ROBERT A. PAPE2026年4月7日In recent years, the conventional geopolitical wisdom has been that the world order was moving toward three centers of power: the United States, China and Russia. That view assumed that power derived primarily from economic scale and military capability.近年来，地缘政治的主流观点认为，世界秩序正朝着美、中、俄三个权力中心演变。这一观点假定，实力主要源于经济规模和军事实力。That assumption no longer holds. A fourth center of global power is quickly emerging — Iran — that does not rival those three nations economically or militarily. Instead, its newfound power derives from its control over the most important energy choke point in the global economy, the Strait of Hormuz.但这种假设已不再成立。第四个全球权力中心——伊朗——正在迅速崛起。它在经济和军事上无法与前三者匹敌，但其新获得的权力源于对全球经济最重要的能源咽喉——霍尔木兹海峡的控制。The strait had long been an international waterway through which ships from all countries could travel. But the joint military campaign that the United States and Israel began waging against Iran this year has prompted Iran to create a selective military blockade of the strait.霍尔木兹海峡长期以来一直是国际水道，各国船只均可通行。但美国和以色列今年对伊朗发起的联合军事行动促使伊朗对该海峡实施了选择性的军事封锁。Roughly one-fifth of the world’s supply of oil and liquefied natural gas moves through the strait. There are no real alternatives to these supply routes in the near term. If Iranian control over the strait persists for months or years, as I believe it may, it will drastically reshape the global order to the detriment of the United States.全球大约五分之一的石油和液化天然气供应都要经过这条海峡。短期内几乎不存在可替代的运输路径。如果伊朗对海峡的控制持续数月甚至数年——我认为存在这种可能性，这将对全球秩序产生深远影响，并对美国不利。Many analysts believe that Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz is only temporary. A widespread expectation is that U.S. and allied naval forces will soon stabilize the situation and that oil flows will resume along familiar lines.许多分析人士认为，伊朗对霍尔木兹海峡的掌控只是暂时的。普遍预期是，美国及其盟友的海军将很快稳定局势，石油运输将恢复到以往。That expectation is flawed. It assumes that to continue to control the strait, Iran must physically close it off. But as we have already seen, you can control the strait without closing it. Today, the strait remains open to tankers. Traffic has dropped by over 90 percent since the war began, though, not because Iran has been sinking every vessel that entered the strait but because, given the credible threat of an attack, insurers withdrew or repriced war-risk coverage. Hitting a cargo ship every few days was more than enough to make the risk unacceptable.但这种预期是有缺陷的。它假设伊朗若要继续控制海峡，必须从物理上封锁它。但正如我们已经看到的，不封锁海峡同样可以控制它。如今，海峡对油轮保持开放，但自战争爆发以来，通行量已下降90%以上。这并非因为伊朗击沉了每艘进入海峡的船只，而是因为面临可信的袭击威胁，保险公司撤回了战争风险保险或提高了保费。每隔几天击中一艘货船，就足以让风险变得不可接受。Modern economies do not simply require oil. They also require oil delivered on time, at scale and with predictable risk. When that reliability breaks down, insurance markets tighten, freight rates spike, and governments begin to look at energy access as a complex strategic challenge rather than a simple market transaction.现代经济体不仅需要石油，还需要按时、大规模且在可预期的风险条件下交付石油。一旦这种可靠性被打破，保险市场就会收紧，运费飙升，各国政府会将能源获取视为一个复杂的战略挑战，而不再只是简单的市场交易。The problem for the United States is one of asymmetry. Protecting each and every oil shipment that passes through the Strait of Hormuz against potential attacks — mines, drones, missile strikes — is a full-time operation. It requires continuous military presence. Iran needs only to hit an oil tanker once in a while to cast doubt on the reliability of the world’s oil shipments.美国面临的问题在于一种不对称性。要保护每一艘通过霍尔木兹海峡的油轮免受潜在攻击——水雷、无人机、导弹打击——是一项全天候的任务，需要持续的军事存在。而伊朗只需偶尔击中一艘油轮，就足以让全球石油运输的可靠性受到质疑。President Emmanuel Macron of France said as much on Thursday when he declared that it was “unrealistic” to open the Strait of Hormuz by force and that “this can only be done in concert with Iran.” He was all but admitting that the flow of oil cannot be guaranteed without Iran’s agreement.法国总统埃马克龙周四也表达了类似的观点，他宣称用武力打开霍尔木兹海峡是“不现实的”，并且“这只能与伊朗协商解决”。这几乎等于承认，没有伊朗的同意，就无法保证石油运输的畅通。For decades, the Persian Gulf had a simple arrangement: Oil producers exported, markets priced, and the United States secured the route. That system allowed rivalry without instability. Now, it is falling apart.几十年来，波斯湾一直遵循一种简单的安排：产油国负责出口，市场负责定价，而美国负责保障运输畅通。这一体系使竞争得以存在而不至于引发不稳定。但如今，它正在瓦解。Gulf states depend heavily on energy exports for state revenue. When insurance rates spike and shipping becomes uncertain, the fiscal impact is immediate. Governments adjust. Cargoes are rerouted. Contracts are renegotiated.海湾国家的政府收入严重依赖能源出口。当保险费率飙升、航运变得不确定时，财政影响立竿见影。政府会做出调整，货物被重新安排运输路径，合同重新谈判。If uncertainty persists, the Gulf arrangement will inevitably change, giving way to a different regional order — one in which the Gulf states increasingly accommodate the actor that can most directly influence the reliability of their exports. That actor is now Iran.如果这种不确定性持续下去，海湾的这一安排将不可避免地发生变化，转向一种新的地区秩序——在这种秩序下，海湾国家将越来越多地迁就那个最能直接影响其出口可靠性的行为体。而现在，这个行为体就是伊朗。The global consequences will be most pronounced in Asia. Japan, South Korea and India depend heavily on Gulf energy. China, though more diversified, also depends on the region for a large share of its energy imports. Those dependencies are embedded in infrastructure — refineries, shipping routes and storage systems that cannot be quickly reconfigured.全球影响将在亚洲表现得最为显著。日本、韩国和印度高度依赖海湾能源。中国虽然来源更加多元，但其相当一部分能源进口同样依赖该地区。这种依赖深深嵌入在基础设施之中——炼油厂、航运路线和储存系统都无法迅速重新配置。If disruption to the energy supply persists, the effects will be widespread. Higher insurance and freight costs will raise prices. Trade balances will worsen. Currencies will weaken. Inflation will rise. Energy dependence will begin to shape policy. Governments will prioritize access to energy. Diplomatic choices will narrow. Actions that risk further instability will become harder to sustain. A 1970s world in which oil shocks lead to years of stagflation will no longer be a distant memory but a nearing reality.如果能源供应中断持续下去，影响将十分广泛。更高的保险和运费将推高价格，贸易平衡将恶化，货币将贬值，通胀将上升。能源依赖将开始塑造政策。各国政府将优先保障能源获取，外交选择将收窄，任何可能加剧不稳定的行动都将更难维持。一个1970年代那种因石油冲击导致多年滞胀的世界将不再是遥远的记忆，而是正在逼近的现实。Again, Iran will benefit.同样，伊朗将从中受益。China depends on Gulf energy to sustain growth. Russia benefits from higher and more volatile energy prices. Iran gains leverage from its position at the Hormuz choke point.中国依赖海湾能源维持增长。俄罗斯受益于更高、更不稳定的能源价格。伊朗则凭借其在霍尔木兹这一咽喉要道获得了筹码。Each of these three nations has incentives that run counter to the economic stability of the United States and its allies. These three nations do not need to coordinate in a formal way. The structure of the system pushes them in the same direction. This is how a new order emerges — not through a formal alliance (at least not at first) but through converging incentives that reinforce one another over time.这三个国家各自都有与美国及其盟友的经济稳定相悖的利益驱动。它们不需要以正式方式协调行动，体系本身的结构就将它们推向同一方向。这就是新秩序的诞生方式——不是通过正式联盟（至少最初不是），而是通过随着时间推移相互强化的趋同利益。Other plausible scenarios in the emerging new world order are darker still. Imagine Iran with control of about 20 percent of the world’s oil, Russia with about 11 percent and China able to soak up much of that supply. They would form a cartel to deny the West 30 percent of the world’s oil. You don’t need sophisticated analysis to recognize the catastrophic consequences: precipitously declining power for the United States and Europe, and a global shift toward China, Russia and Iran.在这个正在形成的新世界秩序中，其他可能的情境则更为严峻。不妨想象一下：伊朗控制着全球约20%的石油，俄罗斯约11%，而中国能够消化其中很大一部分供应。三者可能形成某种卡特尔，使西方失去全球约30%的石油供应。无需复杂分析就能看出其灾难性后果：美国和欧洲的实力将急剧下降，全球重心向中国、俄罗斯和伊朗转移。The United States faces a difficult choice: either commit to a long-term effort to reassert control over the Strait of Hormuz, or accept a new global energy arrangement in which U.S. control is no longer assured.美国面临一个艰难的选择：要么投入长期努力重新控制霍尔木兹海峡，要么接受一种新的全球能源安排——在这种安排下，美国的控制不再有保障。If it chooses acceptance, the outcome is clear: The international system will reorganize with Iran as a fourth center of global power. Yet if the United States chooses to reassert military control, it is in for a long battle, one it could well lose.如果美国选择接受，结果很明确：国际体系将重组，伊朗成为第四个全球权力中心。而如果美国选择通过军事手段重新掌控，那么它将面临一场漫长的战争，而且很可能无法取胜。The Iran war is not a military conflict from which the United States can simply back out, with things reverting to how they were before. Iran would surely demand a heavy price in a new accommodation with the United States — but this price will surely be less costly than that of the alternative future. This is a transformational war, and if these changes continue for even a few years, the global order will change irrevocably.这次的伊朗战争并非一场美国可以轻易抽身、让一切恢复原状的冲突。伊朗在与美国达成新和解时，必将索取沉重的代价——但与另一种未来相比，这个代价很可能仍然更低。这是一场具有转折意义的战争，如果这些变化持续哪怕几年，全球秩序都将发生不可逆转的改变。插图图片来源：Vahid Salemi/美联社Robert A. Pape(@professorpape)是芝加哥大学政治学教授，主持“芝加哥计划：安全与威胁”项目。翻译；杜然点击查看本文英文版，