In the wake of the ongoing US, Israel and Iran war, the former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa (Retired), told The Indian Express that while air battle has always been the opening gambit in such conflicts, it can achieve a lot only if it’s coupled with a ground campaign.In an interview, the former Air Chief added that what Iran is achieving is only of propaganda value, as it is not achieving anything significant in military terms.Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa: There’s a saying in English that ‘one swallow does not make a summer’. If, in thousands of sorties, you get one hit and that too the aircraft hasn’t fallen, you can see how low the loss rate is. The US and Israel have flown 5,700 to 7,600 sorties and had only one hit, so the loss rate is 0.000166 per cent, assuming an average of 6,000 sorties. We had a 0.85 per cent loss rate in the 1971 war, as per Air Marshal Vikram Singh’s book Because of This – A History of The Indo-Pak Air War of December 1971.This means losing about 1 aircraft per 100 sorties across all aircraft types. What Iran is achieving is only of propaganda value. They can claim for propaganda value that, though the Americans and Israelis are claiming that their air defences have been destroyed, they have still managed to hit one stealth aircraft. What Iran is demonstrating is its nuisance value. They are not achieving anything significant in military terms.Also Read | If Trump attacks Iran’s power plants, how region, oil prices will be affectedQ: How long do you think this can go on, given that Iran has been under sanctions for so long?Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa: In an autocratic society like Iran, you can divert a lot of resources into defence, even if your economic condition is not so good. They have been preparing for many years. They have seen what the US has been able to do in Yugoslavia and Iraq. Iraq tried to fight the US conventionally and lost badly. They have prepared and dug deep. More than 40 per cent of Iran is mountainous, so they can dig many tunnels.At best, the enemy can destroy the mouth of the tunnel, so you can clear that debris and come out again. If the enemy is very good at intelligence, it can destroy the ventilation shafts, and life becomes very tough inside. With all these years of build-up of missiles and drones, they must have kept some in reserve. From these reserves, they can pull out from the tunnels and fire. With this, the Iranians cannot achieve victory, but they retain their nuisance value.Q: Iran has been able to cause damage with its drones that cost about $20,000 each, whereas the cost of each interception by Israel’s Iron Dome system is much higher. What are the takeaways from this?Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa: You see the cost-to-benefit ratio of dealing with the nuisance value. Israel and the Gulf countries are using expensive missiles to counter Iran’s drones that are much cheaper to make. All these countries had moved away from air defence guns. We saw in Operation Sindoor that so many drones came from Pakistan, yet there was hardly any damage caused to the IAF infrastructure because we had our air defence guns.Story continues below this adI have now been retired for about six years, but we must have had the Close-in Weapons System (CIWS) inducted by now, which can shoot down the Shahed drones better than the older L-70 guns, and the cost of a round is a fraction of the drone’s cost. The CIWS fires Smart Ammunition, where intelligence on the target’s distance is embedded in the round itself.The system on the ground determines how far the target is, it measures the velocity of the round before it leaves the barrel and the fuse is also programmed to explode on the face of the target. All this happens in microseconds. The round then detonates in the drone’s face. It’s like a 12-bore cartridge used to shoot small birds.The cost-to-benefit ratio shifts in your favour. I’m surprised these systems haven’t been deployed in sufficient numbers. All major US bases in Afghanistan, like Bagram, etc., had the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) air defence systems that could take down even a mortar shell fired by the Taliban. The Iranian drones are larger and can be easily taken down by CIWS.In India, the Army deploys air defence guns. Economically vital areas and points, such as refineries, are defended against aircraft, standoff missiles, and drones. A drone cannot penetrate a blast-pen and take out an aircraft, but it can hit a tank at an oil refinery, triggering a fire that will be portrayed as a major hit. Iran is fighting this perception battle.Story continues below this adQ: How do you see the situation going forward?Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa: The US will back down only in case its own population puts pressure on it, which is exactly what happened during the anti-Vietnam War protests. There are two ways to put pressure on the leadership: first, through body bags. We saw in the 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing case when one suicide bomber killed over 240 marines and the US withdrew from Lebanon.The second way is by increasing the prices of gasoline and goods in US stores. Then, pressure will come from the US public on the President and Congress. Iran failed to do so with the first (create body bags); it is now trying to achieve the second by closing the Strait of Hormuz. A well-equipped Naval ship with a close-in weapon system, supported by mine sweepers, can defend itself and go through the Strait of Hormuz, definitely during the day.But the tankers are all civilian and have to be insured by Lloyd’s Shipping and other marine insurers who have either stopped insuring or severely hiked their insurance costs, which in turn are hiking shipping rates. So, the tanker owners will decide to wait. The nuisance value of the Iranian missiles and drones has affected the civilians the most.Q: What do you think are the US’s objectives and what are the possible off-ramps?Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa: From my perspective, the desired end state would have been that the Iranian nuclear capability should be obliterated; the missile and drone capabilities too get obliterated; and a change of regime, since there were large-scale protests in Iran at the beginning of this year. The US-Israeli alliance would at least be expecting a change of behaviour, that the Iranians stop supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, and stop calling for death to Israel.Story continues below this adOn nuclear capability, they would have been able to set them back quite a bit. Missile and drone capabilities have been made ineffective, though it’s not zero; the pin-prick capability will always remain. A change of regime will need boots on the ground.President Trump can walk away tomorrow if a change in behaviour is the objective, not a change of regime. If that is the case, he can have a peace accord tomorrow.Also Read | One-third of India’s strategic petroleum reserves are empty: Why this matters for fuel securityQ: What are the learnings for India from recent conflicts, where the battle has mostly been in the air, including Russia-Ukraine, Op Sindoor and now Iran?Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa: The air battle has always been the opening gambit in these conflicts. But it can achieve a lot only if it’s coupled with a ground campaign. The liberation of Bangladesh and the Iraq War of 2003 are the best examples of how a change of regime was carried out by ground forces operating in an environment of air superiority.Using air power alone can at best aim for change in behaviour, like the bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War, which ended with the Kumanovo Agreement, signed on June 9, 1999, with Yugoslav and Serb forces agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an international presence.Story continues below this adIn the Russia-Ukraine War, the Russian Air Forces have not been able to achieve air superiority and hence their ground forces have not been very successful.Both Balakot and Operation Sindoor were mainly air campaigns aiming at behavioural change to tell the sponsors of terrorism in Pakistan that we can get you wherever you are and terrorist attacks in India will come to you at a cost. Op Sindoor demonstrated IAF’s capability to hit Pakistani targets through the length and breadth of Pakistan, with their Air Force not being able to respond in kind.