The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Delhi High Court, which said the BJP leaders' remarks did not incite communal violence or public disorder. File PhotoThe Supreme Court Wednesday cleared Delhi Deputy Chief Minister Parvesh Verma and BJP leader Anurag Thakur over complaints that they delivered hate speeches allegedly targeting those protesting the Citizenship (Amendment) Act in January 2020.Dealing with a plea filed by CPI(M) leaders Brinda Karat and K M Tiwari, a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta upheld the findings of the Delhi High Court, which said the BJP leaders’ remarks did not incite communal violence or public disorder.“Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report dated February 26, 2020, submitted before the trial court, and the reasons recorded by the courts below, we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out,” the court said in its order.On August 26, 2020, a trial court dismissed their complaint against Verma and Thakur, holding that the same was not maintainable in law in the absence of prior sanction from the competent authority to prosecute the named accused.On June 13, 2022, the Delhi High Court rejected the pleas of Karat and Tiwari for registering First Information Reports (FIRs) against Verma and Thakur for hate speech, observing that “the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder.”The high court, while dismissing the appeal against this, agreed with this conclusion and said that in respect of offences falling within the ambit of Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the power under Section 156(3) of CrPC to direct registration of an FIR and investigation could not be exercised in the absence of prior sanction.What Supreme Court saidHowever, the Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the trial court and the high court and said that the requirement of prior sanction arises only at the stage of the magistrate taking cognisance, not before.Story continues below this ad“The scheme of CrPC does not contemplate any embargo on the direction for registration of an FIR or the conduct of investigation at the pre-cognisance stage. To hold otherwise would amount to introducing a restriction not envisaged by the legislature. The process of criminal law is sequential: information of a cognisable offence must first be received; an FIR must then be registered; investigation must follow; a report under Section 173 of CrPC must thereafter be submitted; and it is only at that stage that the question of taking cognisance arises,” the apex court said.Also Read | Hate speech case: If said with smile, no criminality, says Delhi HC“The position of law, as crystallised by this Court, is unequivocal. Where information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police, in such circumstances, have no discretion in the matter, either under the statutory scheme or by way of interpretative latitude,” the court said.“Investigating agencies, being creatures of statute, are bound by the duties and obligations cast upon them under the law. They cannot evade or dilute these statutory obligations by resorting to provisions which are inapplicable at the stage of investigation. Any such approach undermines the rule of law and erodes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.”“The criminal process is designed to protect both the rights of the accused and the interests of society. While the requirement of sanction serves as a safeguard against frivolous or vexatious prosecution at the stage of cognisance, it cannot be permitted to operate as a shield to prevent the very initiation of the investigative process where a cognizable offence is disclosed.”Story continues below this ad“Failure on the part of the authorities to perform their statutory duties at the threshold stage not only defeats the legislative intent but also places the ordinary citizen in a position of vulnerability against institutional inaction. The rule of law mandates that the machinery of investigation be set in motion in accordance with law, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations.”