The few times I have flown into Kabul, the descent offered an intriguing view — the sprawling expanse of Bagram airbase, lying just off the flight path, massive runways and a concrete sprawl ringed by mountains. Bagram radiated an aura of strategic purpose, a reminder that Afghanistan, for all its rugged isolation, was coveted by empires.Now, four years after the last helicopter lifted off in 2021, there are reports of the US eyeing a return to Bagram. It is an idea laced with irony — Washington, having left Afghanistan in haste and humiliation, now seeks to reinsert itself, possibly through an understanding with the Taliban it once fought. The logic, though, is cold and strategic: Afghanistan is too central, too exposed, and too unpredictable to be left unobserved.AdvertisementFor two decades, Bagram was the epicentre of America’s military and intelligence footprint in the region. It served as a logistics hub, a drone base, a detention centre, and the forward edge of US power projection into South and Central Asia. From there, Washington could monitor not just Afghan insurgents but also Iranian movements, Chinese activity in Xinjiang, and Pakistan’s volatile tribal belt. The geography is unforgiving, yet that very ruggedness grants it strategic reach to the Pamir Knot, where Central and South Asia, China, and Russia converge.The Americans may not seek a full-scale reoccupation. Their intent could be subtler — limited access, shared intelligence operations, or covert logistics to monitor jihadi activity and broader geopolitical shifts. Afghanistan’s mineral-rich terrain, valued in trillions, adds an economic undercurrent to the interest. Rare earths, copper, lithium, and cobalt — resources critical to the global green transition — lie buried under Afghan soil, and the Chinese are already showing keen interest in mining rights. The US, having ceded the field once, may not want to stay out of the new scramble.Then comes the counterterrorism dimension. The withdrawal of Western forces has allowed groups like ISIS-K and remnants of al-Qaeda to resurface. For Washington, the nightmare scenario is Afghanistan once again becoming a launchpad for global jihad. A small, deniable presence at Bagram, possibly in coordination with elements of the Taliban regime, would give the US early warning capability without direct re-entry into Afghan politics.AdvertisementCooperation with the Taliban is paradoxical. The US sustains Afghanistan through aid and limited engagement but withholds recognition. The Taliban seeks legitimacy and funds, inviting a transactional deal — access and intelligence for economic relief. Yet, this risks internal rifts between pragmatists and hardliners.Beyond Kabul’s hills, the tremors of a US return would be felt across the region. Each of Afghanistan’s neighbours reads Bagram’s revival as a potential threat to its own strategic space. China views any American foothold in Afghanistan as an intrusion into what it sees as its western security perimeter. Bagram’s proximity to Xinjiang and to key arteries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) makes Beijing deeply uneasy. The base would sit alongside routes linking Central Asia to Pakistan and Iran — precisely where China seeks economic dominance.Iran shares that discomfort with China. From its perspective, US surveillance aircraft operating from Bagram could easily monitor its eastern frontiers and even reach into sensitive military zones near Mashhad. Tehran’s cooperation with the Taliban, quietly nurtured after 2021, is partly motivated by the desire to prevent any American re-entry into Afghanistan.Pakistan, too, feels the heat. Though ties with Washington have improved since 2022 over intelligence needs, Islamabad would resist a permanent US base at Bagram — it erodes its leverage over Kabul. Direct US presence weakens Pakistan’s military influence and clashes with strong anti-American sentiment at home.The Central Asian states — Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — are cautious. They remember the turbulence that foreign military bases brought during the early 2000s. With Moscow and Beijing asserting dominance through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, any American re-entry into their southern flank risks reigniting big-power rivalries across their borders.For India, the calculus is complex. New Delhi once viewed the US presence in Afghanistan as a strategic buffer that kept Pakistan and extremist groups in check while offering a counterweight to Chinese expansion. A US return under Taliban patronage alters that equation. It risks creating a triangular dynamic — Washington and Islamabad finding renewed utility in each other, while India is left to navigate a reduced footprint. For New Delhi, the challenge now is to remain engaged with Afghanistan through development, education, and connectivity — projecting influence without dependence on any Western power.The unease among all these players stems from a shared realisation — any external power’s presence in Afghanistan alters the equilibrium of the region. The last time this lesson was ignored, it led to four decades of turmoil — from the Soviet invasion of 1979, aimed at reaching the Indian Ocean, to the American campaign that followed. Every power that has sought permanence in Afghanistan has eventually been forced to retreat.most readYet, the temptation remains. For the US, Bagram offers a vantage point over a shifting world — from Iran’s assertiveness to China’s western outreach, from Russia’s resurgence to the evolving jihadist threat. For Washington’s strategists, it is an anchor in the New Great Game, where geography, technology, and ideology intersect once again. But the lesson of history is clear: Afghanistan grants access, not allegiance. The Americans may believe that a light footprint, far from combat, will help them stay without being trapped. That, too, is what the Soviets once thought as they moved into the same mountains — only to learn that proximity to the Indian Ocean came at a price too heavy to sustain.If the US does return to Bagram, it will not be to fight another war. It will be to watch, to listen, and to hedge — ensuring that, in this restless heart of Asia, no one else wins the peace.The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps and member of NDMA. Views are personal