MAGGIE HABERMAN, JONATHAN SWAN2026年4月8日去年12月，以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡与特朗普总统在后者的佛罗里达俱乐部兼官邸马阿拉歌庄园会面。 Tierney L. Cross/The New York TimesIn the two and a half weeks before the United States began a major military campaign against Iran, a small circle of advisers gathered in the White House Situation Room for a series of pivotal meetings. Previously undisclosed details of that period drawn from reporting for a forthcoming book, “Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump,” show how President Trump’s alignment with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and a lack of sustained opposition from all but one member of the president’s inner circle put the United States on a course to war.在美国对伊朗发动大规模军事行动的两个半星期前，一小群顾问聚集在白宫战情室，参加了一系列关键会议。根据即将出版的新书《政权更迭：唐纳德·特朗普的帝王总统任期内幕》中一些此前未披露的细节可以看出：特朗普总统与以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的立场高度一致，而总统核心圈子里除了一个人之外，几乎没有人持续反对，从而将美国推上了战争轨道。Here are six takeaways from that reporting.以下是该报道的六点主要内容。Netanyahu made a detailed pitch for war to Trump and his team in the Situation Room.内塔尼亚胡在战情室向特朗普及其团队详细提出了开战建议。Sitting across from Mr. Trump in the Situation Room — a venue rarely used for in-person sessions with foreign leaders — Mr. Netanyahu made an hourlong presentation to the president and his top aides on Feb. 11. He argued that Iran was ripe for regime change and that a joint U.S.-Israeli campaign could bring down the Islamic Republic. At one point, he played a video that included a montage of figures who could lead Iran if the theocratic government fell. Among them was Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah.2月11日，内塔尼亚胡坐在特朗普对面——战情室极少用于与外国领导人的面对面会谈——向总统及其高级助手做了长达一小时的陈述。他认为伊朗已经具备政权更迭的条件，美以联合军事行动能够推翻伊斯兰共和国。在陈述中，他播放了一段视频，其中包括一系列如果神权政府倒台后可能领导伊朗的人物，流亡中的伊朗末代沙王之子礼萨·巴列维就在其列。2月11日，在白宫等候内塔尼亚胡到来的记者。The Israeli leader and his advisers laid out what they portrayed as near-certain victory: Iran’s missile program destroyed in weeks, the Strait of Hormuz kept open and minimal retaliation against American interests. Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, could help foment an uprising inside Iran to finish the job.以色列领导人和他的顾问们描绘了一幅近乎必然胜利的图景：伊朗的导弹计划将在几周内被摧毁，霍尔木兹海峡保持开放，对美国利益的报复微乎其微。以色列情报机构摩萨德可以帮助在伊朗境内煽动起义，完成最后一击。Mr. Trump’s response was swift and appeared approving to most in the room. Sounds good to me, he told the prime minister.特朗普的回应迅速而明确，在房间里大多数人听来是赞成的。他对总理说：“我听着不错。”U.S. intelligence officials called Netanyahu’s regime-change scenarios “farcical.”美国情报官员称内塔尼亚胡的政权更迭方案“荒谬”。U.S. analysts scrambled overnight to assess what Mr. Netanyahu had presented. Their conclusions, delivered the next day in another Situation Room meeting, were blunt.美国分析人员连夜加班评估内塔尼亚胡提出的内容。第二天，他们在另一次战情室会议上给出了直率的结论。The first two objectives laid out in the Israeli pitch — killing the ayatollah and crippling Iran’s ability to threaten its neighbors — were achievable, U.S. intelligence officials concluded. The second two goals presented by Mr. Netanyahu and his team — a popular uprising inside Iran and the replacement of the Islamic government by a new secular leader — were not. The C.I.A. director, John Ratcliffe, used a single word to describe the regime-change scenarios: “farcical.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio translated, “In other words, it’s bullshit.”美国情报官员认为，以色列方案中提出的前两个目标——杀死最高领袖并削弱伊朗威胁邻国的能力——是可以实现的。但内塔尼亚胡及其团队提出的后两个目标——在伊朗境内引发民众起义，并用新的世俗领导人取代伊斯兰政府——则无法实现。中情局局长约翰·拉特克利夫用一个词来形容这些政权更迭方案：“荒谬”。国务卿马可·鲁比奥对这个词做了一番翻译：“换句话说，就是胡扯。”Mr. Trump absorbed the assessment — and moved past it. Regime change, he said, would be “their problem.” His interest in killing Iran’s top leaders and dismantling its military remained undimmed.特朗普听取了这一评估——然后就把它抛在了脑后。他说，政权更迭“是他们的问题”。他消灭伊朗最高领导人、瓦解其军事力量的兴趣丝毫没有减弱。Vice President JD Vance was the strongest opponent of the war — and the only one to make a forceful case against it.副总统JD·万斯是这场战争最强烈的反对者——也是唯一一个提出有力反对意见的人。Of everyone in Mr. Trump’s inner circle, Mr. Vance did the most to try to stop the march toward war. He had built his political career opposing precisely this kind of military adventurism, and he told colleagues that a regime-change war with Iran would be a disaster.在特朗普的核心圈子里，万斯是为阻止战争做得最多的人。他的政治生涯正是建立在反对此类军事冒险的基础之上，他告诉同事，对伊朗发动政权更迭战争将是一场灾难。副总统JD·万斯（左）与丹·凯恩在特朗普的国情咨文演讲开始前。副总统是特朗普核心圈子里唯一一位强烈反对发动战争的人。In front of the president and his other advisers, Mr. Vance warned that the conflict could cause regional chaos and untold casualties, break apart the president’s political coalition, and be seen as a betrayal by voters who had supported the promise of no new wars. He stressed the depletion of U.S. munitions and the risk of outsized and unpredictable retaliation given that the regime’s survival was at stake. He also warned about the Strait of Hormuz and the likelihood of soaring gasoline prices.在总统和其他顾问面前，万斯警告说，这场冲突可能导致地区混乱和大量伤亡，撕裂总统的政治联盟，并被那些支持“不打新战争”承诺的选民视为背叛。他强调了美国弹药储备的消耗，以及由于关乎政权存废，伊朗可能进行超大规模且不可预测的报复。他还警告了霍尔木兹海峡的问题，以及汽油价格可能暴涨的可能性。His preference was for no strikes at all. But knowing Mr. Trump was likely to act, Mr. Vance tried to steer him toward more limited options. When that failed, he argued for overwhelming force to end things quickly. At the final meeting on Feb. 26, his message to the president was blunt: You know I think this is a bad idea, but if you want to do it, I’ll support you.他原本倾向于完全不进行打击。但知道特朗普很可能采取行动后，万斯试图引导他选择更有限的选项。当这也失败后，他主张使用压倒性武力迅速结束战争。在2月26日的最后一次会议上，他对总统的表态很直白：“你知道我认为这是个坏主意，但如果你决定要做，我会支持你。”Some Trump advisers had serious private concerns but deferred to the president.一些特朗普顾问私下有严重担忧，但最终还是服从了总统。The positions in the inner circle fell along a spectrum, but with one thing in common: Nobody other than Mr. Vance mounted a forceful argument to change Mr. Trump’s mind.核心圈子里的立场各有不同，但有一个共同点：除了万斯，没有人采取过有力措施试图改变特朗普的决定。Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was the most enthusiastic. We’re going to have to take care of the Iranians eventually, so we might as well do it now, he told the group on Feb. 26, the day before Mr. Trump gave his final order. Mr. Rubio was more ambivalent — his preference was for continued maximum pressure rather than full-scale war — but he did not try to talk the president out of it. Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, worried about the United States being dragged into a conflict in the Middle East on the eve of midterm elections but did not see it as her role to share her concerns about a military decision in a large group setting with the president.国防部长皮特·海格塞斯是最积极的支持者。2月26日，也就是特朗普下达最终命令的前一天，他对团队说：“我们迟早得收拾伊朗人，不如现在就动手。”国务卿鲁比奥则更为矛盾——他更倾向于继续“最大限度施压”，而非全面战争，但他并没有试图说服总统放弃。白宫幕僚长苏西·威尔斯担心美国在中东卷入冲突会影响中期选举，但她认为自己不应该在大型会议上向总统表达对军事决定的担忧。Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had serious concerns about the war and persistently flagged risks: weapons depletion, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the difficulty of predicting Iran’s response. But he was so careful not to take a stand, repeating that it was not his role to tell the president what to do, that he could appear to some to argue all sides simultaneously. Mr. Trump, in turn, would often seem to hear only what he wanted to hear.参谋长联席会议主席丹·凯恩上将对这场战争有严重顾虑，并持续指出各种风险：武器消耗、霍尔木兹海峡可能关闭、难以预测伊朗的反应。但他极为谨慎，从不明确表态，一直强调“告诉总统该做什么不是我的职责”，以至于在一些人看来他似乎同时在支持所有观点。特朗普则往往只听得进自己想听的内容。Trump believed it would be a quick war, like in Venezuela.特朗普相信这将是一场速战速决的战争，就像在委内瑞拉那样。The president’s confidence that a conflict with Iran would be brief and decisive was deep-rooted and largely impervious to contrary evidence. He had been emboldened by Iran’s muted response to his bombing of its nuclear facilities in June and by the spectacular commando raid that had captured the Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his compound on Jan. 3, in which no American lives were lost.总统坚信会和伊朗进行一场短暂而决定性的冲突，这种信心根深蒂固，且几乎不受反面证据影响。伊朗对6月美国轰炸其核设施一事没有激烈的反应，加上1月3日美军特战行动成功从官邸抓获委内瑞拉领导人尼古拉斯·马杜罗且无一名美国人丧生，进一步增强了他的信心。今年1月，委内瑞拉领导人尼古拉斯·马杜罗被押送下直升机，前往曼哈顿的联邦法院。特朗普因那次惊天动地的突击行动成功抓获马杜罗而感到备受鼓舞。When advisers raised the possibility that Iran could shut down the Strait of Hormuz — a choke point for vast quantities of global oil and gas — Mr. Trump dismissed the possibility, assuming the regime would capitulate before it came to that. When told the campaign would significantly deplete American weapons stockpiles, including missile interceptors already strained by years of support for Ukraine and Israel, Mr. Trump appeared to weigh the warning against a more appealing data point: The United States had an essentially unlimited supply of cheap, precision-guided bombs.当顾问们提出伊朗可能关闭霍尔木兹海峡——这一全球大量石油和天然气运输的咽喉要道——的可能性时，特朗普表达了不屑，认为伊朗政权会在事态发展到那一步之前就屈服。当被告知这场行动将大幅消耗美国武器库存，包括因长期支持乌克兰和以色列而已经捉襟见肘的导弹拦截系统时，特朗普似乎把这一警告与一个更吸引他的数据点进行了权衡：美国拥有几乎取之不竭的廉价精确制导炸弹。When the anti-interventionist commentator Tucker Carlson privately asked Mr. Trump how he could be so sure everything would be OK, the president replied, “Because it always is.”当反干预主义评论人士塔克·卡尔森私下问特朗普为何如此确信一切都会顺利时，总统回答：“因为一直都是这样。”For Trump, it was a gut-driven decision enabled by an echo chamber that did not exist in his first term.对特朗普来说，这是一个直觉驱使下的决定，而他身边已形成了一个在他第一任期并不存在的回音室。Mr. Trump’s decision to take the country to war was not driven by intelligence assessments or a strategic consensus among his advisers, which did not exist. It was driven by instinct — the same instinct his team had watched produce improbable results again and again.特朗普决定让国家走向战争并非基于情报评估或顾问团队的战略共识——这样的共识并不存在。它是由直觉驱动的——他的团队一次又一次见证这种直觉带来了原本不可想象的结果。Unlike his first-term team, many of whom regarded him as a danger to be managed or obstructed, Mr. Trump in his second term is surrounded by advisers who view him as a great man of history. After his improbable comeback in 2024, after indictments and assassination attempts, and after ordering the flawless operation that captured Mr. Maduro in Venezuela, the people around Mr. Trump had developed an almost superstitious faith in his destiny and instincts, and in his power to will new realities into existence. In making this high-stakes and high-risk decision, almost everyone deferred to the president’s gut.与第一任期团队不同，当时许多人认为他是个需要被管控或阻挠的危险人物，特朗普在第二任期身边围绕的顾问们视他为历史伟人。在2024年不可思议的东山再起之后，在经历多次起诉和暗杀未遂之后，在下令成功实施抓捕马杜罗的完美行动之后，特朗普身边的人对他命运、直觉以及他让现实屈服于自己意志的能力产生了近乎迷信的信仰。在这个高风险、高赌注的决定中，几乎所有人都服从了总统的直觉。Surrounded by people trying to execute on Mr. Trump’s desires, and with so much having gone his way to that point, almost nothing stood between the instinct and the act.身边都是努力执行特朗普意愿的人，而此前一切又都如此顺遂，几乎没有任何东西能阻挡他的直觉转化为行动。特朗普在2月28日对伊朗发起军事行动后，于3月1日返回白宫。Maggie Haberman是《纽约时报》白宫记者，报道特朗普总统。Jonathan Swan是《纽约时报》白宫记者，报道特朗普总统。翻译：经雷点击查看本文英文版。