Post-Pretoria calm conceals a slow strategy of fragmentation and controlSUPPORT ETHIOPIA INSIGHT .wpedon-container .wpedon-select, .wpedon-container .wpedon-input { width: 200px; min-width: 200px; max-width: 200px; } When the Pretoria peace agreement was signed in November 2022, there was widespread hope that the conflict in Tigray had finally ended for good. Many saw it as a turning point after a war that had devastated communities, infrastructure, and everyday life across the region.At the time, there were concrete signs of de-escalation. Within weeks of the deal, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sent senior government officials to Tigray, a move interpreted as an effort to normalize relations.In Mekelle, Debretsion Gebremichael went further, declaring: “The wise leadership Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed demonstrated in the effective implementation of the peace agreement is admirable.”It seemed that both sides were finally ready to leave the war behind.For nearly three years after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, large-scale violence subsided. Airstrikes stopped and the frontlines fell quiet.But the silence proved deceptive. By early 2026, tensions had hardened into confrontation again, even if not yet into full-scale war. Even before this, there were accusations of breaching the agreement when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) decided to hold its 14th Congress against the wishes of the federal government, resulting in its de-registration as a political party.This raises a troubling question: was the Pretoria Agreement a genuine recognition that the war could not be won, or a pause to buy time?One remark from Sebhat Nega, an influential TPLF founder, has taken on new relevance. He was once quoted as saying that TPLF signed the treaty to buy time. Looking at what both sides have done since then, the claim feels less like speculation.Meanwhile, the outside world watches from a distance.In practice, this has meant limited scrutiny and even less sustained pressure. What is unfolding in Tigray barely registers beyond periodic statements, even as warning signs continue to accumulate. The fragile stability we see today risks collapsing into renewed large-scale violence at any moment.And if that happens, it will not remain confined within Ethiopia’s borders. Any future conflict will almost certainly spill into the wider region. Regional actors, notably Eritrea, have already reasserted their involvement.Abiy’s TacticsWhen TPLF decided to hold its party conference against the wishes of the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), Abiy stated publicly that proceeding would mean a return to war.Similar warnings had preceded the outbreak of war in late 2020. In the months that followed, many of his allies echoed his message. Daniel Kibret, Abiy’s socio-economic advisor, was among the most vocal, using social media and national television to criticize the TPLF and Tigray.His rhetoric was dangerous, and he was not alone. A chorus of allies, ministers, and regional officials joined in, turning public discourse into a steady drumbeat of accusations and threats.At the time, some dismissed Abiy’s warnings as political posturing. But when the war came, it brought devastation on a scale that shocked even seasoned observers of Ethiopia’s turbulent politics.So when Abiy repeated similar language in 2024, many held their breath. His words carried the weight of precedent.Yet since his public warning in July 2024, the government appears to have shifted tactics, moving away from overt threats toward a quieter effort to weaken Tigray and erode TPLF’s grip on power. The threats receded.Today, Abiy rarely responds publicly to TPLF provocations. That silence does not signal disengagement. It suggests a more deliberate effort behind the scenes, one that operates through administrative, economic, and political pressure.This strategy may prove more consequential than open confrontation, as the following sections will show.Internal DivisionAbiy has achieved what he could not through direct confrontation with TPLF. The once formidable coalition of Tigrayan resistance has weakened significantly, partly due to TPLF missteps, and partly the result of the quiet, sustained strategy pursued by the federal government.The Pretoria agreement clearly stipulated power-sharing between the two sides and the formation of an inclusive administration in Tigray. Yet, whether by design or circumstance, the federal government chose to stay out of Tigray’s internal politics, allowing TPLF to dominate the post-war landscape.What appeared to be a concession proved, in effect, a trap.Rather than using the opening to rebuild a war-ravaged region, TPLF leaders became consumed by internal disputes. It took months to agree on an interim leader in 2023, and even then the leadership split into rival factions.The last two years of Getachew Reda’s tenure were marked by persistent infighting—accusations and counter-accusations among competing factions—until he was ultimately forced to flee Tigray.His departure was a major blow. Getachew had been the party’s public face, and its most articulate defender.The fragmentation did not stop there. Senior Tigrayan generals, including Tsadkan Gebretinsae, and more recently General Guesh Gebre and his associates, have left Tigray for Addis Ababa.Public support for TPLF has also eroded sharply. War fatigue, unfulfilled promises, and prolonged internal feuds have alienated many Tigrayans from a party that once commanded near-universal loyalty.Abiy, meanwhile, has offered refuge to TPLF faction leaders and generals. No number of airstrikes or ground offensives could have fractured TPLF as effectively as its own internal collapse. He has, in large part, watched from a distance as his principal rival destroyed itself.This is the advantage he appears to have cultivated, one built without spectacle or battlefield heroics. It relies instead on patience, restraint, and the steady erosion of a once-cohesive adversary.Leadership ShiftTadesse Werede, the current interim president of Tigray, played a central role in the collapse of Getachew’s presidency. Recently, Getachew himself offered a detailed public account.According to him, the erosion was gradual, driven by repeated interference that steadily stripped his office of authority. Tadesse, he claims, played a decisive role in weakening the presidency over time, until it was effectively powerless. In the end, Getachew was forced out of Tigray by the region’s military leadership.Tadesse was not an outsider or neutral figure. As head of the armed forces in Tigray, he controlled the decisive security apparatus. Yet he was also the figure who, from within, helped dismantle the political leadership he was meant to uphold.Abiy, seeing an opening, appears to have viewed Tadesse as a suitable intermediary. He was appointed interim president for one year, a term originally set to expire on 8 April, now quietly extended by another year.The figure who helped bring down Getachew is now entrusted with overseeing Tigray’s fragile political order. Meanwhile, the Tigrayan public watches as leadership disputes persist and uncertainty stretches on.After Getachew fled, Abiy called for Tigrayans to nominate a leader through a virtual process. Predictably, TPLF opposed the idea. Rather than push the initiative, Abiy allowed Tadesse, then TPLF’s preferred figure, to assume leadership for a year.At the time, this was widely seen as a setback for Abiy and a short-term win for TPLF. Subsequent developments suggest the decision may have served a longer-term federal objective: deepening divisions within both the party and the Tigrayan military structure.Over time, signs emerged that TPLF leaders had begun to view Tadesse as a growing threat to their own power base. This concern surfaced in increasingly direct criticism from aligned media outlets.In early April, Zara Media, a staunch TPLF supporter, reported that Tadesse had been informed by the party leadership that his term would end on 8 April. At the same time, some local administrations in Tigray’s Central Zone went further, declaring the Pretoria framework effectively void and calling for a return to the pre-2020 political order, an indication of how fragile the post-war arrangement had become.Abiy, for his part, remained silent. He did not need to defend Tadesse. TPLF’s internal reactions were already exposing its insecurities.Against this backdrop, he moved quietly to extend Tadesse’s interim presidency by another year, despite clear opposition from the TPLF, formalized in its 9 April statement. That opposition escalated on 19 April, when the party called for “the restoration of Tigray’s elected regional parliament, suspended during the conflict.”Tadesse, for his part, has refused to relinquish power. The coming days and weeks will show how events unfold in Tigray.For many Tigrayans, the extension signals continued hardship and prolonged uncertainty. For TPLF, it presents a sharper dilemma: attempt to remove Tadesse by force, as they did with Getachew, or accept and work with a leader they openly distrust. Their recent posture suggests the latter is increasingly unlikely.The extension points to a broader conclusion: Tadesse is operating, at least in effect, within a framework that aligns with federal interests.The result is a gradual unravelling, driven by administrative drift, political paralysis, and the steady weakening of any unified opposition.Tadesse may see himself as preserving stability. In practice, he is holding Tigray in a state that serves a different purpose: divided, fatigued, and unable to cohere into a single political force.Silent SiegeThe 2020-2023 siege on Tigray drew intense international scrutiny. Western governments threatened sanctions, and the United Nations convened emergency sessions. For a time, Abiy was firmly under the spotlight.Since then, the federal government appears to have adjusted its approach.After Pretoria, it moved cautiously. To ease external pressure, key services—banking, telecommunications, and air transport—were gradually restored. These steps were framed as normalization. A world eager to believe the war was over largely accepted the signal and moved on.But pressure has quietly returned. For more than a year, little fuel has been sent to Tigray. Banks remain open in name, but lack cash. Transport—by air and road—is technically available, yet priced beyond the reach of most. A plane ticket now costs what a family once lived on for months.Regional civil servants are paid irregularly. In many areas, schools remain closed because teachers have gone months without salaries. The education system has, in effect, stalled.Many residents have already left Tigray, fearing a renewed war. Some depart in waves; others leave quietly, one family at a time, heading to Addis Ababa and elsewhere.Cities are thinning out. Businesses are shutting down. Conditions continue to deteriorate, yet international attention remains limited.Though the situation now resembles—and in some respects exceeds—the earlier siege, it has not drawn comparable scrutiny. Pressure is no longer declared. It is applied incrementally, without the visibility that once triggered global reaction.Arming OpponentsWhen TPLF expelled Getachew and other senior military figures, the federal government moved quickly.What began as temporary refuge has evolved into support for splintered factions. There are indications of weapons, logistical assistance, and access to bases in the Afar region, suggesting a more transactional relationship.TPLF bears clear responsibility for the internal fractures that have weakened what was once a cohesive front. Leaders were sidelined. Reconstruction took a back seat to infighting.For Abiy, however, these divisions present an opportunity. Those seeking federal support risk becoming instruments, useful for a time, then expendable.Gedu Andargachew, a former national security advisor, recently stated in an interview that Abiy repeatedly expressed a desire to see Tigray weakened. Whether taken as insight or interpretation, the claim aligns with current dynamics.Support for dissident armed groups cannot be separated from a broader pattern: pressure applied not through direct confrontation, but through fragmentation.For those receiving support, the choice is not simple. Many were pushed out by the very structures they once served. In that context, armed self-preservation may appear less like betrayal than necessity.The longer-term risk is different: replacing one dependency with another.Party FragmentationSince the Pretoria agreement, the NEBE has registered more than a dozen new political parties in Tigray.Some are led by former TPLF figures, including Getachew Reda’s Tigray Democratic Solidarity (Simret). Others, such as Tinsae Seba Enderta Party, have no prior ties to TPLF.On the surface, this suggests an opening of political space.In reality, it is unfolding in a region still recovering from war and operating under severe constraints.In that context, the rapid expansion of parties points to a different effect: the diffusion of political cohesion. The result mirrors familiar divide-and-rule dynamics, fragmenting constituencies, dispersing leadership, and weakening the possibility of unified opposition.The proliferation of parties also reflects a deeper erosion of trust among Tigray’s political elite. Representation is increasingly contested. Public confidence continues to thin.What emerges is not pluralism in the conventional sense, but fragmentation, an environment in which influence can be managed without overt force.Controlled UnravelingSince the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, Abiy has secured outcomes through quiet, calculated maneuvering, outcomes that likely exceed what renewed war could have delivered.In the post-agreement period, he has moved deliberately to reshape political and security dynamics in ways that advance his strategic interests while avoiding the scrutiny that open conflict would invite.Tigray, meanwhile, remains deeply divided. Political fragmentation, competing narratives, and unresolved grievances continue to undermine any cohesive response.The result is a region weakened from within at a moment when unified leadership is most needed. .wpedon-container .wpedon-select, .wpedon-container .wpedon-input { width: 200px; min-width: 200px; max-width: 200px; } Query or correction? Email us window.addEventListener("sfsi_functions_loaded", function(){if (typeof sfsi_widget_set == "function") {sfsi_widget_set();}}); While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.Main photo: Tadesse Werede meets Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Getachew Reda in Addis Ababa to present a performance report ahead of the extension of his interim term. 7 April 2026. Source: Fana TelevisionPublished under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.The post Abiy Is Quietly Dismantling Tigray appeared first on Ethiopia Insight.