Violence flared out in Manipur again on Tuesday (April 7) after two children — a four-year-old boy and his newborn sister — were killed when a rocket-like projectile struck their home in a Bishnupur district village. This sparked protests, in which two civilians were killed, officials said.Manipur burns not with the sudden blaze of a single match, but with the slow, inexorable combustion of history, land, identity, and power. For nearly three years, from May 2023 onwards, this state of 3.2 million people has been convulsed by ethnic violence between the dominant Meitei community in the Imphal Valley and the Kuki-Zo tribes in the surrounding hills. More than 260 lives have been lost, while over 60,000 people have been displaced into segregated relief camps.To understand why Manipur is burning, one must trace the fault lines back through centuries, then examine the precise trigger of 2023, and the fragile shape of whatever “peace” has emerged by March 2026. Only then can we glimpse the way ahead.A kingdom divided by valley and hillOnce an independent princely kingdom (Kangleipak), Manipur fell to Burmese invasion in the 18th century, then to British protectorate status after 1891. The colonial administration’s divide-and-rule strategy institutionalised the valley-hill binary: Meiteis (Tibeto-Burman Hindus and Sanamahis, ~53% of population) in the fertile Imphal plains; Nagas and Kukis (Christian hill tribes) in the mountainous regions that make up around 90% of the state’s land area.The 1949 annexation of Manipur remains historically fraught; some groups claim the merger agreement was allegedly signed under duress by Maharaja Bodhachandra Singh without the consent of the Legislative Assembly.Then came the land laws. The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, prohibits non-tribals (primarily Meiteis) from buying land in the hills, where Scheduled Tribe (ST) status grants protective quotas in jobs, education, and political representation.Meiteis, classified as Other Backward Classes (OBC) in the valley, felt squeezed: their population grew, valley land fragmented, while hill tribes held vast reserved forests. A complex web of ethno-nationalist insurgencies subsequently emerged: the United National Liberation Front and the People’s Liberation Army in Manipur demanding Meitei sovereignty, National Socialist Council of Nagaland factions pursuing a unified Naga homeland, and Kuki militants campaigning for an autonomous “Kukiland”.Story continues below this adAlso read | In Manipur, a ‘popular’ government is back. But questions remainDecades of instability were punctuated by alleged extrajudicial executions under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1980–2004) and devastating Naga-Kuki internecine violence in the 1990s. This historical trauma was further exacerbated in the 2010s by converging geopolitical pressures: an influx of Chin-Kuki refugees fleeing Myanmar’s civil strife, demographic anxieties over undocumented immigration, and the proliferation of highland poppy cultivation tied to the ‘Golden Triangle’ narcotics trade network.The Meitei demand for ST status, voiced since 2012 by groups like the Scheduled Tribe Demand Committee Manipur (STDCM), was the ideological timber. It promised hill-land access and quotas. Tribals saw existential threat: dilution of their protections, demographic swamping.The build-upNongthombam Biren Singh, a former footballer turned BJP politician from the Meitei community, became Chief Minister in 2017 and secured re-election in 2022 with 32 seats (later bolstered). His government’s aggressive forest eviction drives were accused of being a pretext to target Kuki hamlets suspected of illicit poppy cultivation.March 2023 saw the state withdraw from the 2008 Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with two Kuki militant groups (Kuki National Army, Zomi Revolutionary Army), accusing them of inciting protests. Biren’s rhetoric escalated: Kukis were painted as “illegal immigrants”, “narco-terrorists”, and forest destroyers. Meitei nationalist outfits Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, patronised by the state, amplified this narrative.Story continues below this ad People stage a protest following a bomb attack in Bishnupur on April 7, in Wangkhei area of Imphal, on April 8, 2026. Photo: PTIA Manipur High Court order of April 14, 2023, instructing the state to evaluate Meitei inclusion in the ST roster, proved to be the match that lit the fuse.While the HC directive was annulled after Supreme Court intervention, tribal groups organised large protests, which ran into Meitei counter-blockades.The crisisOn May 3, 2023, there was stone pelting and arson at Torbung-Kangvai on the Churachandpur-Bishnupur border. By evening, Kuki mobs torched Meitei properties in Churachandpur; Meitei mobs retaliated in the valley, burning Kuki settlements, churches (over 250 eventually destroyed), and homes. Within 48 hours, violence engulfed Imphal East, West, Kangpokpi, Kakching, and Tengnoupal. Curfews, shoot-at-sight orders, and an internet blackout followed. Although security forces were deployed en masse, eventually escalating to an overwhelming presence of 126 columns and 62 paramilitary companies, early containment efforts proved sporadic and critically uncoordinated. Weapons vanished from police armouries.The initial phase of the conflict triggered an acute humanitarian crisis, resulting in over 50 deaths and mass displacement by mid-May. The violence proved protracted; by late 2024, state-confirmed fatalities reached 258 with upwards of 60,000 internally displaced persons, though these official figures are widely presumed to be conservative.Story continues below this adAlso read | Ethnic faultlines in Manipur still run deep. Yumnam Khemchand Singh has his task cut outMeiteis evacuated the hills and Kukis fled the valley. This profound geographic segregation gave rise to de facto parallel administrations, wielded by the Arambai Tenggol in the valley and a coalition of Kuki militant networks in the hills.The state government under Biren Singh faced accusations of bias.Uneasy truceAlthough the violence never ceased entirely, with sporadic resurgences throughout 2024 and 2025 resulting in further fatalities, its overall intensity gradually subsided. This deceleration was primarily driven by mutual exhaustion among the warring communities and the precarious buffer zones established by central security forces. Following Biren Singh’s resignation on February 9, 2025, a year-long imposition of President’s Rule established direct federal governance over the state.While this central oversight facilitated rigorous disarmament initiatives and expanded humanitarian relief, it failed to entirely pacify the region, as evidenced by fatal skirmishes across Kangpokpi, Jiribam, and Churachandpur in March 2025. Consequently, a formidable contingent exceeding 250 Central Armed Police Force companies remains stationed to maintain order.Story continues below this adAlso read | Manipur imperative: Peace & political processThe reinstatement of the elected administration in February 2026 marked a pivotal transition, led by the newly appointed Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh.Attempting to bridge ethnic divides, his government formed a coalition cabinet with Kuki and Naga representation and reconvened the Legislative Assembly by March. Early governance initiatives emphasised reconciliation via military-backed integration tours and high-level federal discussions on refugee resettlement.As of March 2026, relief camps still house tens of thousands. Economic life stutters; inter-district transport is tentative.The way forward demands structural reforms:1. Disarmament first: Recover looted weapons, dismantle vigilante and militant parallel structures.Story continues below this ad2. Inclusive dialogue: A credible peace committee excluding tainted figures, including women leaders (who bore disproportionate trauma), civil society from all sides, and neutral facilitators. Address the ST demand transparently, perhaps through a broader review of quotas and land laws that protects hill rights while easing valley pressures.3. Root causes: Accelerate hill development to close the valley-hill gap. Regulate poppy via alternative livelihoods, not punitive evictions. Revive SoO agreements with safeguards.4. Accountability: Complete probes into audio tapes, sexual violence, allegations of police complicity.5. Reconciliation rituals: Truth-and-reconciliation forums, inter-community youth camps, economic packages tied to joint projects.Story continues below this adThe author is an Army officer with field experience in conflict-affected regions of Northeast India.