DANIEL BYMAN, SETH G. JONES2026年4月20日As the United States’ and Israel’s war with Iran grinds to an uncertain conclusion, observers have been quick to label it a win for China. The war has damaged American prestige around the world and angered countries and their populations whose economies face inflation and disrupted supply chains. But a closer look at Iran’s methods in resisting the United States reveals uncomfortable lessons for China as it weighs whether to follow through on its threats to take Taiwan.随着美国和以色列与伊朗的战争缓慢走向不确定的结局，观察人士迅速将其称为中国的胜利。这场战争损害了美国在全球的威望，并激怒了许多国家及其民众，因为他们的经济面临通胀和供应链中断。但仔细观察伊朗抵抗美国的方式，却给中国带来了令人不安的教训——当中国考虑是否兑现武力夺取台湾的威胁时，必须认真思考这些教训。Iran prevented the far more powerful United States from winning a war that, on paper, it should have walked away with. Iran weathered decapitation strikes and continued to counterattack, despite heavy bombing and inferior weapons. Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is particularly instructive. Its navy had only dilapidated surface ships, a small number of diesel-powered submarines and numerous small, fast-attack speedboats. Iran’s air force had no advanced attack aircraft and no true bombers.伊朗成功阻止了实力远胜于己的美国赢得一场在纸面上本应轻松取胜的战争。伊朗经受住了斩首式打击，尽管遭受猛烈轰炸且武器装备处于劣势，仍持续进行反击。伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡的能力尤其具有启发性。伊朗海军只有老旧的水面舰艇、少量柴油动力潜艇和大量小型快速攻击艇；空军既没有先进的攻击机，也没有真正的轰炸机。What Iran did have, however, was a large stockpile of drones and missiles — including anti-ship cruise missiles — capable of striking vessels in the strait and hitting military and commercial targets across the Middle East. Iran also decentralized its command and control network and dispersed and concealed its weapons in multiple locations to make it difficult for the United States and Israel to find and destroy all of them.但伊朗拥有大量无人机和导弹库存——包括反舰巡航导弹——这些武器足以打击海峡中的船只，并攻击中东地区的军事和商业目标。伊朗还将其指挥控制网络分散化，并将武器分散隐藏在多个地点，使美国和以色列难以全部发现和摧毁。China’s military is less lethal than that of the United States and hasn’t engaged in major combat operations in nearly a half-century, but it also has advantages over Taiwan. Its navy has the most ships of any in the world, including advanced aircraft carriers, destroyers, guided-missile corvettes and nuclear-powered submarines. It has an arsenal of attack aircraft, bombers and drones, as well as ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles.中国军队的杀伤力不如美国，而且近半个世纪没有参与过大规模作战行动，但它对台湾拥有明显优势。中国海军拥有世界上最多的舰艇，包括先进的航空母舰、驱逐舰、导弹护卫舰和核动力潜艇。它还拥有大量攻击机、轰炸机、无人机以及弹道导弹、巡航导弹和高超音速导弹。Taiwan has significant capabilities, too, such as anti-ship cruise missiles and drones, that can create what the U.S. Indo-Pacific commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, calls a “hellscape” for China — a lethal 50-mile “kill zone” in the Taiwan Strait. It has built up its sea and air defenses, extended conscription and otherwise responded to China’s tremendous military growth. It plans to do more. The Trump administration has assembled a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan that is likely to include drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, uncrewed underwater vehicles, air defense systems, high-mobility artillery rocket systems, mines and other systems.台湾同样具备相当强的能力，例如反舰巡航导弹和无人机，能够在中国军队面前制造美国印太司令部司令塞缪尔·帕帕罗上将所说的“地狱景观”——台湾海峡内一条致命的50英里“杀伤区”。台湾已加强海上和空中防御，延长兵役，并针对中国庞大的军事扩张采取了其他应对措施。它还计划进一步加强。特朗普政府已为台湾准备了140亿美元的军援方案，很可能包括无人机、反舰巡航导弹、无人潜航器、防空系统、高机动性火箭炮系统、水雷及其他装备。These hoped-for weapons are critical because they could help Taiwan defend itself against China. They can help repel an invasion force by destroying part of it before it leaves China’s ports, sinking ships as they transit the strait and hitting forces as they try to land. The U.S. LUCAS system, a reverse-engineered copy of Iran’s cheap Shahed drone, is an example of a “good enough” system that, when used in large quantities, can threaten amphibious forces and targets on the Chinese mainland.这些期待中的武器至关重要，因为它们能够帮助台湾抵御中国的进攻。它们可以在中国军队离开港口前就摧毁部分入侵力量，在其穿越海峡时击沉舰船，并打击登陆的部队。美国开发的LUCAS系统（通过对伊朗廉价的见证者-136“沙赫德”无人机的逆向工程仿制而成）就是一个“够用就好”的例子，当大规模使用时，能够威胁两栖部队和中国大陆的目标。Survival requires more than hardware. Iran weathered repeated strikes against its political and military leaders by quickly replacing them and by decentralizing military command and control. It maximized deception and concealment, stored weapons in underground bunkers to increase survivability and relied on mobile systems that could be quickly rolled out, launched and rolled back into bunkers.生存需要的不仅仅是硬件。伊朗通过快速替换被打击的政治和军事领导人，并将军事指挥控制网络分散化，从而经受住了针对领导层的多次打击。它最大限度地运用欺骗和隐蔽手段，将武器储存在地下掩体中以提高生存能力，并依赖机动系统——这些系统可以迅速推出、发射，然后撤回掩体。Taiwan needs to prepare similar moves to survive the potential disruption of its command networks and to be ready to fight in the face of decapitation strikes, space and counterspace attacks and offensive cyberoperations. Doing this will require plans for succession, decentralized command and control, deception and survivability.台湾需要做好类似准备，以应对指挥网络可能遭受的破坏，并在面对斩首打击、太空与反太空攻击以及进攻性网络作战时仍能继续战斗。要做到这一点，就需要制定接班计划、分散式指挥控制、欺骗措施以及提升生存能力的方案。The Iran war highlighted the lesson that air power alone cannot win wars. To avoid casualties or getting dragged into a protracted conflict, America relied on air power against Iran. While China is probably willing to take more casualties in a Taiwan conflict, the Iran war is a reminder that China would most likely have to deploy ground troops and risk heavy losses to seize Taiwan.伊朗战争凸显了一个教训：仅靠空中力量无法赢得战争。为了避免伤亡或陷入旷日持久的冲突，美国主要依赖空中力量打击伊朗。虽然中国在台湾冲突中可能愿意承受更多伤亡，但伊朗战争提醒人们，中国要想夺取台湾，最可能仍需投入地面部队，并面临惨重损失的风险。The Iran war may yet turn out to be a geopolitical windfall for Beijing, but it also serves as a warning — and an opportunity — for Washington and Taipei. Iran’s ability to frustrate a superior military underscores that determined defenders, armed with the right mix of asymmetric capabilities and resilient command structures, can deny even the most powerful adversaries a quick or decisive victory.伊朗战争最终可能成为北京的地缘政治意外收获，但它同时也对华盛顿和台北构成了警告——以及一次机会。伊朗挫败优势军事力量的能力表明：如果拥有正确搭配的非对称能力和富有韧性的指挥结构，即使面对最强大的对手，意志坚定的防御者也能使其无法获得快速或决定性的胜利。If the United States and its allies internalize these lessons — prioritizing quantity over exquisite high-tech systems, investing in survivable and decentralized defenses and encouraging dispersal, concealment and mobility — they can help Taiwan transform itself into a far more formidable obstacle to Chinese aggression. That may be enough to deter a Chinese attack from occurring in the first place.如果美国及其盟友真正吸取这些教训——优先发展数量而非精致的高科技系统、投资具有生存能力和分散化的防御体系，并鼓励分散、隐蔽和机动性——它们就能帮助台湾将自己转变为中国侵略的更强大障碍。这或许足以从一开始就威慑中国，使其不敢发动攻击。Daniel Byman是战略与国际研究中心战争、非常规威胁和恐怖主义项目的负责人，也是乔治城大学的教授。Seth G. Jones是该中心国防与安全部门总裁，也是《美国优势：军事科技纽带与大国主导地位的根源》一书的作者。翻译：纽约时报中文网点击查看本文英文版。