August 22, 2025 06:50 AM IST First published on: Aug 22, 2025 at 06:50 AM ISTShareThe recent to-and-fro in India-Russia-China diplomacy and their impending summits could be viewed, arguably, against the backdrop of New Delhi’s recent discomforts with US President Donald Trump. In what has been a particularly active week for Indian foreign policy, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in New Delhi for the 24th round of boundary talks, after which External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar travelled to Moscow to co-chair the 26th session of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission. In less than two weeks, PM Modi will meet with President Xi Jinping at the SCO, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to visit India later this year. While these engagements are independent of the Trump disruptions, in the face of tensions with Washington, they have acquired a new dimension.India’s immediate concern with respect to Russia is Trump’s threat of secondary tariffs on cheap oil purchases. With the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska offering little clarity on the Ukraine war, the US has doubled down on the tariff threat: The US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, this week accused India of profiteering from Russian oil, while Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, wrote an op-ed bluntly titled ‘India’s oil lobby is funding Putin’s war machine — that has to stop’. India can only hope that the US and Russia reach a deal over Ukraine and that Trump rolls back the additional 25 per cent tariff threat. Whatever direction this issue takes, however, going ahead, the larger lesson is that New Delhi must pursue independent relations with the “great powers”, and foreign policy agility must be shored up by unity and long-overdue economic reform at home.AdvertisementIndia’s engagement with China has accelerated since the formal conclusion of the disengagement process nearly a year ago. During Wang’s visit to Delhi, the two sides agreed to restart direct flights and border trade, and to establish new mechanisms on border management. Significantly, Beijing’s official handout urged India and China to “demonstrate their responsibility as major powers”. Yet it would be naive to believe that China will not continue to view relations with India through a zero-sum competitive lens. The border dispute remains unresolved, and while disengagement has taken place, the de-escalation that Jaishankar reiterated in his talks with Wang (who visited Islamabad right after New Delhi) still hasn’t begun. Beijing appears to see merit in keeping up the pressure along the border. China’s defence capacity has grown formidable, while India continues to run a trade deficit of over $100 billion with it, amid tensions with its largest export market, the US. This makes it all the more vital for India to step up domestic economic reform, enhance its technological capabilities, modernise the defence sector — India successfully test-fired Agni-5 on Wednesday — and strengthen security partnerships with its Asian partners. Only by moving towards narrowing the gap with China can New Delhi build enough leverage with Beijing.