Saheb Singh ChadhaAugust 30, 2025 02:59 PM IST First published on: Aug 30, 2025 at 02:59 PM ISTPrime Minister Modi’s visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit is the most significant development in India-China relations in the past five years. The discourse on these developments, and the broader India-China normalisation, requires nuancing on at least three key counts. These include, but are not limited to, the drivers of the normalisation, the Government of India’s appetite for better India-China ties, and its position on the border standoff.Analysts argue that it is US President Donald Trump’s policies and the churn in India-US ties that is pushing India closer to China. Others state that it is India’s economic necessities that are driving the engagement. However, a close reading of government statements and conversations with policymakers in New Delhi makes clear that managing a disturbed and disputed border with Beijing is the primary imperative. It was the disruption of peace and tranquility at the border that was holding India-China ties back, and it is the recent “general prevalence of peace and tranquility in the border areas” that is “leading to gradual normalisation of bilateral relations.”AdvertisementTo recap, both sides have been engaged in a standoff at their shared border since the summer of 2020, triggered by China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo. The scale and scope of the attempt coupled with the violent conduct of Chinese troops – such as in Galwan – was viewed as a strategic escalation by India that had disturbed peace and tranquility at the border. Given India’s longstanding position that peace at the border was essential for broader bilateral exchanges, the latter, including high level political dialogue, were effectively frozen. India maintained that the relationship would not normalise unless peace and tranquility were restored, through the steps of disengagement and de-escalation.Also Read | Can India and Japan lead a new Indo-Pacific order?Disengagement was painstakingly negotiated over five years, which enabled a meeting at the highest level between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping in October 2024. This set the ball rolling on the high-level political dialogue visible today, and this dialogue is entirely consistent with India’s position over the past five years. Thus, this engagement has long been under negotiation, rather than triggered by immediate geopolitical or economic concerns. The recent concerns have certainly provided impetus to this normalisation, and the India-China relationship is not insulated from geopolitics and geoeconomics.Then, it has been argued that India is making a ‘bad bet’ on Beijing, ‘cozying up’ to it, ‘pivoting’, ‘submitting’, all presuming a level of ambition in New Delhi that does not appear to exist at this time, and likely will not in the near future. The fact of the matter is that the experience of the Ladakh standoff – now in its sixth year and ongoing – has left few doubts in New Delhi about the nature of the long-term China challenge. De-escalation of the 100,000 troops and equipment deployed is yet to take place. There is systemic distrust of China across all three levels of government, be they political, diplomatic, or military.AdvertisementIn this context, the rekindling of people-to-people exchanges such as the Kailash Mansarovar yatra or direct flights is being prioritised because they are relatively less difficult to conclude, as opposed to border and trade negotiations. These measures, and statements such as PM Modi likening India and China to members of a family, are with a view to bring down the public rhetoric and temperature of the relationship – to enable a political atmosphere conducive for meaningful negotiations. These tactical measures and initial steps must not be conflated with broader ambitions for an India-China tango.most readAlso in vogue is a misunderstanding about India’s position on the border standoff. It has been assumed by several in the strategic community that “status quo ante” as of 2020 is the Indian government’s stated objective. Since the standoff began in the summer of 2020, the Government of India has not, publicly, explicitly, across briefings and meeting statements at the diplomatic and political levels, articulated that its goal was a “return to status quo ante”. It has advocated for the “full restoration of peace and tranquility”, it has stated its view that China’s actions constituted attempts to alter the status quo, and it has advocated for disengagement and de-escalation.Lastly, India’s history with China should engender strict caution, but it should not prevent searching for opportunities where plausible. The fact is that China has adopted a conciliatory posture towards India and its neighbourhood in the past, between 1988-2008, when its other interests have been under threat. In 1988-91, it underwent crises of domestic political stability (Tiananmen), and with the end of the Cold War, it was left alone facing the threat from the sole superpower – the United States. Faced with this strategic context and the unipolar moment, it sought to stabilise its periphery, including its relationship with India. Thus, this period saw tangible progress on managing the disputed border and on resolving the boundary question, with agreements signed in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012, and 2013. Cut to the present, where great power competition and geo-economic churn is pushing it to reach out to its neighbourhood once again. It held a central conference on neighbourhood diplomacy in April for the first time in 12 years, and the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi resulted in tentative progress on border management, the boundary question, and high-level dialogue. Thus, it is worth pondering whether the current geopolitical moment presents India with an opportunity for a new modus vivendi with China, if only tactical.Chadha is a senior research analyst at Carnegie India, and the author of Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020-2024