriculture, oil exploration, and mining. Forced displacement and re-displacement of whole communities occurred during conflict and peacetime alike.In addition to violence, natural disasters have prompted displacement. Sudan has been affected by drought since the 1970s; Darfur has been especially hard hit and has experienced several famines since the early 1980s. The pastoral tribes of Darfur, who form the core of the RSF, have been particularly affected, and their traditional livelihood systems have been shattered by the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation in their homelands.A New Conflict with Devastating ConsequencesEven with this history, Sudan’s current civil war is unprecedented in nature, magnitude, and impact. For instance, while previous conflicts took place in remote rural areas, this one started in Khartoum and at the heart of the government. Within days of fighting beginning, the RSF took control of most of the capital and federal government institutions, including the country’s main airport, the army and security headquarters, the presidential palace, almost all federal ministries, and the central bank headquarters. The occupation of most parts of greater Khartoum is also significant because the metropolis is home to about one-eighth of the country’s population and most of its top educational institutions. As a result, the central government was almost totally paralyzed from the very first weeks of the conflict, resulting in the relocation of the limited government bodies that are still functioning to the coastal city of Port Sudan.The SAF and its allies have destroyed squatter settlements and makeshift homes around Khartoum where IDPs had been driven. In central Sudan, accusations of collaboration with the RSF were used as a pretext to burn down villages. RSF forces have used similar deliberate displacement strategies against adversaries in Darfur.Moreover, both sides have mobilized, armed, and extensively relied on various militias—many of which were formed along regional, ethical, and tribal lines—to an unprecedented extent, adding dangerous ideological and ethnic dimensions to the fighting.Patterns of Internal DisplacementApproximately 70 percent of people who were already IDPs when the war erupted lived in official camps and were mainly assisted by international aid agencies. IDPs were registered in 16 of the country’s 18 states, with 80 percent displaced by the fighting in Darfur and living in camps in the region. Approximately 52 percent of these IDPs were female and about 28 percent were under age 18.More than 1 million people (an estimated 29 percent of IDPs) have experienced secondary or tertiary displacement since April 2023, while in excess of 2.7 million others remained in their initial areas of displacement. Though the Darfur region had previously hosted by far the most IDPs, states in other regions have more recently become major hosts for the displaced (see Figure 1).Although Sudan has taken steps to establish a national normative framework to address internal displacement—including with the government's displacement policies of 2006 and 2009 —it has neither formally adopted the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement nor ratified the 2009 African Union Kampala Convention on IDPs. Nevertheless, the government has acknowledged the UN Guiding Principles and made efforts to align its policies accordingly, while also expressing commitment to several provisions of the Kampala Convention. Despite these steps, genuine political will to tackle the root causes of displacement and mitigate its impact on individuals and communities remains limited. Institutional capacity to implement existing policies is weak, and government officials often invoke national sovereignty to resist external pressure for reform. Lack of political will at various levels and the gap in policy implementation worsens the vulnerabilities of displaced people and exposes them to various forms of exploitation, abuse, and further displacement, within and across national borders.Sudanese Refugees and Foreign RefugeesAs of July 2025, an estimated 3.2 million Sudanese had fled the country and sought protection abroad. Another 500,000 or so are believed to have left to join family members in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. At the same time, Sudan has long been a regional hub for refugees from other countries; amid the current crisis, more than 813,000 left to return to their origin countries, with thousands departing Sudan every month.Historical ties and practical factors such as geographic proximity, accessible border crossings, and existing social connections have made Egypt (1.5 million), South Sudan (1.2 million), and Chad (870,000) the primary international destinations for people fleeing Sudan (including Sudanese and those of other nationalities; see Figure 2). The relatively porous nature of many African borders, the existence of regional asylum agreements such as the 1969 Organization of African Unity convention on refugees, and refugee protections offered by many countries have facilitated movement. Still, refugees from Sudan in neighboring countries face widespread protection challenges. Many lack access to basic services such as health care, education, and official documentation, and their freedom of movement is often restricted by local laws and bureaucratic procedures.Conditions in Host CountriesEgypt is host to largest population of people displaced from Sudan. The true number is thought to be much higher than the 1.5 million officially registered refugees and asylum seekers. Due to the historical and cultural connections between the two countries, the Egyptian government and people generally welcome Sudanese escaping conflict. Although the country prohibits establishing refugee camps, it supports refugees integrating into urban areas. As such, nearly all refugees from Sudan reside in either Cairo, Alexandria, or Aswan. The rapid influx into these urban centers has placed a significant strain on housing, education, and health-care services; rising costs of housing and education, along with documentation issues, are refugees’ primary challenges. The June 2024 closure of nearly all community learning centers set up by Sudanese refugees exacerbated the situation, leaving many children without access to education.South Sudan, the world’s newest country, is the most challenging context. State institutions remain fragile, the economy is weak, and conflict remains widespread. Although South Sudan’s civil war formally ended in 2018, there remain 2 million IDPs and a further 2.4 million South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers abroad, including in Sudan. The situation is further complicated by the return of approximately 787,000 South Sudanese who had taken refuge in Sudan. Arrivals from Sudan have strained the already limited infrastructure and services and created social tension that has been further fueled by reports of mistreatment and summary execution of South Sudanese refugees in Sudan who were accused of collaborating with the RSF.Chad hosts approximately 870,000 Sudanese refugees, most of whom were displaced from the Darfur region. In addition, an estimated 270,000 Chadians returned from Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict. Women and children constituted approximately 87 percent of Sudanese refugees in Chad as of this writing. Many arrive traumatized, injured, and malnourished, and are settled in remote, underdeveloped areas where natural resources are scarce, infrastructure is inadequate, essential services are lacking, and livelihood opportunities are minimal.To reach Libya, an estimated 313,000 Sudanese undertook a perilous journey across the desert, often through Chad or Egypt, before arriving in an economically fragile country that lacks a functioning central government. Libya has increasingly become a major refugee hub and a key transit point for Africans and others attempting to reach Europe. Here, too, most refugees and asylum seekers are women and children. Owing to the limited humanitarian presence and scarce aid, refugees must compete with local communities for already overstretched services. This competition frequently fuels social and political tensions and often escalates into violence.Uganda hosts the most refugees in Africa, with more than 1.9 million people primarily from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); as of July 2025, approximately 82,000 new refugees had come from Sudan. Although Uganda hosts a relatively small number of Sudanese refugees, their situation is notable. While most Sudanese refugees travel by land, about one-third of those in Uganda arrived via air. In addition, unlike other refugees, many Sudanese in Uganda are from Khartoum, highly educated, and of working age. Uganda has welcomed Sudanese refugees, offering automatic, prima facie refugee status based on their nationality. While they must register in the Kiryandongo settlement, they can move freely, work legally, start businesses, and access health and educational services, in line with Uganda’s generally open refugee-hosting model.Finally, Ethiopia and Sudan have historically hosted refugees from each other, including Sudan’s hosting of Ethiopian refugees since the 1970s and Ethiopia’s welcome of most South Sudanese fleeing war in the 1960s through the 1990s. Approximately 20,000 Ethiopian returnees were forced to join the 44,000 Sudanese individuals and 10,000 people of other nationalities who have sought protection in Ethiopia over the last two years. Most crossed the Kurmuk or Metema border points and were hosted in camps in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region. Due to security concerns in their areas of origin, most returnees joined IDP camps in the central Tigray region.Refugees in SudanWhen war broke out, more than 1.1 million refugees were in Sudan, just 38 percent of whom resided in official camps, primarily in Eastern Sudan and White Nile states. More than half (52 percent) were in the Khartoum and White Nile states, reflecting significant presence in urban areas.While many have returned to their countries of origin or found other destinations, as of June 2025 Sudan continued to host 882,000 refugees and asylum seekers, 74 percent of them from South Sudan—ironically, a country where many displaced Sudanese have fled. Most refugees are in the relatively calmer states of White Nile, Kassala, and Gedaref, where they have nonetheless been adversely affected by the effects of conflict and the influx of hundreds of thousands of IDPs.About 51 percent of those who remained in Sudan as of 2025 were women and girls, 23 percent were children under age 18, 4 percent under age 5, and 16 percent living with disabilities. These individuals have often been harmed by the paralysis of public institutions due to the conflict. Meanwhile, many schools and other public buildings have been converted into residential areas for IDPs, and humanitarian aid has been limited and restricted, making matters worse for refugees and their host communities.The Humanitarian TollThe conflict has caused massive destruction and suffering. Combining deaths from conflict with those due to famine, disease, and lack of health care, the total war-related death toll could exceed 150,000. A London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine study estimated that more than 61,000 people died in Khartoum State alone between April 2023 and June 2024.Indeed, many more people are believed to be dying from hunger and disease than from fighting. Children are particularly affected. The Sudan Doctors Union reported that more than 522,000 infants had died from malnutrition between the outbreak of war and January 2025. A cholera outbreak, which killed 546 people in 2024, has affected ten states including White Nile, home to many South Sudanese refugees. By February 2025, at least 11 of Sudan’s 18 states were facing three or more disease outbreaks, including cholera, dengue, malaria, measles, or diphtheria. In Omdurman, adjacent to Khartoum, a recent cholera outbreak killed nearly 200 people in recent weeks, mostly returning displaced people or refugees.The health-care system was already weak and has become worse, with 80 percent of hospitals in the worst-hit areas not working. Extremely limited health care has meant people with chronic diseases often cannot get needed medicines, and many patients die due to lack of care. Meanwhile, since 2024, several parts of the country have been in famine conditions, and the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that half the population will struggle with severe food shortages in 2025. Both the SAF and RSF have been reported to use starvation as a weapon of war by systematically obstructing the delivery of food, medical supplies, and humanitarian aid.Education is virtually nonexistent. Almost all 19 million school-age children are out of school. Ninety percent of all 23,000 schools have been closed or are unreachable, as are all universities. Many schools and universities have been converted into shelters for displaced families, used by the military, or destroyed.Children have faced risks including kidnapping, sexual violence, forced military recruitment, and child labor. These threats lead to violence and psychological distress. Additionally, conflict and displacement have a profound impact on children’s physical and mental well-being.By May 2025, the conflict had claimed the lives of at least 84 humanitarian workers, all of them Sudanese. A significant incident occurred in April, when the RSF attacked the famine-stricken Zamzam displacement camp in North Darfur, resulting in the deaths of nine Relief International workers as well as more than 100 civilians (including at least 20 children). In January, a drone strike at the Saudi Maternal Teaching Hospital in El Fasher, attributed to the RSF, killed more than 70 individuals, including patients and medical staff. On December 19, 2024, an aerial bombardment in Yabus, Blue Nile, resulted in the loss of three World Food Program (WFP) team members. The targeting of aid workers and rampant looting of food supplies have further hindered relief operations, causing significant disruptions and increasing dependence on local organizations with limited resources.The Impact of Aid CutsUnprecedented aid cuts by donors including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union since January 2025 have had a significant impact on the crisis response. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is among the organizations most affected by these cuts, which have disrupted operations across key host countries. For instance, the approximately $806 million refugee response plan for Chad was less than 5 percent funded as of May 2025. Such severe underfunding hampers efforts to provide essential services including shelter, food, health care, and protection to vulnerable populations.Similarly, Uganda has faced challenges due to cuts to health care and other spending. For example, even before the recent cutbacks, there was a 67 percent reduction in essential services such as for gender-based violence casework from 2023 to 2024.Unparalleled TollThe current war is not Sudan’s first brush with violence. However, its brutality, magnitude, and consequences are unparalleled in the nation and regionally. The scale of the devastation is particularly notable given how overlooked it has been, amid a range of crises worldwide.The conflict and its repercussions are human-made and preventable, yet humanitarian aid to reduce the impact has faded. Rather than being an unfortunate consequence of war, forced displacement is often a deliberate strategy of fighters seeking to punish certain groups, expand power, or achieve other objectives. With little international support, this displacement is difficult to prevent. The failure of Sudanese actors, regional forces, and the international community to act promptly and decisively to stop the conflict and address its devastating ramifications will continue to lead to serious repercussions for Sudan, the entire region, and beyond.