MATIAS SPEKTOR2025年8月27日 Jose FloresPresident Trump has announced 50 percent tariffs on India and Brazil, two of the global south’s largest economies. He wants India to cut ties with Russia, even though dozens of countries maintain similar ties without such steep consequences. And he wants Brazil’s government to drop charges against former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is accused of trying to stage a coup after losing the 2022 election. These tariffs are more than trade measures; they’re tools of political coercion, designed to use economic pain to rewrite other nations’ domestic and foreign policies.特朗普总统宣布对全球南方两大经济体印度和巴西加征50%关税。他希望印度断绝与俄罗斯的联系——尽管数十个维持类似关系的国家并未遭受如此严厉的惩罚。他还希望巴西政府撤销对前总统博索纳罗的指控，后者被控在输掉2022年大选后试图发动政变。这些关税不仅是贸易手段，更是政治胁迫的工具，旨在通过制造经济痛苦来改写他国的内外政策。But while Europe, South Korea and Japan have acquiesced to many of Washington’s demands on trade, India and Brazil are charting a different path that could reshape how developing countries resist American pressure. Rather than giving way in submission or panic, they’re pushing back — and buying time to activate alternative partnerships that have been years in the making, a policy political scientists call strategic hedging. It’s a survival strategy that is helping nations fight back against Mr. Trump, but paving the way for a more fragmented and dangerous world.但是，当欧洲、韩国和日本已经默许华盛顿在贸易上的许多要求时，印度和巴西正在开辟一条不同的道路，这可能会重塑发展中国家抵抗美国压力的方式。它们没有屈服或恐慌，而是发起反击，并争取时间来激活酝酿多年的替代伙伴关系，政治学家称之为“战略对冲”。这是一种生存策略，正在帮助各国反击特朗普，但同时也在推动世界走向更分裂、更危险的境地。Washington today sees foreign policy through the lens of ally or adversary. For emerging economies, this is a false choice. Strategic hedging means cultivating multiple, overlapping relationships that prevent overreliance by any single major power. Think of it as a geopolitical version of portfolio strategy: Just as investors spread risk across assets, nations spread dependency across relationships. The goal isn’t self-sufficiency but rather preserving freedom of action. When alternatives exist, no single partner can dictate terms.当今华盛顿以“非友即敌”的视角看待外交政策。对新兴经济体而言，这种“二选一“是个伪命题。战略对冲意味着培育多重交错的关系网络，避免过度依赖任何单一大国。可将其视作地缘政治版的投资组合策略：正如投资者分散资产风险，国家也在对外关系中分散依赖性。这么做的目的不是为了自给自足，而是为了保持行动自由。当有替代方案存在时，任何单一伙伴都无法独断专行。Brazil and India have spent decades perfecting this approach. Throughout the 1990s, while Washington was basking in its unipolar moment, they were quietly building other relationships out of deep distrust of American power. They watched the United States abandon negotiations it disliked, exempt itself from international jurisdiction and interpret “rules-based order” to mean “our rules, your compliance.” The lesson wasn’t that America was evil but that even benevolent hegemons eventually abuse their power — and that emerging countries could never afford to be entirely dependent on the United States.巴西和印度几十年来一直在完善这种方法。整个1990年代，当华盛顿陶醉于单极时刻时，它们出于对美国权力的深度怀疑悄然构建其他关系。它们目睹了美国退出不喜欢的谈判、让自己免受国际司法管辖，并将“基于规则的秩序”解释为“我们定规则，你们来遵守”。它们学到的教训并非美国邪恶，而是即便仁慈的霸主最终也会滥用权力——而新兴国家永远承受不起完全依赖美国的代价。Today these countries seem to feel vindicated in their suspicions of Washington, and justified in hedging their bets.今天，这些国家似乎觉得它们对华盛顿的怀疑得到了证实，并且对冲策略的合理性也得到了证明。In the wake of Mr. Trump’s tariffs, Brazilian exporters are accelerating partnerships in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Indian firms are expediting certifications and regulatory clearances for an array of products in markets around the world. Both nations’ governments are reviving their quest for trade agreements that bypass Washington, a trend that European countries have also embraced in their own efforts to diversify trade away from the United States. These aren’t perfect substitutes for the massive American market, but they’re enough to avoid caving to American demands.面对特朗普的关税，巴西出口商正在加速与非洲、欧洲、中东和东南亚国家建立伙伴关系。印度企业正在加快全球市场一系列产品的认证和审批流程。两国政府都重启了绕开华盛顿的贸易协定谈判，而这一趋势也被欧洲国家所采纳，以推动自身的贸易多元化、减少对美国的依赖。这些虽不能完全替代庞大的美国市场，但足以避免屈服于美国的要求。In this game China offers no real alternative, despite its size. Beijing’s partnerships come with their own dependencies such as preferential trade terms that favor Chinese exports; its neighbors view it with deep suspicion, and its international influence networks still pale beside America’s. BRICS, a bloc of developing countries, provides a forum for coordination but no genuine governance structure. Countries including Brazil and India likely feel they’d be better off standing on their own than joining Beijing’s orbit.在这场博弈中，尽管体量庞大，中国并未提供真正替代方案。北京提供的伙伴关系自带依附属性，例如有利于中国出口的优惠贸易条款；周边国家对其戒心深重，其国际影响力网络仍远逊于美国。金砖国家集团虽提供协同合作的论坛，却缺乏真正的治理结构。巴西和印度等国可能认为，与其加入北京的势力范围，不如自力更生。Hedging is a heavy lift. It calls not just for a wealth of trading partners but also for the domestic capacity to use them. Brazil and India’s weaknesses — crony capitalism, crushing inequality and endemic corruption, among other things — limit their freedom of action. They can turn to new markets, but weak governance may make them less appealing to those markets.对冲策略是一项艰巨的任务。它不仅需要众多的贸易伙伴，还需要具备利用这些伙伴的国内能力。巴西和印度的弱点——裙带资本主义、严重的社会不平等和普遍腐败等——限制了它们的行动自由。它们可以转向新市场，但薄弱的治理可能会降低这些市场对它们的兴趣。Still, even imperfect hedging beats capitulation. Brazil and India are demonstrating that emerging powers can preserve some agency despite both outside pressure and internal deficiencies. From Indonesia to South Africa, from Turkey to the Philippines, other countries are watching closely. These nations have also demonstrated a reluctance to choose between Washington and Beijing and seek space to pursue their own interests. What they’ve lacked is a framework for that resistance — until now.尽管如此，即使是不完美的对冲仍胜于投降。巴西和印度正在证明，新兴力量即使面临外部压力和内部缺陷，也能保留一定主动权。从印度尼西亚到南非，从土耳其到菲律宾，各国都在密切关注。这些国家也表现出不愿在华盛顿和北京之间选边站队的态度，它们寻求追求自身利益的空间。它们所缺乏的正是抵制框架——直到现在。What Brazil and India show is that strategic hedging can succeed even under duress, if you’re willing to lay the groundwork. They have framed resistance as a stand for sovereignty rather than anti-Americanism. They have spent decades keeping diplomatic doors open despite Washington’s pressure. It’s been hard work, but it’s preserved their agency — at least so far.巴西和印度的例子表明，只要愿意打好基础，战略对冲即使在胁迫下也能成功。它们称自己的抵制行动是在维护主权而非反美。几十年来，它们顶着华盛顿的压力，保持外交大门的敞开。这是一项艰苦的工作，但它保留了自主权——至少到目前为止是这样。The approach has limits — and risks. Many of the world’s most advanced tech, finance and security systems still run through U.S.-led networks. India has been deepening its cooperation with the United States on semiconductor manufacturing and defense, while Brazil’s economy is highly dependent on Chinese demand for its raw materials. Markets may read hedging as risk, pushing up borrowing costs and shaking currencies. In a crisis, “keeping options open” can look like indecision, and shrink leverage with all sides. Even when hedging is a rational strategy for individual countries, it threatens to unravel what remains of global cooperation — a cost even the hedgers may come to regret.这种方法有其局限性和风险。许多世界最先进的科技、金融和安全系统仍然通过美国主导的网络运行。印度一直在深化与美国在半导体制造和国防领域的合作，而巴西经济高度依赖中国对其原材料的需求。市场可能将对冲视为风险，从而推高借贷成本并动摇货币汇率。在危机下，“保留选择权”可能显得优柔寡断，削弱与各方的杠杆。即使对冲对单个国家是理性策略，它也可能瓦解全球合作的剩余部分——这个代价甚至可能最终让对冲者后悔。If Brazil and India successfully weather Mr. Trump’s tariffs, they’ll prove American economic coercion can be resisted and other countries will almost certainly develop their own hedging strategies. The outcome, though, won’t be a new world order but managed disorder — a return to the messy multipolarity of the early 20th century, when multiple powers and weak international institutions ultimately laid the foundations for world war.如果巴西和印度成功挺过特朗普的关税冲击，它们将证明美国的经济胁迫是可以抵抗的，其他国家几乎肯定会制定自己的对冲策略。然而，其结果不会是一个新的世界秩序，而是一种“受控的失序”——回归到20世纪初纷乱复杂的多极格局，当时列强林立和的国际机构的孱弱，最终为世界大战埋下祸根。We may not be headed for global conflict, but neither Brazil nor India harbors illusions about where all of this leads. They know hedging is expensive, that managing multiple relationships requires constant attention, that playing all sides means trusting none. The world they’re helping to create — fractured, fluid, uncertain — offers no guarantee of prosperity or stability. But they also recognize that hegemonic order is ending, whether they participate in its demolition or not. Better to help shape the emerging disorder than be shaped by it.我们或许不会走向全球冲突，但巴西和印度都不抱有任何幻想，它们很清楚这一切将通往何方。它们知道对冲代价高昂，管理多重关系需要持续关注，多方周旋意味着不可信任任何一方。它们正在帮助创造的这个世界破碎、流动、充满不确定性，它无法保证繁荣或稳定。但它们也认识到霸权秩序正在终结，无论是否参与它的解体。与其被正在形成的失序所塑造，不如参与对它的塑造。For American policymakers, the signals should be sobering. Mr. Trump’s tariffs won’t restore American dominance; they’re speeding up its decline. Every arbitrary punishment teaches other countries that dependence on America is dangerous. More and more nations will respond by seeking other partners — even inefficient ones — because autonomy matters more than efficiency when the dominant power can’t be trusted.对美国政策制定者而言，这些信号应令人警醒。特朗普的关税不会恢复美国主导地位，而是在加速其衰落。每次任意惩罚都在告诫他国：依赖美国是危险的。越来越多的国家将通过寻求其他伙伴——哪怕是效率不高的伙伴——来回应，因为当主导大国变得不可信任时，自主权比效率更重要。The tragedy is that this emerging landscape serves nobody’s interests. Americans will pay more for everyday goods as supply chains fracture, watch the dollar lose its privileged status and see their companies locked out of the world’s fastest-growing markets. Brazilians and Indians will almost certainly face higher prices for imported technology while their economies stagnate. The world will be poorer, more uncertain, more prone to conflict.可悲的是，这个正在出现的格局不符合任何人的利益。随着供应链断裂，美国人将为日用品支付更高费用，目睹美元失去特权地位，看到自家企业被拒于世界增长最快的市场之外。巴西和印度几乎注定要面对进口技术价格攀升与经济停滞的双重压力。世界将更贫困、更不确定、更易发生冲突。This dissolution isn’t inevitable. America could still choose patient diplomacy over economic coercion, building coalitions through compromise rather than diktat. Brazil and India could temper hedging with cooperation on shared interests — technology, finance, even nuclear nonproliferation — that create stakes in stability. But that requires leaders who recognize that new rules for global order need to be written now. The question isn’t whether the old order can be saved; it can’t. It’s whether we can create a new set of rules and institutions or stumble blindly into chaos.这种瓦解并非不可避免。美国仍然可以选择通过耐心外交而非经济胁迫、通过妥协而非命令来构建联盟。巴西和印度可以在共同利益——技术、金融甚至核不扩散——上以合作来调和对冲，从而为稳定创造利益基础。但这需要领导人认识到，全球秩序新规则亟待制定。问题不在于旧秩序能否被拯救——它不能。问题在于我们能否创建一套新的规则和制度，还是盲目陷入混乱。Matias Spektor是巴西圣保罗瓦加斯基金会(Fundacao Getulio Vargas,FGV)的政治和国际关系教授。翻译：杜然点击查看本文英文版。